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Far right parties attract opposition; that is to say, civil society groups, not formally connected 
with other political parties, that have as their sole or principal aim achieving a reduction in the 
number of people who support, and particularly vote for, far right parties. 
What is the effect of this opposition on far right parties? 
While the far right is a frequent research topic, what effect different kinds of opposition have on 
different kinds of far right party is understudied. Using the United Kingdom as a case study, this 
thesis researches how fascist and populist radical right parties are affected by confrontational and 
community-building styles of opposition. These are, respectively, the British National Party (BNP), 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Unite Against Fascism (UAF), and Hope not Hate. 
A mixed methods approach is adopted; the first step is quantitative analysis, and the second is an 
in-depth analysis of the particular case of Barking and Dagenham from 2006 to 2010, with 
particular reference to the BNP and allowance made for UKIP. 
More specifically, this thesis uses regression analysis on a new data set of activity by opposition 
groups, with local electoral, socio-economic, and demographic information to understand what 
effects opposition groups have. This is supported by historical and newspaper analysis and elite 
interviews to understand the nature of the opposition groups and why they campaign in the 
manners they do, using the particular experiences of Barking and Dagenham to explain where 
and why effects manifest. 
The principal results are that opposition of the forms studied does not, in general, have 
substantive effects. To the extent that there are effects, they are under specific circumstances. 
Opposition group activity has more effect on UKIP than BNP. Consistent activity over a period of 
time can reduce voting for far right parties, but short bursts of activity can paradoxically 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Admit me Chorus to this history; 
Who prologue-like your humble patience pray, 
Gently to hear, kindly to judge, our play. 
- The Chorus, Henry V, William Shakespeare 
 
On Saturday, 17th April 2010, around five hundred people, including the author, gathered in a 
warehouse that had been converted into offices in a run-down part of East London. They would 
spend the day delivering newspapers, specially produced for the occasion, to prevent a far right 
party from gaining more seats in that municipality’s administration. 
Did it matter? 
The day of action described above was organized by Hope Not Hate, and took place in Dagenham, 
shortly before the 2010 local elections. In 2006, after a slow build up, the British National Party 
(BNP) had had an electoral breakthrough, becoming the official opposition at the London 
Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council. The aim of the day was clear; to stop the BNP.  
The campaigners were clear that they had made a difference. Hope Not Hate would release a book 
subtitled ‘the story of the campaign that helped defeat the BNP’ (Lowles 2014). Another group, 
Unite Against Fascism, would claim that, ‘[s]uccessful campaigning by UAF ... dealt the BNP heavy 
electoral blows’ (Unite Against Fascism 2003).  
What is not clear, and not studied, is what actual effect it had on votes for the British National 
Party. 
The day of action was not a one-off; not in its location, not in the organisation behind it, not in its 
tactics. Rather, it was part of a concerted effort, ongoing to this day, to prevent, as far as possible, 
far right parties from gaining seats in the House of Commons, the European Parliament, and local 
government by civil society organisations employing different strategies to achieve their aims. 
The rise, or re-rise, of the far right is a frequent topic of discussion in both lay and academic 
circles in the UK, the EU, and beyond (see, for instance, Grierson 2019 and Foster 2016 for the 
former, Trilling 2012, Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018 
for the latter). These have variously addressed electoral success (Golder 2003), leadership 
(Veugelers 1999), internal organisation (Ellinas and Lamprianou 2019), social and economic 
drivers (Mudde 2007), and a host of other factors. However, relatively few have examined 
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responses to the far right, and still fewer have looked at civil society responses to the far right in 
the electoral arena. 
The far right is controversial; there is no universal agreement on what the far right even is, let 
alone what causes it, what its effects are, or what it means. Among the many reactions it has 
provoked, it has produced opposition (see Renton 2000 and 2006, Copsey 2000 and 2004, Mudde 
2007). That is to say, it has caused other political and social players to take actions with the 
specific intent of worsening the position of far right parties, not simply because they are political 
opponents but because they are held to represent a politics and a philosophy that is in and of 
itself morally unacceptable. 
This opposition takes different forms - mainstream political parties engaging (or not) with such 
parties in different ways, up to a cordon sanitaire; indirect state action, such as electoral 
thresholds systems; direct state actions, such as outright bans and legal proceedings (Akkerman 
and Rooduijn 2015). Much of this is captured in the recent literature on political opportunity 
structures and the far right (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). 
A potentially significant part of the picture that is understudied, however, is the effect of direct 
opposition from civil society groups. There is a range of such groups across the world, some 
stretching back to the 1980s or before, some much more recent. They range from general anti-
racist groups to investigative magazines, from organisations that gather intelligence on their 
opponents in the shadows to those that organise marches of thousands. This opposition and 
these groups bear study both because their purported effects, if true, are substantial factors in 
the political choices made by citizens and because the effort expended, if misdirected, is, at best, 
a waste and, at worst, counterproductive. 
The potential range of opposition, therefore, is very large. However, much of the opposition to 
far right parties that exists is ancillary to other objectives. An organisation like Show Racism the 
Red Card, which uses professional footballers to promote anti-racism, may have the effect of 
damping support for far right parties, and it may even be pleased at that result, but its objectives 
are not directly the diminution of the far right parties. 
The intent of the present study is to investigate the effects of those organisations whose raison 
d'être are specifically to hinder far right parties at elections - to either stop people voting for 
them, or to have people vote for another party. 
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The far right is a diverse grouping - in terms of geography, in terms of history, in terms of 
ideology, in terms of success. It ranges from Greece’s LAOS1 to the Golden Dawn; from the 
previously regional Lega Nord to the Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore with its fascist roots; 
from the Frente Nacional to Vox. There is a generally accepted divide in the literature within the 
broader far right category or family between, crudely, more extreme and less extreme subtypes. 
It is convenient to label these as fascist and populist radical right, respectively (Golder 2003; 
Mudde 2007). Although there are substantial similarities between these two groups, the 
differences are profound. The fascist parties tend to be longer-established and more extreme 
than the populist radical right. The populist radical right tends to be more acceptable and more 
electorally successful. The differential effects of opposition on the two sub-groups of the far right 
also merit investigation as this can better explain why particular forms of action are effective.  
In order to determine the effects of opposition groups, and particularly different types of 
opposition groups, on far right parties and on different kinds of far right parties at election time, 
certain data are required. These include electoral results, information on the activities of the 
opposition groups themselves, and data on other phenomena that can affect far right parties’ 
performance. 
The United Kingdom presents an excellent testing ground for these questions.  
Firstly, both a fascist party, in the form of the British National Party, and a populist radical right 
party, in the form of the United Kingdom Independence party, are present, contest elections, and 
have candidates returned to office (Mudde 2007; Ford and Goodwin 2014a). 
Secondly, there are a range of elections that can be studied, at the local, national, and European 
level. The socio-economic and demographic data needed and for which allowance must be made 
as existing theory suggests that they materially impact the far right (Golder 2003) is also readily 
available. 
Thirdly, by studying a single country, other factors that could materially affect the electoral 
performance of far right parties, such as geographic situation, national history, political 
situation, and the like, are held constant. 
Finally, there are two different opposition groups, Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism, that 
respectively represent a liberal and a radical tradition of anti-fascism and opposition (Copsey 
 
1 Popular Orthodox Rally. The Greek is Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός, transliterated as Laikós Orthódoxos 
Synagermós, and abbreviated in Greek as ΛΑ.Ο.Σ. and in English as LAOS. 
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2017) to the broader far right, allowing a determination of the effects of different styles of 
activity on the far right. 
The portion of this study that analyses large numbers of election results using quantitative 
measures runs from 2005 to 2015. This time period is chosen as it marks a distinct phase in terms 
of opposition to the far right in Britain. Unite Against Fascism was started in 2003, with Hope not 
Hate beginning the following year. While far right parties had been growing for some time before 
this, it was for the 2005 elections that the opposition groups under study were in full swing. The 
end date is the 2015 general election, following which the protracted Brexit process marked a 
new phase in British politics (Jennings and Lodge 2018). While the quantitative analysis focuses 
on both UKIP and the BNP, the qualitative analysis zooms in on the BNP through the case study of 
the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, over the period from 2006 to 2010, looking at the 
activities of both Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism. This time period represents the four 
years between the 2006 election that saw the British National Party become the largest 
opposition group on the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council and the 2010 election 
that saw them lose all their seats. It is a period of maximum activity that gives the best 
opportunity to see the effects of activity by Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate. This case 
study focusses on the British National Party because of the particular nature of its campaigning 
and concentrated support, where the United Kingdom Independence Party campaigned in a more 
traditional, media-based manner and attracted diffuse support across the UK. 
Structure 
Having set out the case for the study, this introductory chapter moves on to give brief 
backgrounds to both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate; then gives a precis of the research 
design; a summary of the findings follows; and, finally, the importance and contribution of the 
study are presented. 
The thesis then progresses by looking at the available literature, broken down by literature on 
the far right itself, literature on opposition to the far right, and literature on social movements as 
a means of understanding groups that oppose the far right. The third chapter lays out the 
research design for this study, based on an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach, 
which is justified in that chapter. The research design chapter continues by covering the 
variables used in the quantitative analysis and operationalisation thereof, before looking at data 
sources. Finally, it covers both the quantitative and qualitative methods that are used, before 
setting out some expectations for the quantitative analysis. In order to place both the far right 
and opposition to the far right in context and to explain how their modern manifestations 
depend both on their own histories and the interplay between them over time, chapter four sets 
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out a history of fascism and anti-fascism, from its origins through the Second World War, 
through the rise and fall of the National Front and its concomitant opposition, to the emergence 
of the BNP. The fifth chapter discusses the United Kingdom Independence Party, the British 
National Party, Unite Against Fascism, Hope not Hate, and how they each operate and campaign. 
Chapter six presents the results of the quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis then 
guides and is supplemented by the qualitative analysis of a case study, the London Borough of 
Barking and Dagenham from 2006 to 2010, in chapter seven. Finally, the thesis concludes with the 




The core question of this thesis is: what effects, if any, civil society opposition groups have on the 
electoral performance of far right parties in the United Kingdom? In order to approach this 
larger question, three groups of sub-questions are asked: 
What is the nature of the opposition groups?  
 What are their effects? 
 What are the explanations for any effects? 
These begin with asking how the long history of interaction between the far right and groups 
opposed thereto shape the worldviews and understandings of modern-day groups that oppose 
the far right. It further asks as to whether and to what extend the groups opposing the far right 
under study in this thesis can be understood as social movements and, if so, what implications 
this has for how their activities, and particularly for the longevity or otherwise of forms of 
action. It combines the answers from these to give an understanding of they will operate today. 
The next set of questions are as to the effects of the activities of the opposition groups. Do the 
activities of the opposition groups have a measurable impact on the electoral performance of far 
right parties? These questions are answered through statistical analysis of an extensive data set 
of elections and opposition group activity. The impact is not found to be great; at times 
counterproductive; and that particular patterns of activity have particular effects. 
The final questions asked are as to what explains the apparent connection between activity by 
the opposition groups and the diminution of votes for far right parties, taking Barking and 
Dagenham as a case study, and finding that a range of substantial changes in the communications 
strategy of local government in the area, along with other changes, may have actually been the 
drivers of that reduction in vote. 
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Unite Against Fascism 
As the BNP started to pick up council seats in the early 2000s, there was no national campaign 
opposed to the far right; with the decline of the National Front in the 1980s, the various anti-
fascist groups had drifted away. 
The Anti-Nazi League had been relaunched in 1992 with the Millwall by-election (Popple 2003). It 
attempted to continue in the mould of its illustrious predecessor, although it would not catch the 
imagination as its namesake did. In 2003, it became apparent to people on the left of British 
politics that a different approach was needed as the BNP were changing tactics (Unite Against 
Fascism 2018). 
This alternative would be Unite Against Fascism, which brought together the National Assembly 
Against Racism (a successor to the Anti-Racist Alliance of yore), the Anti-Nazi League (close to the 
Socialist Workers Party), the Muslim Council of Britain and other faith groups, the Trades Union 
Congress, and a range of MPs (Socialist Worker 2003; Unite Against Fascism 2018), including three 
Conservative MPs, two of whom - David Cameron and Michael Howard - would go onto be leaders 
of their party, while the third, Sir Teddy Taylor, was a member of the hard-right Monday Club. 
The initial leadership was Weyman Bennett of the SWP and Sabby Dhalu of the National Assembly 
Against Racism (NAAR); members of Rock Against Racism were also involved, as were Unison, the 
Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL), and the Communications Workers Union (CWU) 
(Unite Against Fascism 2018). The National Union of Teachers (NUT), the Public and Commercial 
Services Union (PCS), the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT), and 
Unite would also take part. 
Searchlight - to become Hope not Hate, as discussed below - would be part of the steering group, 
but would leave after disagreements over strategy (Copsey 2011b:133). As it was Hope not Hate 
that left Unite Against Fascism, this is discussed at greater length below. 
It should be noted that Unite Against Fascism did not deal solely with political parties, and was 
particularly concerned with the rise of the English Defence League after 2009 (Copsey 2011:134; 
Unite Against Fascism 2018). This took the form of reverting to physical confrontation, and spilt 
over into its efforts regarding the BNP (Copsey 2011b:138). 
Hope not Hate 
Hope not Hate’s origins lie in Searchlight. Searchlight is discussed at greater length in the history 
chapter, but there were three principal, if overlapping, activities in the latter years of the 
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twentieth century and the first years of the twenty-first; these were education; investigations; 
and publishing the magazine. These were carried out by three separate entities - Searchlight 
Information Services2, Searchlight Educational Trust, and Searchlight Magazine Limited. This 
split is not unusual. There are considerable tax benefits available to charities, but those benefits 
come with equally considerable restrictions on what charities may do, particularly in and around 
politics. However, control of these various organisations would become an issue further down the 
line. 
Searchlight started campaigning as a result of the BNP’s emergence around 2001. The Hope not 
Hate moniker emerged from a t-shirt design in 2003, and then appeared on Searchlight leaflets, 
before becoming the brand for Searchlight campaigning (Lowles 2014:11). Over a period of time, 
Searchlight Information Services would come under the Hope not Hate brand, as would 
Searchlight Educational Trust3. Searchlight Magazine would retain its identity. 
Hope not Hate split from Searchlight during 2011 and 2012. It is well known in anti-fascist and 
left-wing circles that this split, and the split between Nick Lowles (of Hope not Hate) and Gerry 
Gable (of Searchlight), was surrounded by some acrimony (Rosenberg 2018). Precisely what 
caused this conflict is not clear, though a combination of disagreements about strategy, 
leadership, and financing seems probable (Rosenberg 2018). Around 2011 and 2012, the changes 
were completed (Hope not Hate 2014b). The change in the senior management team and 
corporate structures did not, however, affect the style of campaigning under the Hope not Hate 
brand. 
The spark for Searchlight to start campaigning, rather than just investigating and publishing, 
was the series of race riots across the north of England in the summer of 2001. The causes of the 
riots were, of course, complicated. Searchlight, though, would become particularly engaged in 
Oldham, in the outskirts of Manchester. In crude terms, the white and Asian communities in 
Oldham lived effectively separate lives, with little interaction. A series of race hate incidents 
caused a powder-keg of resentment to explode, which the BNP stoked and from which it tried to 
benefit. 
The principal campaigning opposition to the BNP at the time was the Socialist Workers Party-
dominated Anti-Nazi League. Searchlight, however, wanted to campaign for something, rather 
 
2 It has often been pointed out that the initials of Searchlight Information Services are the same as those of 
the Secret Intelligence Service, better known as MI6. 
3 Searchlight Information Services would become Hope not Hate (1986) Ltd in 2012, and would be wound up 
in 2015. Searchlight Educational Trust would become Hope not Hate Educational in 2012 and then Hope not 
Hate Charitable Trust in 2016. A new organisation, Hope not Hate Ltd, would be established in 2012. 
Searchlight Magazine Ltd. would continue as it was (Companies House 2019). 
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than merely against the far right, and to that end started working with a local group, Oldham 
United Against Racism (OUAR). Searchlight used its expertise in research and investigations to 
find the unsavoury pasts of people associated with the BNP there, and then used the local 
connections and branding of OUAR (Lowles 2014:32) to spread the results of those investigations 
in the form of leaflets and a free newspaper. There were also efforts to convince the local press to 
become openly hostile to the BNP on the back of these investigations, where previously it had 
been ambivalent or even acknowledging that they were raising real issues (Lowles 2014:32). This 
was followed up with research in Oldham that suggested that aggressive leaflets that did not 
relate to people’s quotidiarian experience, including of the BNP, simply did not have any effect. 
Moreover, the BNP had changed the way it campaigned. It was no longer a matter of physical 
control of streets (Copsey 2011a:131) and so a new form of opposition work was required. 
Hope not Hate identified a key driver of votes for the far right as being disconnection between 
people and the political process, both locally and nationally (Copsey 2011b:135) and particularly 
where the local Labour Party had effectively taken an area for granted (Cruddas 2018; Hain 2018; 
Hodge 2018). 
In 2013, Hope not Hate initiated a consultation of their members as to how they should engage 
with UKIP after its surge in that year’s council elections (Hope not Hate 2013b). Two-thirds of 
respondents were in favour of taking more action regarding UKIP (Hope not Hate 2013c; Hope not 
Hate nd). The results of this would only come to fruition after the time period of this study, but it 
would represent a ramping-up of specific activity against UKIP. However, as with Unite Against 
Fascism, and in spite of protestations to the contrary, Hope not Hate was carrying out work in 
relationship to UKIP at least as early as 2004 (Hope Not Hate 2013)4.  
Research design 
An explanatory sequential research design is used (Cresswell 2015) using mixed methods is 
employed. This design involves the collection and analysis of quantitative data on the activities of 
the opposition groups, the electoral results of the far right parties, and relevant socioeconomic 
indicators, that are then explained with qualitative data, with the second phase building on the 
results of the first (Ivankova et al 2006). This approach is particularly appropriate given that the 
area is under-studied and lacks data. 
 
4 Regrettably, Hope not Hate have had several revamps of their website, with a lot of information that was 
on it no longer available. 
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Because of the relative paucity of coverage in the literature on opposition to the far right, it is 
necessary to answer a set of questions to understand the phenomena under study before the 
main question of effects can be answered. As set out above, these come under three broad 
headings: 
What is the nature of the opposition groups?  
 What are their effects? 
 What are the explanations for any effects? 
The nature of the opposition groups is taken to include their strategy, their tactics, and their 
activities, but also their background and history, particularly in terms of their lineage and how 
events and debates in the past shape their understanding of the world today and so what they do. 
This is their weltansschauung, including where it comes from, and how it affects their actions in 
the now.  
In order to understand the opposition groups and why they operate in the manner they do, a 
history of the far right and of opposition to the far right is provided, understanding the 
opposition groups as social movements (Tilly 2004). This is supplemented with elite interviews to 
provide a picture of what the philosophical and political underpinnings of the opposition groups 
are and how their own institutional memories shapes how they act today. 
As the opposition groups are specifically seeking to affect the far right parties at the polls, 
quantitative analysis using electoral data lends itself to answering the question of what, if any, 
effects the opposition groups cause. This is done using regression analyses using a new and 
original data set of activity by Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism, based on content 
analysis of around two thousand documents. Local level electoral, socio-economic, demographic, 
and opposition activity data are used to give the finest-grained picture possible. The result is an 
understanding of the effects, such as they are, of activity by the opposition groups - Hope not 
Hate and Unite Against Fascism - on the far right parties - the British National Party and the 
United Kingdom Independence Party.  
Finally, to explain the effects revealed by the quantitative analysis, a comparison of the 
operations of Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism on the British National Party in the 
London Borough of Barking and Dagenham from 2006 to 2010 is conducted. 
Findings 
Opposition groups might be expected to have a substantial impact on the electoral performance 
of the far right, given their history, the amount of their activity, and the claims they make for the 
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effects of their activity. However, this is not the case; the impact of the opposition groups is in 
fact limited. In explaining this puzzle, this thesis makes four principal findings. 
Firstly, the pattern of opposition over time is very important. Consistent activity over a period of 
time tends to hamper both types of far right party, but flashes of intense activity, 
counterintuitively, tends to actually help them. This is a significant result that suggests at least 
some opposition activity is having the opposite effect to that which its instigators desire and 
expect. 
Secondly, different types of far right party respond to opposition activities differently; populist 
radical right parties are more susceptible to the effects of opposition activity than are fascist 
parties, both when being helped and when being hindered. This provides further evidence for the 
distinction within the far right, and leads to an expectation that the parties will behave 
differently. 
Thirdly, the effects of the opposition group activity in toto is relatively limited when compared to 
the impact of social, economic, and demographic drivers of votes for the far right. 
Finally, the nature of the opposition groups and their choice of activities can be effectively 
explained by considering them as social movements and understanding their respective histories. 
Importance and contribution 
The importance of the subject of this thesis lies in its contribution to the broader study of far 
right parties. While the far right is broadly studied, opposition to it is not. Although no moral 
judgment is passed in this thesis, much of the study of the far right, both in academic and 
popular writings, carries a subtext of understanding a pathology in order to combat it. A 
considerable amount of work is expended in opposing far right parties and this thesis could 
shape how that effort might be used to greater effect.  
The study makes a number of theoretical contributions. Firstly, opposition to the far right is 
generally under-researched. This study begins to address that lack of research, and indicates 
avenues for future research. It also addresses contemporary, rather than historical, opposition. 
Specifically, it indicates the importance of meso level effects on the electoral performance of the 
far right, suggests that patterning of activity in opposing the far right is critically important, and 
that the net effect of opposition to the far right from civil society groups is underwhelming. 
Furthermore, it provides a synthesis of anti-fascism based on activity, but seeing radical and 
liberal traditions. It identifies the two opposition groups under study as representative of those 
groups, but also shows how they can be understood as social movements. It plots the histories of 
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the two social movements going back into those traditions. As social movements with long 
histories, their particular dynamics inform how they see the world and how they understand the 
far right and, hence, how they campaign and why certain tactics and strategies persist.  
It also provides a quantitative analysis of the far right, based on a new and substantial dataset of 
activity by groups opposed to the far right, and matching, localised electoral, socio-economic, 
and demographic data, as well as indicating the viability of protest event analysis in this field if 
allowance is made for the patterning of protest events. Based on the new data sets, it provides a 
sharper picture of some of the dynamics affecting far right parties than is afforded by national 
data, which can obscure local trends with national statistics. A contribution is also made to the 
literature on how local factors affect the fortunes of far right parties, including opposition, but 
also the more-commonly studied socio-economic and demographic factors. 
This has a range of implications. Many of the contributions may be applicable to other party 
families that lie outside the mainstream, including the radical left and the green movement. It 
emphasises the importance of local and meso effects, which has implications for studies that 
solely use national data.  
Finally, there are clear, real-world implications as to the efficacy of combating the far right in 
these manners in terms of consistent activity over a longer period of time being at least 
somewhat effective, while flashes of intense activity can have the opposite effect to that which is 
intended in actually helping far right parties. 
This chapter has laid out in brief the rationale for the study as a whole. In the next chapter, the 
scene for the study is set with a review of the literatures on the far right, on opposition to the far 
right, and on social movements. 
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Chapter 2 – The far right and its opposition: a 
review of the literature 
So many books, so little time 
- Frank Zappa 
Introduction 
In 1993, the British National Party (BNP) won their first ever council seat, when Derek Beackon 
was returned at a by-election in the Millwall ward of Tower Hamlets. Despite increasing his total 
vote at the full election the next year, Beackon’s share of the vote fell and he and his two fellow 
candidates lost. In 2008, Richard Barnbrook was elected as an at-large member of the Greater 
London Authority for the BNP, with more than five per cent of the vote; at the next election in 
2012, the vote for the BNP more than halved in both votes and share. At the 2010 general 
election, the British National Party received in excess of half a million votes, reaching almost two 
per cent of ballots cast. Five years later, this had fallen to fewer than two hundred thousand 
votes, representing a share of less than one per cent. 
Nor was this restricted to local government; the BNP went from a vote share of 1.13% in the 
European Parliament elections of 1999 to 6.2% in the same polls ten years later, returning two 
MEPs – Nick Griffin, the party leader, in the North West England European constituency with 
eight per cent of the vote, and Andrew Brons, with almost ten per cent of the vote in the 
Yorkshire and the Humber European constituency. By 2014, they had fallen again to 1.2% of the 
vote and did not even contest the elections in 2019. 
Nor is this a phenomenon restricted to the BNP; the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 
went from five councillors in 2007 to over 200 in 2015, including control of Thanet District 
Council. UKIP also went from one per cent of the share of the vote in the European Parliamentary 
elections of 1994 to a third of Britain’s European delegation in 2014 before losing all its MEPs at 
the 2019 elections. 
The essential question being asked in this thesis is ‘why do some far right parties do better than 
others’? Although the question may be simply put, the answer - or rather, answers - are less 
tractable. As with almost any question in the social sciences, there is no one answer. Rather, a 
there are a set of explanations that, together, give a picture of what circumstances will help and 
hinder far right parties and, more importantly, why they do so. As the phenomenon is so broad, 
with so many variables at play, this thesis looks to one particular sub-question: what is the effect 
of opposition by civil society groups on far right parties? 
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In order to provide a background on the understanding offered by the literature on the various 
phenomena that must be understood to answer this question, this chapter proceeds in three 
parts. Firstly, it looks at the broad debate on the far right and, in particular, on the causes of the 
far right’s success, examining existing explanations and their limitations in addressing the 
present research question and, in particular, identifying two key gaps in the literature - meso-
level explanations and opposition - as well as some of the more problematic areas in what is 
available. Opposition is largely self-explanatory, although this thesis looks specifically at groups 
that have opposition to the far right as their core activity, as set out below. Meso-level 
explanations sit alongside macro- and micro- level explanations. Where macro-level explanations 
deal with gross factors – the unemployment rate, the level of immigration, and so on – that can 
drive votes for the far right and micro level factors deal with more individual, attitudinal factors, 
meso-level explanations are how national-level factors are understood by individuals in 
particular localities, mediated through group membership, local media, and the nature and 
conditions of the area. They are ‘the local contextual determinants of radical right support’ 
(Goodwin 2009:325) and ‘local organizations to which individuals belong, or through which they 
gain knowledge and norms, such as the family, school, or party’ (Eatwell 2000:350). Meso-level 
explanations are the glue that joins micro-level and macro-level explanations. 
This chapter then moves to the literature on opposition to the far right. While it takes on some of 
the theoretical distinctions made, it argues that much of it is either out of date or irrelevant to 
the contemporary far right. Using this section of the literature, it provides a historical account of 
the development of opposition to the far right. Following this, the thesis will look at the 
particular parties and opposition groups, giving a brief overview of their development. 
It will then look at the literature on social movements, applying Tilly’s (2006) conception of 
repertoires of contention and Tarrow’s (2011) idea of cycles of collective action to opposition 
groups, to offer an explanation for how opposition groups develop a set of strategies and then 
cleave to them even when they are outdated. 
Explaining the success of the far right 
Explanations for the success of the far right are as varied as the far right itself. In order to make 
sense of the explanations, this section begins by looking at definitional questions. It then looks at 
drivers for support of the far right, broken down, following a common split in the literature, into 
supply and demand. This split is between the supply factors that are intrinsic to parties 
themselves – the choices they make, for instance – and the demand factors that look at the social 
and economic factors that drive people to vote for far right parties. This split allows similar 
factors to be analysed together to understand the broad processes at work and see commonalities 
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between, for instance, the way different socio-economic conditions affect the vote for the far 
right. This framework, as discussed below, is widely used in the literature to understand drivers 
for far right success. 
It then looks at levels at which the far right may be understood, in terms of individual affect, the 
means by which individuals and groups gain their opinions, and large-scale drivers such as the 
economy.  
What is the far right? 
The question of what exactly makes the far right is a vexed one. Hainsworth (2008:23) describes 
the situation as one of ‘taxonomic ambiguity’; it is, per Roberts (1994:480) very varied and not 
clearly delimited. This section proceeds chronologically through both the development of the far 
right itself and the development of how the literature understands the far right as it changes. In 
short, it is held that, for the decades after the Second World War, ‘far right’ and ‘fascist’ were 
synonyms, but that a new, non-fascist but still definitively far right variant emerged and rose to 
prominence, with much of the ‘old’, fascist far right emulating, either just in form or in form and 
in substance, this new far right. This new far right is best understood, following Mudde (2007) as 
nativist, authoritarian, and populist. 
For much of the post war period, ‘what is the far right?’ was barely a question: ‘[u]ntil the 1980s 
the term extreme right was synonymous with that of neo-fascism’ (Ignazi 2003:1). From the ashes 
of 1945 for almost four decades, the only people who considered themselves or were considered 
on the further reaches of the rightward edge of politics were the likes of Britain’s National Front 
(NF) and, of greater political relevance, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) in Italy (Ignazi 
2003). 
The term far right, then, at one point meant the same as neofascist, but this changed as the new 
far right emerged and the neo-fascist wing became less important. This change, from a 
comfortable match between ‘neofascist’ and ‘extreme right’ has led to a great number of terms 
for the phenomenon. Cas Mudde (2007:11) finds authors using twenty-three different terms, for 
what he calls the populist radical right. This panoply of names, per Mudde, does not represent 
contestation over what the far right is so much as ‘a lack of clear definitions’. 
One of, if not the earliest, attempts to pin down the nature of the far right was Theodor Adorno’s 
‘The Authoritarian Personality’ (Adorno et al. 1980), which, seeking an explanation as to how 
ordinary people could either be driven or convinced to commit the atrocities seen in the Second 
World War, purported to find markers of an authoritarian personality. This work, though 
influential, has been widely criticised for its methodology, not least by Martin (2001). Moreover, 
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it focusses on the individual level, rather than the party; it might or might not explain why 
someone of a given set of persuasions might vote for a far right party, but it does not actually say 
what a far right party is. 
Nor is it sufficient to approach the far right themselves for a definition. As Hainsworth (2008:5) 
points out, the extreme right do not generally call themselves the extreme right, mutatis 
mutandis for radical right and far right. That said, there are instances where parties will take, if 
not the ‘right’ moniker, the name of extreme, as in the case of the French Front National, who 
turned the designation used against them and made it a virtue, branding themselves ‘extremists 
of the middle’ (Backes 2007:246), neither right nor left. 
Backes (2007), through a historical and lexicological investigation, arrives at ‘the antithesis of the 
constitutional state’ (Backes 2007:248) as a definition of extremism that consists of ‘striving for 
‘autocracy’ in the sense of concentration and lack of control of governmental authority. Its entry 
into use at various times in the various European political lexica were at times of political and 
religious ferment (Backes 2007:244); in the modern period, it was originally applied to the left, 
but was ‘extended to the extreme right’ after Mussolini led the March on Rome that was 
precipitated his appointment as Prime Minister by Victor Emmanuel III (Backes 2007:244). Pace 
Dahl’s (1971:5) definition of the state as polyarchic, extremism also aims for monism – a single 
political actor which, even if variegated, manages the affairs of state and (if even considered 
separate) people. This gives a pair of two-fold options for a potential four-fold typology; 
‘democratic anti-constitutionalism’, ‘constitutional anti-democratism’, ‘anti-constitutional anti-
democratism’ and ‘constitutional democracy’ (Backes 2007:251), with the former three opposed 
and antithetical to the latter one. Constitutional democracy, while allowing for substantial 
variation in terms of political and economic outcomes, encompasses mainstream parties that are 
committed both to the existing structures of the state (particularly as regards who counts as a 
member thereof) and the democratic process for choosing and replacing representatives and 
governments that asserts the ‘fundamental equality of human beings’ (Backes 2007:252). 
Democratic anti-constitutionalism covers those ideologies that accept the principle of equality, 
but not the manner in which the state is constructed. Anti-democratic constitutionalism accepts 
the state order, but challenges who is a member of the state (and, implicitly, the nation). Anti-
democratic anti-constitutionalism rejects both the current form of the state and the principle of 
equality. These categories (with the exception of constitutional democracy, which cannot apply 
to the far right) do not necessarily apply solely to the far right; democratic anti-constitutionalism 
could cover some varieties of the far left, as could anti-constitutional democracy, while anti-
constitutional anti-democratism could conceivably contain regimes such as the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
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This simple schema worked well enough for a while;‘[t]he terms ‘fascism’ and ‘Nazism’ and then 
‘neo-fascism’ and ‘neo-Nazism’, were the language of political and historical researchers until the 
1960s’ (Hainsworth 2008:8). All the parties grouped under the label of the far right in this period 
could comfortably be placed in the anti-democratic, anti-constitutional box. The situation now is 
rather different. There are far right parties across Europe - Mudde identified over fifty in 2000 
(2000:185), rising to over seventy in 2007 as new parties were formed (Mudde 2007:305-308), with 
that list excluding parties we would now include, such as the Fremskrittspartiet of Norway. The 
MSI reformed itself into a new party, Alleanza Nazionale in 1995 (Carter 2011), its fellows would 
start gaining substantial political representation, even entering government in Austria in 2000, 
when the Freiheitliche Partei Oesterrichs (FPOe) formed a coalition with the Oesterrichische 
Volkspartei (OeVP). Even in Britain, where the ‘story… has long been one of failure’ (Goodwin 
2011:xiv), the British National Party (BNP) received almost one million votes at the 2009 elections 
to the European Parliament. This remarkable turnaround in the fortunes of the far right is 
explained by the far right, in some way, having changed from its neofascist past; as Ignazi 
(2003:2) puts it, ‘as these new extreme right parties do not share any commitment to neo-fascism 
they are a different type of extreme right’. 
Following Backes’ (2007) terms, the emergence of these new far right parties presented a 
definitional and conceptual challenge. The extreme right moved from just being in the anti-
constitutional, anti-democratic box to also be democratic anti-constitutionalists or anti-
constitutional democrats as new parties emerged and old parties changed to ape them (Ignazi 
2003:22). This change was not limited to ideology; the manner in which parties presented 
themselves and campaigned changed as well, including in cases where the core ideology either 
did not change or was occulted. As described below, this would open the door to different 
electoral fortunes. 
This dilemma in pinning down the new version of the far right is noted in the literature; citing 
Mudde (1995: 204-5), Hainsworth (2008) highlights the novelty of this new far right as a potential 
reason why it has yet to be pinned down; the various -isms have histories extending, in some 
instances, centuries. However, twenty-five years since Mudde wrote, the problem does not seem 
to have abated. How, then, to understand this dichotomy? 
One option, following Carter (2005), is to say that far right parties must be both anti-democratic 
and anti-constitutional. They must exhibit ‘a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and 
institutions of the democratic constitutional state (a feature that makes right-wing extremism 
extremist)’ (Carter 2005:17) as well as ‘a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality 
(a feature that makes right-wing extremism right-wing)’ (Carter 2005:17). This translates, to, in 
the first instance, ‘anti-partyism, anti-parliamentarianism and anti-pluralism’ (Hainsworth 
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2008:12) and, in the second, ‘nationalism, racism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism and exclusionism’ 
(Hainsworth 2008:12). 
This would suggest that parties like UKIP, who arguably meet the latter requirements but are not 
necessarily anti-parliamentary, fall outside the definition; in Hainsworth’s (2008:12) words, 
‘[t]hey do not reject democracy per se, but have reservations about its actual workings’. They are 
then ‘perceived as right-extremist because they unquestionably occupy the right-most position 
of the political spectrum’ (Ignazi 2003:2). Clearly, this definition does not work in all cases. In 
some cases, the rightmost party is not generally considered far right – for instance, Portugal, 
until the emergence of the Partido Nacional Renovador (later renamed Ergue-te) around the turn 
of the Millennium, did not have what we would instinctively recognise as a far right party, but on 
this definition one of the mainstream parties would have to be considered as such. Equally, some 
countries have more than one far right party, not least of which is the UK with UKIP and the BNP 
or, Italy with the Lega and FT-MSI. Abedi (2004:12) suggest that being opposed to the political 
establishment identifies the far right, although this has the problem of snap changes in 
characterisation on joining a coalition, and Hainsworth (2008) points out that the FPOe, DVP, and 
LN have all entered coalition governments without giving up their (perceived) outsideriness. It 
may be a difficult rope to walk, but it is at least conceptually possible for – to use Abedi’s term – 
an anti-political establishment party to continue to seek to change the establishment from within 
without being totally subsumed into it. 
However, if we accept that there are different types of far right party (Ignazi 2002:24; Carter 
2005:17; Hainsworth 2008:17), we can return to Backes’ typology to explain it. If the classic 
variant of the far right party only appeared as both anti-constitutional and anti-democratic, it 
today also appears as anti-democratic and constitutional, and anti-constitutional and democratic. 
This allows us to distinguish between these ideal types while still categorising both as far right 
inasmuch as their shared opposition, even if that opposition is qualitatively different or only 
overlaps rather than being the same, to the democratic, constitutional order is sufficient to put 
both populist radical right parties and post-fascist parties under the same header of far right, 
particularly 
This also allows us to understand UKIP and similar as a far right party if we see ‘anti-partyism, 
anti-parliamentarianism and anti-pluralism’ (Hainsworth 2008:12) not as binaries but as scalars; 
UKIP may not be as anti-pluralistic as the BNP (for instance), but it is still anti-pluralistic; the 
BNP’s had a stated preference for removing people they do not consider autochthonous (Goodwin 
2011:68), where, crudely, UKIP wanted to restrict further immigration. Using this approach also 
has the potential to allow a different view of the Backes typology. Rather than being a simple 
question of being anti-constitutional and anti-democratic, an ideology can be seen as more or less 
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anti-constitutional and more or less anti-democratic and, in graphical terms, plotted on a chart 
rather than set in boxes; Backes’ graphical representation (Backes 2007:251) does not show the 
(logically necessary) position of anti-constitutional anti-democratism being diametrically 
opposed to constitutional democracy, instead placing it alongside. 
With the possible exception of the Golden Dawn, there are few, and even fewer successful, far 
right parties that, at least as they present themselves to the public, are traditional, Blud und 
Boden5, fascist or neo-fascist entities. Rather, even those that have clear roots in the fascism of the 
Second World War or earlier now present themselves as approximating more moderate (or, at 
least, less extreme, parties) as closer to the mainstream. Indeed, as Nick Griffin, then leader of 
the British National Party, put it in an address to various far right activists in the United States, 
while sitting next to the Ku Klux Klan leader, David Duke, ‘There is a difference between selling 
out your ideas and selling your ideas’ (Panorama 2001). 
This emergence of new far right parties, and the morphing of old far right parties to be like them, 
either in actuality or in appearance, merits explanation. What is it that happened or changed that 
lead to this emergence and metamorphosis? An approach to this question that focuses on the 
party as the unit of analysis comes, ultimately, from Stein Rokkan’s model of political cleavages 
(Rokkan 2009). The various cleavages in a society give space for political parties to emerge. 
Kitschelt & McGann (1995) argue that a shift in the cleavages in society, and the principal axis 
along which issues salient to the population lie, while political parties remain wedded to their 
former positions, gives political space for parties on the far right and far left. Thus, what 
emerged on the right began as economically liberal though politically and culturally 
authoritarian, but the political and cultural dimensions either started or rapidly became not just 
more important but definitional, while the economic positions were either downplayed, quietly 
dropped, or outright reversed. Their ‘new radical right’ does not map onto or descend from the 
‘old’ extreme right, having different origins, demands, and bases of support. It attracts cross-
class support, with support for capitalism and a small, but strong, state. Rather than being 
authoritarian in the manner of neofascist parties, they seek to defend with a paternal authority 
the structures of capitalism. Crucially, they are a response to multiculturalism, rather than a re-
heated version of a philosophy that predates it. 
Ignazi (2003) adopts this party family approach as the first step of his two-step classification, 
seeing it as only a ‘screening’ mechanism. The second step is the party’s ideology: do they exhibit 
‘anti-parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, and anti-partyism’ (Ignazi 2003:33)? From this, Ignazi 
 
5Blood and soil, a motto of the Nazi Party. 
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offers two subgroups within the far right, the traditional and the post-industrial. The traditional 
is the neo-fascism represented by the MSI, as discussed above, while the post-industrial varietal 
is anti-system, while maintaining at least an apparent support for democracy as a norm, a focus 
on post-material issues such as ‘the defence of the natural community’ and ‘the demand for law 
and order … and the uneasiness over representative mechanisms … express a desire for an 
authoritative guide’ (Ignazi 2003:2) in an atomised society. They are a mix of ‘free enterprise and 
social protection (limited to the native), of modernizing inputs and traditional reminiscences’ 
(Ignazi 2003:34). This division is similar to Taggart’s (1995) neo-fascism and neo-populism, or 
Betz’s (1994) authoritarian and libertarian varieties, even if there is no clear boundary between 
the variants (Roberts 1994:480) 
Fennema (1997) argues that one of the fundamental attributes of these parties is that they are 
stigmatised by mainstream parties. This argument very quickly runs into some substantial 
problems. There are stigmatised parties on the far left, and opposition to immigration and to 
immigrants is not confined to the far right. More substantively, it also implies that a party can 
fundamentally change if anything causes it to be no longer stigmatised; it seems to defy logic that 
the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich/Alliance for the Future of Austria can be considered far right in 
the morning and, having formed a coalition with the Österreichische Volkspartei/Austrian 
People’s Party, is no longer so by the afternoon. A similar approach is taken by Kitschelt & 
McGann (1995), who use perception as far right as well as when it first appeared to decide 
whether a party is neofascist or new radical right. 
In the same 2007 text where he raises the problem of definition , Mudde provides an admirably 
concise (and potentially falsifiable) definition: populist radical right parties are nativist, 
authoritarian, and populist (Mudde 2007:22). 
Nativism is, for Mudde (2007), nationalism and xenophobia combined. Authoritarianism is given 
in the vein of Adorno et al. (1980), and is uncriticality and positivity towards figures of authority 
within one’s own nation, and hostility towards others, coupled with support for law and order 
(effectively as a hand-me-down from earlier militarism). Populism is a conflict between two 
groups within the nation - a corrupted and corrupting elite that betrays the interests of the 
honest people. It is fundamentally different from the neo-fascism that previously made up the far 
right, in that 
‘the radical right is (nominally) democratic, … whereas the extreme right is in essence 
antidemocratic, opposing the fundamental principle of sovereignty of the people’ (Mudde 
2007:31). 
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Mudde has a ‘ladder’ to get from the prerequisite of nationalism to the flavours of the far right. 
Nationalism plus xenophobia is nativism; the addition of authoritarianism gives the radical right. 
At this point, the ladder effectively branches. Adding anti-democracy to the radical right leads to 
the extreme right, while adding populism instead gives the populist radical right. This is, again, 
the standard division that is seen in the far right as described above. 
While widely accepted, this ‘ladder’ is not without its problems. For one, there is no necessary 
reason why a party cannot be populist and anti-democratic. The Golden Dawn, prima facie, seem 
to fit that bill (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). Secondly, the implicit assertion is that the 
populist radical right has displaced the neofascist right. This seems like a premature view; 
indeed, since Mudde wrote in 2007, parties that cannot meaningfully be considered as part of the 
populist radical right because of their antipathy to democracy have been (by their standards) 
positively resurgent, with Jobbik receiving more than one of every five votes cast in the 
Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2014, and the Golden Dawn managing more than six per 
cent of the vote in the 2015 elections to the Hellenic parliament, despite its leadership being 
imprisoned awaiting trial for being members of a criminal organisation, following the murder of 
the left-wing rapper Pavlos Fyssas. 
It is also important to note that the populism of the right is a creature unto itself; it is different 
from populism of, for instance, the left. March (2016) finds right populism exclusionary, opposed 
to elites and outsiders, and focussed on ethnic issues, while left populism is broadly inclusionary, 
opposes elites but not outsiders, and looks to socioeconomic issues as its bread and butter issues. 
There are also more problems around parties that are less clearly anti-democratic. Mudde lists 
the BNP as a populist radical right party. Goodwin (2011:49) suggests this may at least appear to 
be the case, as the BNP could ‘mobilize protest votes while not appearing as revolutionary anti-
democrats’. However, ‘the impetus behind the demand for a change of strategy was political 
expediency rather than ideological conviction’ (Goodwin 2011:52). It is not clear whether the BNP 
had actually changed its spots, had simply covered them up for the sake of expediency, or had a 
compromise of the two, with some parts of the party having actually moved away from previous 
positions while others were willing to go along with them while it offered success. 
A potential explanation for the rise of far right parties to relative electoral success that must be 
considered is that it is not the far right that has been helped by these changes, but populism, and 
that we are better off understanding these as a manifestation thereof, and including in our 
analyses left populist parties and acknowledging that we see populism in mainstream parties as a 
reaction to a populace that is increasingly weary of a political class they see as remote, self-
interested, and ineffectual. 
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March identifies three elements that must be present for populism to be identified: ‘people-
centrism, anti-elitism, and popular sovereignty’ (March 2017:283); they can occur in other 
ideologies or positions, but it is their simultaneous occurrence that is diagnostic of populism. 
This does, returning to the discussion on Backes’ (2007) typology raise the issue of whether these 
are binary or scalar variables, or whether a surfeit of one can compensate for a lack of another – 
can an ideology that is (say) not particularly people-centred but very anti-elitist be considered 
populist? 
The above notwithstanding, populism is more easily described than actually measured. Following 
Pauwels (2014:33-36), March (2017:286) identifies two broad ways of measuring populism. The 
first is ‘quantitative computer analysis’ (March 2017:286), ideal where information technology 
can make light work of large amounts of data and removes the judgment of the researcher as a 
factor; while March sees this latter aspect as a negative, removing interpretation, it also provides 
a certain robustness given that the human factor is removed. The second is content analysis as 
traditionally understood, with a human coding texts against a schema. This content analysis is 
further broken down into three types; analysis of entire speeches, analysis of paragraphs, and 
key-word coding. 
This presents an apparent conflict with the conceptualisation of the far right in binary terms 
discussed above as we are quantifying the amount of populism. Pappas (2016) applies Sartori’s 
(1984) criticism of degreeism – that categories are not merely useful but essential when trying to 
demonstrate necessary and sufficient conditions for social phenomena – and applies it to the 
specific case of populism. There are particular problems in measuring populism – ‘questionable 
data reliability, irregular sampling, and coding biases’ (Pappas 2016:10) as well as the great 
difficulty in ‘measur[ing] (degrees of) populism over time and space’ (Pappas 2016:10). This has 
the result that populism can be found everywhere and, to paraphrase Popper, potentially 
explaining everything, explains nothing. This is a particular problem with definitions of 
populism that reduce it to ‘closeness to the people’ (March 2017:283), an understanding that 
makes it ubiquitous. 
As, therefore, we can separate the populism of the right from the populism of the left, Mudde’s 
formulation of the populist radical right as nativist, authoritarian, and populist provides a 
working definition with some robustness. 
As is often noted, the far right is a diverse grouping of political parties (Mudde 2013). It has 
developed over time, such that it has two identifiable subgroups. While they share substantial 
commonalities, not least nationalism, there are grounds to distinguish between them, and set 
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them as the extreme right, consisting of fascist and neo-fascist parties, on the one hand, and 
populist radical right parties on the other (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2016).  
In the next section, the existing arguments given to explain the successes and failures of far right 
parties are covered. 
Supply and demand 
Having established a working definition of a far right party, it is easier to turn to the question of 
what explains their electoral success. Why, given the opprobrium heaped upon far right parties, 
do voters in their millions cast their metaphorical pebbles into those urns? 
As described above, Kitschelt and McGann (1995) suggest that the effect of contemporary 
capitalist development is to allow populist appeals to the market and authoritarian decision-
making. They distinguish between ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ factors, an important distinction that 
remains in much of the work on the far right. This division is common across the literature 
(Eatwell 2003, Koopmans et al. 2005, Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2007, van Kessel 2015 to indicate just a 
few). While there are some factors that fall across both categories, the division is useful, based on 
a split between a focus on structure, in the case of demand, and agency, in the case of supply 
(Eatwell 2003). The demand side, then, looks at ‘arguments that focus primarily on socioeconomic 
developments, such as the impact of immigration, unemployment or rapid social change (Eatwell 
2003:46), while the supply side looks to ‘the messages which reach voters … leadership and 
programmes of the insurgent and mainstream parties, or the media’ (Eatwell 2003:46). More 
succinctly, the demand side focusses on voters, while the supply side focusses on the parties 
themselves and their strategies to make discursive opportunities for themselves and to exploit 
political opportunities, such as the dynamics of competition amongst other parties. Aside from 
providing broad coverage of the factors that affect votes for the far right, this split covers the two 
types of drivers for the far right – those extrinsic to far right parties and those intrinsic. It also 
allows the commonalities in the processes by which, for instance, social and economic factors 
drive votes for the far right, and makes it clear that there is an interplay between the activities 
and choices of far right parties and the social and economic conditions of the voters whose 
support they seek. 
As part of the changes Kitschelt and McGann (1995) describe, they see three axes of political 
competition, around citizenship, decision making, and resource allocation. An expansion of the 
public sector leads to more left-leaning, liberal voters, while exposure to international 
competition in the private sector leads to people favouring lower taxes, and hence a smaller 
welfare state. Where political parties either remain wedded to old combinations, or have 
converged, voters will demand a different alternative if the new dimensions of division that 
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emerge are not covered by existing parties. This is not, however, sufficient for a breakthrough; a 
far right party must supply an alternative. By positioning themselves to take advantage of new 
alignments on the axes of competition, far right parties can capitalise on the opportunity. For 
Kitschelt and McGann, it is important to see parties as more than mere ciphers for public 
opinion, but as organisations with their own preferences and decisions to make. In short, the far 
right can do well given three factors: an advanced, capitalist, and postindustrial society with 
increased salience of the libertarian left/authoritarian right divide; convergence of mainstream 
parties; and the parties finding the right formula to present themselves. 
As presented, these arguments have some major flaws. For one, Kitschelt & McGann suggest that 
Greece does not have the social preconditions for a strong extreme right, which conflicts with the 
emergence of the Golden Dawn. It also remains rather broad-brush; it suggests how demand 
factors may change, but not what they may change to, and it does not explain how the (very) 
macro-level change in political salience leads to changes in how individuals vote. Moreover, 
supply, protestations to parties not being ciphers notwithstanding, seems to be little more than 
political opportunism. Nevertheless, the division between demand and supply is a useful one in 
seeing that, within the broad heading of the far right, the populist radical right are not merely a 
continuation of neofascist antecessors. The next two sections expand on demand and supply 
explanations, respectively, for support for the far right, and at specific instances of these 
explanations. 
Demand 
As detailed above, demand arguments look to structural factors to explain far right voting. 
Amongst the instances of demand arguments that Mudde (2007) offers are two that appear 
promising but suffer from the same flaw of a lack of specificity. These are modernization and 
crisis. Modernization seeks some feature of recent changes to society that causes people to vote 
for the far right, largely because they have lost out from modernization (Betz 1994, but see also 
Ford and Goodwin 2014a). In the case of modernization, grand changes are described, but not 
applied to how people vote; large-scale processes are not translated down to the micro level 
(Mudde 2007). Equally, there are different patterns of modernisation against different 
backgrounds of historical experience – the former Warsaw Pact, the European south, Protestant 
north and west Europe - but, as mentioned above, the distinction seems increasingly hard to 
sustain given the rise of far right parties where, apparently, they should not flourish. 
Similarly, crisis - a shock to the political system causing voters to prefer a radical alternative to 
what is on offer – is poorly specified. There are various possibilities - unemployment (Lubbers 
and Scheepers 2001), immigration (Golder 2003), political dissatisfaction (Dahl 2000), change in 
the political system (Kitschelt 2002), and so on. The essential theoretical problem Mudde 
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identifies with all of these is poor specification as to what constitutes a crisis, although it is not at 
all clear that the authors mentioned would necessarily group themselves into a crisis-driven 
camp; indeed, at times the difference between crisis and modernisation seems rather thin; 
Kitschelt’s (2002) argument around the rise of the cartel party could just as easily be a feature of 
modernisation. More problematically, however, the evidence does not clearly point in one 
direction, with weak and contradictory correlations between the given explanation of different 
works. 
However, several of the possible drivers included under crisis or modernisation do appear to 
have meaningful effects. It is perhaps more fruitful to look at these individually. 
Perhaps no issue is, prima facie, more likely to help the far right than where immigration, or 
perhaps issues that can be connected thereto, have high salience amongst the population. Eatwell 
(2003) identifies immigration having high salience, or issues that can be connected thereto, 
amongst the electorate will benefit far right parties as a possible driver; it was ‘initially, the most 
common demand-side approach to the revival of extreme right voting in Western Europe’ 
(Eatwell 2003:47). This matches Mudde’s (2007) description of ethnic backlash. In both 
formulations, it is the presence or increase of the numbers of people who are not members of the 
nation or ethnie that serves as the driver. Mass immigration is given as one possible cause of this. 
However, the evidence is contradictory; Mudde’s own research shows no particular correlation, 
while others do (Golder 2003, again with an interaction between unemployment and 
immigration) and still more find none (Duelmer & Klein 2005). Similarly, Eatwell (2003) identifies 
cases where there appears to be a match between immigration and votes for the far right, such as 
the Front National in France, but apparently not in the case of the Alleanza Nazionale in Italy. In 
any case, the motivation for voting for far right parties appears more complicated and allowance 
must be made for supply-side factors; for instance, parties like the Front National have broad 
platforms that run across the whole gamut of politics and policy. Not everyone who votes for a 
far right party will do so because of their position on immigration (although, manifestly, it must 
be at least tolerable); authoritarian conservatism and ‘ninism’ – being ‘ni droit ni gauche’, neither 
right nor left – attract voters (Eatwell 2003). Eatwell (2003) also indicates that it may be 
perceptions, rather than the reality of the number of immigrants, that matter, such as the 
Norwegian Fremskrittpartiet benefiting from perceived over-favourable treatment of 
immigrants; indeed at least one study finds ‘it is not clear if voters’ decisions to vote for an anti-
immigrant party are impacted by actual demographics or by perceptions’ (Stockemer 2016:1001). 
A similar issue is raised by Eatwell (2003) in regard to the argument that economic disadvantage 
is the driver. The argument itself is straightforward enough; those who are deprived in a society 
will vote for parties that offer an improvement in their economic circumstances. The far right 
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often offer this, even if through the lens of wanting to make sure that their co-nationals are 
favoured by virtue of the nationality rather than their economic circumstance, linking to the 
aforementioned discussion of the role of immigration. A more sophisticated version of the 
argument is that ‘extreme right voters are not simply likely to come from those already suffering 
disadvantage, but from those who fear economic change’ (Eatwell 2003:54). Again, the evidence is 
mixed, with an apparent, broad trend but counterexamples thereto. 
It should also be noted that older studies tend to look at numbers of immigrants, rather than rate 
of change in the number of immigrants, and absolute economic indicators rather than change in 
those indicators. This is particularly true for older research in the field. 
A further possible driver of votes for the far right is social breakdown (Eatwell 2003); the 
dissolution of the traditional bonds of community – church, social groups, trade unions, even 
political parties – that ground people in a society. This growing anomie or social isolation leads to 
a search for meaning and identity in the traditional values offered by far right parties. However, 
while Eatwell (2003) does find evidence for the thesis, citing particularly urban areas of France 
and Germany, there are countervailing instances both of people suffering from this social 
breakdown not voting for the far right, and people not suffering from it that do vote for the far 
right. 
The particular variant of this social breakdown is Eatwell’s (2003) protest thesis; put off by 
mainstream parties’ convergence, voters choose a radical outlet for their frustrations. However, 
there are many possible such outlets, including left and green parties, or even parties 
traditionally excluded from government, such as the British Liberal Democrats, but votes go to 
parties of the far right. This suggests that votes are not merely being cast for the sake of 
protesting, but that there is, the element of protest notwithstanding, a particular appeal to far 
right parties, in the form of their ideology or programme. This touches on political opportunity 
structures that parties can exploit, and is revisited below. 
This social breakdown ties into Eatwell’s (2003) idea of reverse post-material politics as a 
motivator for voting for the far right. As the general political debate represented in the media 
has shifted from the traditional issues of economic and class competition to post-material issues, 
those for whom material issues remain front and centre are effectively abandoned by the 
mainstream political parties. This runs into problems in that it cannot explain local variations; 
given that political culture will be broadly similar across an entire country or, at least, large areas 
of it, one would expect, were this driver to be definitive, all areas where traditional, material 
issues remain in contention to exhibit similar propensity to vote for far right parties. This is not 
borne out in reality. 
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Mudde (2007) raises two final possibilities similarly quickly that are dispensed with in short 
order; the apparent connection between populist radical right attitudes and voting for populist 
radical right parties is only ever taken to the level of correlation and not causation. Insecurity 
and fear of crime simply do not have the empirical backup to suggest they are substantial reasons 
for people to vote for the far right. 
The broad trend across demand drivers for voting for the far right is that the various possible 
factors, prima facie, are promising, but that promise breaks down. There are too many counter-
examples for any one demand factor to be the key to explaining votes for the far right. A possible 
explanation for this comes in Matt Golder’s (2003) interaction of unemployment and 
immigration. It is not a single factor that matters, overriding all others, but particular 
combinations of them. 
An important methodological point emerges here. Most studies of the far right use national data 
for immigration, whether in terms of economic migrants, asylum seekers, totals, or other 
measures. It would not be expected for migrants to equally distribute themselves across a 
country and the available data (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 2014) suggest they do no such thing; 
differences between two different parts of a given state are likely to be greater than a difference 
between the average of that state and another (Veugelers 1999). It is perhaps no surprise, then, 
that what emerges are weak and contradictory results from statistical analyses when the number 
of foreign-born people in the UK ranges from 1.5% in Northern Ireland to 36.2% in London, 
mutatis mutandis for other countries. Even if migration were constant across a state, the 
economic situation is not. This objection can similarly be levelled at the crisis and modernization 
arguments; plainly, a crisis in one part of a state may not affect all parts of a state. Particularly as 
far right parties have adopted a local first strategy (Goodwin 2011), using finer-grained data is 
important. However, many studies continue to use country-level data, as Kestilä and Söderlund 
(2007) point out, including Mudde (2002, 2007), Luebbert (1991), Taggart (1995), Ignazi (2003), 
Kitschelt and McGann (1995), and Golder (2003). The use of NUTS 2 and NUTS 36 level data or 
similar, together with the local research that Mudde (2007) advocates can readily ameliorate this. 
There are a growing number of studies that do use finer-grained data; these are dealt with below. 
A final demand factor is the history of the particular country in which a far right party operates. 
Many states, particularly in Europe, have a history of authoritarian rule, from the military 
 
6 Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics is a system of hierarchical subdivisions of EU and EEA 
states devised by EUROSTAT. For the United Kingdom, NUTS 1 consists of the nine regions of England plus, 
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. NUTS 2 has forty divisions, and NUTS 3 has one hundred and 
seventy four, consisting of unitary authorities, counties, and groups of districts. The full system is at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview. 
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dictatorships seen in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, to the Soviet domination of eastern Europe. 
While it may be an aggravating factor, it is plainly neither necessary nor sufficient: ‘the thesis … 
cannot account for the striking absence of populist radical right success in most of the 
postcommunist world’ (Mudde 2007:np) while populist radical right parties have emerged in, for 
instance, the Netherlands in the form of the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) which has an 
authoritarian rule in its history that is both much more distant and associated with resistance 
thereto. Far right parties also exist in the United Kingdom, which not only has no history of 
authoritarian rule, but has opposition to fascism and the far right as a part of its national identity 
(Eatwell 2003:59). This begins to enter the realm of political opportunity structures; indeed, 
Eatwell (2003) considers national traditions to come under the heading of supply, emphasising 
that the categories are not cut and dry. In any case, it seems that national traditions are 
intervening variables, rather than causes in and of themselves. 
Ultimately, Mudde, Kitschelt and McGann, and Eatwell reach similar conclusions; demand factors 
may give an indication of the potential size of support, and they may be necessary, but they are 
not sufficient. Alone, they treat political parties as mere ciphers with no agency of their own. For 
that, supply factors must be brought into play. A particular problem with demand factors is that 
they cannot account for local variations; as both Eatwell (2003) and Mudde (2007) highlight, these 
processes operate on macro, meso, and micro levels. 
Supply 
Supply side factors, as stated above, are those that shape the manner in which votes perceive far 
right parties (Eatwell 2003). Clearly, there are many potential factors that shape this, from 
leadership to manifesto to the media (Kestilä and Söderlund 2007). It is useful, therefore, to split 
them into supply side factors that are internal to the party and those that are external to it 
(Mudde 2007).  
External supply side factors are, broadly, political opportunity structures. Tarrow gives a useful 
definition: 
 ‘By political opportunity structure, I refer to consistent - but not necessarily formal, 
 permanent or national - dimensions of the political environment which encourage or 
 discourage people from using collective action’ (Tarrow 2011:18) 
In the specific case of far right parties, these include how other political parties act, both in terms 
of messaging and campaigning, whether they converge on the centre of politics, or leave salient 
issues unraised (Eatwell 2016:412), as well as the effects of proportionality, district magnitude, 
minimum vote requirements and so on in making it more or less easy for small and new parties 
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to succeed at elections. The latter are discursive opportunity structures; how far right parties can 
shape their narrative and, in some cases, adjust their policies to create ‘a legitimate discourse 
about immigration and conceptions of citizenship’ (Eatwell 2017:415). Political opportunity 
structures can be short-term or long lasting, draw from institutional setups or the particularities 
of a given time and place, or situation of a party (Dinas et al 2016). 
It should be noted that Tarrow draws collective action widely, such that it will include political 
parties. Most obvious is the electoral system - generally, the more proportional a system, the 
easier it is for a far right party to do well (Eatwell 2000), though this is true for small parties more 
generally (Duverger 1972). Similar is the political context - if pre-existing parties maintain the 
loyalty of their voters, it is harder for new parties to emerge. However, convergence amongst the 
mainstream parties and disconnection from issues and issue-complexes that are salient to voters 
(Kitschelt & McGann 1995) can open a space for the populist radical right. An important counter 
to this comes from Piero Ignazi (2003), suggesting that the rise of the new right, figureheaded by 
Thatcher and Reagan, effectively legitimized the territory that the populist radical right would 
later claim. Minkenberg’s (2001) evidence can be taken to suggest that convergence is more 
important for allowing populist radical right parties to emerge than to continue thriving after 
having broken through, and add that it may be that the prior legitimization, per Ignazi, of certain 
policies and politics then allows their continuance. 
As above, it is often not realities, but perceptions of realities that shape how people vote. The 
manner in which the media portrays the far right, its competition, and the conditions of society 
manifestly shape these perceptions (Eatwell 2003:57). Exactly how the media affects the far right 
is a complicated picture; it can advance their interests by raising the salience of their interests, 
while simultaneously attacking them directly, as in the Sun’s ‘Bloody Nasty People’ front page; 
the far right are both legitimised and delegitimised by the media. It should be noted that local 
media are also important players here, and can help explain different results between apparently 
similar localities, such as in Oldham (Eatwell 2003:57), where uncritical reporting of the BNP’s 
activities appears to have boosted them in the early 2000s. 
The cultural context is suggested as another political opportunity structure, linking back to 
national context above. While this factor sits above in demand, more appropriately under supply 
is that, as a populist radical right party does well, it forms links into society that make it more 
acceptable and make it easier to find supporters and, crucially, organisers. This, though, would 
apply to almost any organisation - success breeds success. This similarly applies to the media, 
who can be both supportive and destructive of the far right (Mudde 2010). The media can 
explicitly criticise or support the populist radical right, and they can also increase the salience of 
the issues that the populist radical right would want to raise simply by discussing them. Most 
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importantly, they can raise public awareness of a new populist radical right party, making them 
particularly important in breaking through on to the electoral scene. 
It is generally accepted that, as for any small party, a majoritarian electoral system is a hindrance 
and a more proportional system with low entry barriers is a help. It should be noted, though, that 
second-order elections, particularly the European Parliamentary elections that must be 
conducted using a proportional system, provide an alternative route to electoral success. 
In short, external supply side factors are not as clear as might be ideal, but it can be seen that 
they help, but do not determine, the success of populist radical right parties, particularly when 
they are breaking into the mainstream, and less so when they are more established. 
Internal supply factors are those intrinsic to the parties. These include ideology and organisation 
(Mudde 2007) and the presence (or otherwise) of a charismatic leader (Eatwell 2003). 
It is reasonably obvious why being organised would be matter to any political party of any stripe; 
it is easier to achieve your aims if you have a system for recruiting candidates, managing 
volunteers, determining policies, and so on. From this, it is reasonable to posit, as Lubbers et al. 
(2002) do, that ‘extreme right-wing parties … gain support only when they are well-organised’ 
(Lubbers et al 2002:351). However, Mudde (2005) provides counterexamples of the Deutsche 
Volksunion in Germany and Bulgaria’s Ataka of parties that gained electoral success either before 
or without ever developing effective internal organisations. This suggests, per Mudde (2005), that 
party organisation explains the persistence of populist radical right parties, rather than their 
emergence from the shadows. It may be possible for a populist radical right party to rapidly grow 
from nothing or next to nothing without strong party organisation, but it will not have any sort 
of longevity without either having or developing some organisational heft (de Lange and Art 
2011; Mudde 2005).  
Parties of this stripe adopt command-and-control structures, with decisions made by a limited 
group of members around the party leadership (Betz 1998). This allows parties to make decisions 
rapidly, even completely changing tack on an issue, without having to refer back to members or 
other stakeholders (Betz 1998). This is even more important for the fissiparous rightward and 
leftward ends of the political spectrum. Far right parties, in particular, ‘have shown themselves 
to be especially prone to factionalism and infighting’ (Carter 2005:65) and so a charismatic 
leader’s instructions will be sent down a relatively centralised chain of command (Carter 2005). 
Mudde (2005) suggests various ways that effective organisation can impact a party’s success, 
from party cohesion to stability of the leadership to discipline. Many of these make intuitive 
sense; if a party has the wherewithal to recruit and train members who make effective candidates 
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and elected representatives, it will do better than a party that is casting around for anyone to 
stand. A more organised party will also be able to deal with the administrative requirements of 
standing for election. Harrison (1997) highlights the inability of some far right parties to stand in 
the same seat at subsequent elections. This is perhaps not surprising, given, to take the British 
example, the nomination requirements. To run for a Westminster constituency, a prospective 
candidate must be nominated by ten electors who live in that constituency; for a general election, 
that means marshalling thousands of signatures and hundreds of forms that must be physically 
handed over to a returning officer. For local council seats, the requirements are the same, but 
must be met for every ward contested (Local Elections (Principal Areas) (England and Wales) 
Rules 2006).  
Carter (2005) finds, as one would expect from the above, that organisational ability does affect 
the electoral prospects of far right parties and has real explanatory power. Carter identifies three 
types of far right party: ‘(1) weakly organised, poorly led and divided parties, (2) weakly 
organised, poorly led but united parties, and (3) strongly organized, well-led but factionalized 
parties’ (Carter 2005:66).  
However, it is hard to analyse any political party’s organisation. No corporate body wants its 
dirty laundry aired in public; still less so whose success and, indeed, existence is premised upon 
the public having a positive view of it. This is even more so in the case of populist radical right 
parties, who are suspicious of anything that smacks of the liberal elite, including academia 
(Mudde 2005:267; Carter 2005:65-66). This leads to a particular problem in how to characterise 
and then study the different organisational modes of such parties. Lubbers et al. (2002) effectively 
reduce this to a linear scale between ‘good’ and ‘bad’; alone, this clearly fails to account for, for 
instance, different modes of territorial organisation, democracy and member involvement, 
leadership powers, management of stakeholders, and so on.  
However, the problem of measuring organisation may be resolved in another way. Lubbers et al 
(2002:360) find a high degree of multicollinearity between their triptych of charismatic leader, 
the activity of members, and the organisation of, in their terms, an extreme right-wing party. De 
Lange and Art suggest that it is not organisation per se so much as organisational 
institutionalisation that matters. This is seen in their comparison of the List Pim Fortuyn  and 
Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid, where the extensive structures of the former did not 
prevent its collapse. This view of the importance of institutionalisation rather than organisation 
per se is shared by Rooduijn (2015).  
Institutionalisation here suggests a certain degree of predictability and the ability to manage 
internal divisions and provide structures, formal or otherwise, by which to recruit and marshal 
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volunteers. Where a charismatic leader has effective control over all aspects of the party, their 
directions can substitute for formal organisational structures. In short, it is predictability – that 
party members and elites know and abide by the rules of the game, instead of engaging in 
infighting and competing claims for internal legitimacy – that benefits far right parties. This can 
come from formal organisational structures, a charismatic leader, or a Fuehrerprinzip style of 
leadership. However, well-understood structures that are abided by will have a life beyond the 
departure or weakening of a leader. This, though, seems a rare occurrence, and far right parties 
often struggle following the departure or defenestration of a charismatic leader (Betz 1998). The 
idea of a charismatic basis for authority extends back to Weber and this version of charisma – 
more than just an inspiring orator or effective parliamentarian, ‘a charismatic leader constitutes 
a new leadership, a new structure of social relationships, and a new cognitive definition of the 
situation of social action’ (Rainer Lepsius 2016:89). However, while the Weberian understanding 
of charisma certainly works for this explanation, a more mundane form of charisma amongst 
leadership also fills the function necessary for driving far right votes; it can be a form of ‘low-cost 
signalling’ (Eatwell 2003:62). 
All political parties seek to effect political change, whether by gaining office, raising issues, or 
putting pressure on other parties to change their positions. This is also true for far right parties; 
they have ideologies. While parties are not completely free to change their ideology – moderating 
too much may lose more extreme members (Eatwell 2003:60) – it can be modified to an extent, 
and the focus can be shifted to different aspects of the platform with a view to putting the party 
in the most favourable light. It is also the case that far right party platforms are popular with 
some voters. 
The picture that emerges from the combination of the above is unclear, sometimes contradictory 
and ridden with methodological problems. In many areas, there is simply not enough literature, 
either because of the intractability of the subject or because the academy has not yet had time to 
analyse what are relatively recent developments. Indeed, Mudde (2007:259) writes, only a year 
after Twitter was founded and before Google’s acquisition of YouTube, that ‘the growing 
popularity of the internet will inevitably increase [populist radical right parties’ websites’] 
prominence in years to come’. 
Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, there is no magic formula that 
explains or predicts when the far right, in any guise, will do well. There appear to be certain 
factors that make success more likely, with political space, formed by crisis, convergence, or 
realignment, foremost among them. Political opportunity structures, in the form of the electoral 
system and the like, also matter but are not definitive. An ideology and presentation that are 
tolerable to a significant number of voters seems to matter, as does the ability to recruit effective 
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organisers behind a charismatic leader. Again, however, these are adjunctive and not definitive. 
Many of these factors are relevant, or are greatly increased in relevance, only when another 
variable is also present. 
A broader criticism may be made; all the potential factors, with the possible exception of the 
electoral system and the media, only operate in the positive space. That is to say, their complete 
absence is treated as null, while their presence will aid the populist radical right. This is 
somewhat counter-intuitive. 
Levels of analysis 
As mentioned above, the demand factors are categorised by Mudde as macro, meso, and micro. 
While the macro and micro are simple enough to pin down, ‘[t]he meso [level] is concerned with 
local organizations to which individuals belong, or through which they gain knowledge and 
norms, such as the family, school or party’ (Eatwell 2000:350 cited in Mudde 2007:217). The meso 
level is specifically marked as under-studied. Supply factors can also be, though Mudde does not 
deal with this, found at different levels. Much of the criticism levelled at some of the macro level 
explanations boils down to no connection being made to how this actually causes people to 
change their voting behaviour. The connection has to be made through the meso level, and so it 
is particularly important. ‘Organisations’ must be drawn broadly here; they need not be formally 
established. The residents of a particular block or estate will form an organisation for these 
purposes – a means by which they learn about and understand their environs – even if there is 
not, for instance, an established residents’ association.  
Moreover, political opportunity structures need not be national. The local context clearly 
matters; if traditional parties are resting on their laurels in a given area, an opportunity might 
open up for a far right party that does not exist even in the neighbouring district. This is 
compounded by local variations in socio-economic and demographic indicators. 
The institutional context, listed under supply, changes at different levels. Particularly if a party is 
adopting a local strategy, of which more later, this does apply differently at each level. The same 
is true of political context. While a party’s ideology will be consistent within a certain range, and 
top leadership is definitionally the same for all members, local organisers are not necessarily as 
effective in one place as another. It cannot be assumed that supply factors operate in the same 
way or with the same logic at each level of analysis. This further underlines the problem 
highlighted earlier of using national level data to deal with phenomena that vary substantially at 
the sub-national level, even being completely absent in some places. 
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The combination of this is to make studying far right parties at the local level particularly 
important. Indeed, the only way to understand the organisations to which people belong that 
shape their worldview and so to open up the meso level to study is to approach the local level. 
The picture that emerges is complicated. Broadly, there are supply and demand factors. These 
can operate at different levels. However, there are substantial gaps and methodological problems 
with the analysis available. 
This provides a working understanding of the far right and of some of the phenomena that affect 
its performance in gross. The next section looks at the local level, including its importance, the 
benefits of studying the far right at sub-national levels, and the challenges therein. 
Local factors 
Although many studies use national-level electoral, socioeconomic, and demographic data., there 
are a growing number of studies that use finer-grained, subnational data. These studies bring 
particular benefits in dealing with sub-national demographics and socio-economic situations; 
particular local political opportunity structures; the activities of local political parties to 
capitalise on those structures; and other benefits. There are particular approaches that can be 
taken for measuring the activity of political parties and, indeed, other organisations at the local 
level, although there are certain methodological problems with using such local level data. These 
are all dealt with in turn. 
Local socioeconomics and demographics 
These studies address the immediate issue of the considerable variation that can occur in socio-
economic and demographic indicators across the breadth of a state (Kestilä and Söderlund 2007) 
– the gross domestic product per capita of a country, for instance, may be a useful comparator 
against other countries, but it may conceal a great deal of internal variation. Intuitively, the 
economic conditions of a city in post-industrial decline are not going to be the same as those for a 
global city based on finance. Using local data brings other benefits to the study, as detailed below. 
Local political opportunity structures 
As set out above, political opportunity structures are ‘consistent - but not necessarily formal, 
permanent or national - dimensions of the political environment which encourage or discourage 
people from using collective action’ (Tarrow 2011:18). Political opportunity structures will clearly 
vary at the sub-national level where, for instance, there are different regional governments (or, 
in the case of much of England outside of London, no regional government). Different electoral 
systems at different levels of government will also vary, both in terms of the manner in which 
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votes are counted, how many representatives are returned, and the size of the electoral 
circumscription (Kestilä and Söderlund 2007). 
Beyond these effects of the administrative structures across types of area, there are 
particularities to each area that will have an effect on them. Media landscapes will likewise vary; 
the decision of a newspaper to be relatively uncritical of a party may, at least, not hinder them 
and may actively help them by normalising their positions. For instance, the coverage of the 
British National Party in Oldham, which was not openly hostile to them, connects to their 
subsequent electoral success (Eatwell 2003:57). Similarly, the local socio-economic and 
demographic situation, and the saliency of concerns about those issues amongst a given 
population, can open or close opportunities for parties of all sorts, including far right parties. 
Taken to extremes, the presence of a single-issue party that only campaigns on single issues can 
result in that one, particular issue having very high saliency in a given area where it would have 
very little in other places. For instance, the very specific issue of the level of provision at a 
hospital in the West Midlands of England led to a party, Independent Kidderminster Hospital and 
Health Concern, returning an MP to parliament and having some success at the level of local 
government, while the promotion of a bypass around the largest town in Lincolnshire saw Boston 
Bypass Independents take control of Boston Borough Council (Bottom and Crow 2011). 
Political parties at the local level 
Political parties of different families campaign in different ways, according to their political 
priorities, their bases of support, and the political opportunity structures in which they find 
themselves. For instance, a left wing party is more likely to spend its time focusing on blue collar 
or unionized workers, where a party with a base amongst ethnic minority will focus on that 
community and so on, mutatis mutandis. 
In the specific instance of far right parties, activities can broadly be broken down into the direct 
and the indirect. The former is largely self-explanatory; the latter is operating through 
mobilisation issues, including candidates for elections, and other activities that give the party an 
organisational base and a kernel of support in the community (Ellinas and Lamprianou 2019). 
Local political activity is also critically important, especially when a political party or local 
branch thereof has developed roots in a community, in that it affects the meso level. As discussed 
above, the meso level is ‘is concerned with local organizations to which individuals belong, or 
through which they gain knowledge and norms, such as the family, school or party’ (Eatwell 
2000:350 cited in Mudde 2007:217). Manifestly, the activities of a political party in a specific area, 
as opposed to national, broadcast campaigns and media appearances, affect how individual voters 
and groups of voters will see the political situation and consequently affect how they vote. Using 
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local level data allows us to unpack some of these variables to gain a better understanding of why 
people vote for far right parties and how far right parties seek their votes. 
The traditionally-studied drivers – immigration, economy, and so on – of the far right vote 
cannot explain the differential votes for the Golden Dawn across Athens in Dinas et al. (2016)’s 
study; rather, allowance must be made for local organisational strength and effectiveness. The 
process of developing that local effectiveness also takes time, hence the finding that the Golden 
Dawn made breakthroughs where there was the conjunction of the right circumstances and an 
existing local party with the wherewithal to capitalise thereupon. In particular, this includes a 
feeling of being part of or otherwise embedded in that particular, local community to give a sense 
of authenticity. 
Because they are generally smaller parties without the organisational heft of established, 
national political parties, and because they are more likely to receive a hostile reception in 
national broadcast and print media, local activity is particularly important to far right parties. 
This is seen with Golden Dawn (Dinas et al. 2016), the British National Party and (British) National 
Front (Eatwell and Goodwin 2010), and the (French) Front National (Kestilä and Söderlund 2007). 
These strategies seek to ‘[create] a ‘local culture’ that reinforces anti-immigrant positions 
through contacts in the local community and cooperation with local initiatives’ (Dinas et al 
2016:81). 
This establishes the importance of using sub-national data in looking at the electoral 
performance of the far right. There are further benefits. Kestilä and Söderlund (2007) identify 
three particular advantages of using subnational units as basis for comparative analysis; it 
increases the number of cases, concomitantly increasing degrees of freedom; it is very difficult to 
operationalise different political opportunity structures across states, almost by definition; and 
many campaign or otherwise salient issues can be held constant. This allows the use of 
comparative techniques that would typically be used between states to be used within a single 
state. 
Measuring at the local level 
With both the importance of using local level data to account for sub-national variations and the 
various benefits set out, the following sets out the process for actually measuring and 
operationalising said data. 
Measuring what political parties are doing at the local level is difficult. In particular, as Ellinas 
and Lamprianou (2019) indicate, the nature of political campaigning has changed over time. As 
identification with mainstream or, indeed, any parties has dropped and vote volatility has 
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increased, political parties have shifted from being able to just campaign in the weeks leading up 
to an election – in essence, to remind ‘their’ voters that they were, say, Labour voters and that 
the local polling station was at such and such a place – to campaigning that takes place month in 
and month out, to build relations with voters and avoid the charge of political parties only being 
seen when they want something – votes at election time. This shift presents a particular 
challenge to many studies of campaigning activities by political parties, particularly at the local 
level. It also represents an opportunity upon which, as described above, far right parties have 
seized. 
It is not necessarily sufficient, as some (Carty and Eagles, 1999; Pattie et al. 2003) do, to look at 
spending returns. For instance, under UK electoral law, an appearance by the leader of a party in 
a given locale is included in election returns as spending by the national party, and not by the 
local party (Electoral Commission 2019:16). This flurry of activity, bringing local, regional, and 
national press attention that will make potential voters in a given electoral circumscription 
much more aware of that party, as well as galvanising party activists and, for a time, bringing 
increased administrative support from national and regional political party offices, will not show 
up as local activity in information provided to the Electoral Commission. 
Even setting this aside, local election spending is not necessarily a good guide to activity. A 
relatively wealthy local party with few members can pay for its election literature to be delivered 
to electors, where one without such resources but with willing members can achieve the same 
effect without any financial outlay. 
At the local level, contact is likely to be directly between candidates and party workers and 
voters. It is therefore relatively unlikely to attract attention precisely because of its humdrum 
nature. An alternative, as used by Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019), is self-reported activity by local 
activists and leaders, and by recollections from voters as approaches variously used that have the 
obvious problems of being dependent on human recollection. This is clearly problematic, given 
both the vagaries of human memory, the tendency to present things in a light favourable to 
oneself, and the potential for deliberate deception. This is supported by a dataset gathered from 
the website of the subject of their study, Golden Dawn, that lists all their activities. This is then 
further supported with qualitative research, notably interviews of party leaders, to give an 
understanding of what organisers seek to achieve with their campaigning, and why they choose 
where they campaign. 
However, a simple count of activity in a given location is not sufficient. The temporal factor is 
important. A burst of activity in the period immediately before the polls open might, on a simple 
count, appear of greater magnitude than a lesser total amount of activity that is spread out over 
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months, even though the latter, conceivably, has a greater impact (Ellinas and Lamprianou 2019). 
Intense activity in the run-up to the election may be the traditional form of campaigning, and 
may be effective with some voters, but it is limited to the run-up precisely because party workers 
can only maintain that intense level of campaigning for short periods. Particularly given that, as 
described above, far right parties are likely to be trying to put roots into a community and build 
personal relationships with people, both processes that take time, it is important to have a means 
of assessing both how regularly an area is the target of campaigning and the level of that 
campaigning. 
The solution taken by Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019) is to use separate measures for intensity and 
consistency of action. Intensity is how many campaigning activities taken place in a given time 
period in a given location; consistency is how frequently and regularly campaigning takes place. 
These measures can then be used as independent variables in statistical analysis, with a measure 
of electoral success as a dependent variable. This provides a means of assessing the impact of 
campaigning given the factors listed above that must be considered. It should be noted that this 
method is not necessarily limited to far right parties themselves; the method logically works for 
any form of campaigning where the patterning of intensity and consistency is important. This 
include organisations that campaign against far right parties, both because their own activities 
may be subject to the same dynamics as the parties themselves, and because they will be 
impacting the parties’ campaigning activities. Although this relatively new approach has yet to 
be widely adopted in the literature, the results from Ellinas and Lamprianou’s own work is 
encouraging and suggests the method’s validity, and the results have been adopted by others 
(Vrakopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2019 and Whiteley et al. 2019, for instance). 
Methodological problems 
Translating the potential benefits into reality does run into methodological problems. 
In their critique of Kestilä and Söderlund’s 2007 paper, Arzheimer and Carter do concur that 
‘features of the subnational context are potentially relevant for the radical right vote and should 
be incorporated into more comprehensive accounts of support for these parties’ (Arzheimer and 
Carter 2009:336). However, Arzheimer and Carter (2009) raise a pair of substantial problems: the 
size of electoral circumscriptions, and immigrant status. 
The question of the size of electoral circumscriptions essentially asks as to how local local must 
be. In Kestilä and Söderlund’s (2007) analysis of the FN in France, their units of study, are the 
French departments, which are relatively large in terms of population. The smallest, Lozère, in 
Occitanie, with a population of on the order of seventy-six thousand, approximates the size of a 
Westminster constituency. The largest, Nord, on the border with Belgium, has in excess of two 
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and a half million people, or slightly more than the population of the entire country of Slovenia. 
Indeed, twenty-one departments have over one million inhabitants. Beyond the issue of scale, 
there is also considerable variation between departments in terms of size. 
However, in no small part due to the advances in computing and in governmental attitudes 
towards the open availability of such demographic data, it is increasingly easy to obtain precisely 
the kind of very low level data, both through EUROSTAT and national statistical bureaux. 
Electoral information is dependent on the manner in which votes are collated, but are available 
down to much small circumscriptions than the departement. Berning et al. (2018), for the Sub-
national context and radical right support in Europe (SCoRE) project, were able to use the over 
two thousand French cantons for their study. 
The second issue raised by Arzheimer and Carter (2009) is around immigrant status. People can 
simultaneously be immigrants and have the right to vote. An area with many immigrants, then, 
will not necessarily be a strong candidate for a far right party, of which ever variation, to do well 
on the basis that immigrants who can vote are unlikely to vote against their own interests or, in 
extremis, for their own expulsion. Taken to extremes, Arzheimer and Carter’s (2009) criticism is 
essentially that a department that consisted entirely of immigrants would, on Kestilä and 
Söderlund’s account, be expected to have a very high vote for the Front National, which is clearly 
counter-intuitive. This will hold true for other measures of the allochthonous population. 
Although Kestilä-Kekkonen and Söderlund (2009) do not directly address this issue in their 
rejoinder, the complaint raised by Arzheimer and Carter (2009) is not insurmountable. There are 
few areas of European countries that are not overwhelmingly populated by natives of that 
country; even in the great metropolises, few areas are not majority white. While the effect 
Arzheimer and Carter (2009) describe is real, it does not overwhelm the countervailing effect, not 
least because propensity to vote must be considered. Both registering to vote and turning out to 
vote is lower amongst ethnic minorities (Heath et al 2013), further diminishing the strength of 
the effect. 
In short, the available literature suggests that there are both benefits and necessities to studying 
the far right at a subnational level and that, while there are difficulties in doing so in a rigorous 
manner, they can be overcome. 
This section has set out the first part of the triad of the review of the literature, concerning the 
far right itself. We turn now to opposition to the far right. 
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Opposition to the far right 
This section begins with definitional questions around opposition to the far right in general and 
anti-fascism in particular. As the history of opposition to the far right is unavoidably intertwined 
with the far right itself, this section then sets out that history to later explain how both the far 
right and opposition thereto have developed. 
In one sense, opposition to the far right is trivial to define: it is simply ‘being against the far 
right’. This, however, is rather too loose, and something more workable is required. 
The literature on opposition to the far right is sparse. Much of it specifically deals with 
opposition to fascism, rather than the far right as a whole, and much of it is essentially historical 
in nature, dealing with the previous waves of the far right: the 1930s and the 1970s. It is also 
generally poorly integrated into the literature on the far right itself. As described above, fascist 
and far right were synonyms until the 1980s, and so, until then, anti-fascism was opposition to 
the far right was anti fascism. What literature there is on anti-fascism can therefore be used. 
Nigel Copsey provides an anti-fascist minimum: 
‘What all anti-fascists shared in inter-war Britain, at a minimum, was political and moral 
opposition to fascism rooted in the democratic values of the Enlightenment tradition.’ 
[emphasis in original] (2010:xviii) 
While the premise that the COMINTERN was meaningfully rooted in the Enlightenment tradition 
is an eye-raising one, that is a debate more properly belonging to the realms of political theory. 
Copsey suggests that an actor’s opinion as to whether they are anti-fascist or not must be 
accepted. This is very deeply problematic. His intention is to allow that the Communist Party (CP) 
was anti-fascist, even when, under direction from the COMINTERN’s theory of social fascism, 
even social democrats were fascists. However, it would also mean that someone who genuinely 
believed the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds was protecting cormorants in a fascist 
manner and opposed them on that basis could be considered an anti-fascist. It may be that the CP 
was in some meaningful way antifascist while it considered the Trades Union Congress (TUC) to 
be fascists, but that would be because they actually opposed actual fascists, and not because they 
considered themselves anti-fascist. Motivation is, therefore, less useful in determining what anti-
fascism is, although it may well be useful in determining types of anti-fascism. This does, though, 
have a starting point: ‘political and moral opposition to fascism’. For the present purposes, this is 
still problematic. ‘Moral opposition’, or a general attitude hostile to fascism, would bring in, as 
Williamson (2010) argues, the Conservative party as a major anti-fascist force, despite not taking 
any particular steps against the British Union of Fascists. Translated to the supply and demand 
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factors, it may have had the effect of denying or making political space, as Kitschelt & McGann 
(1995) suggest may have happened in Europe sixty or so years later, but this is an incidental 
effect rather than a specific aim. 
Renton (cited in Copsey 2000:xvii) provides a more useful definition: 
‘activists, people who objected to the rise of fascism, who hated the doctrines of fascism 
and did something to stop their growth [emphasis added]’ 
Renton’s intention is to give particular importance to the CP (and later the Socialist Workers 
Party and Anti-Nazi League, as in Renton (2006)). He highlights the importance of activity. For 
the present purposes, this is key; the specific objects of interest are those civil society 
organisations that oppose far right groups, rather than more generic and widespread attitudes, 
even if they must be taken into account. 
Although Renton’s definition is preferred over Copsey’s, Copsey’s division between radical and 
liberal is more useful than Renton’s active and passive. For Renton, anti-fascism must have a 
countervailing vision, or it is merely non-fascist. This is rather problematic; it is clearly possible, 
both in theory and in practice, to oppose something and to desire its diminution or extinction 
without changing any other part of society, or to simply not have any position on the rest of 
society. It also implies that an organisation with great capacity and many members that did not 
advocate a different vision would be non-fascist, while an organisation that did very little but had 
that alternative vision would actually be anti-fascist (if somewhat ineffectual). The radical/liberal 
division is more useful. That is to say, there is a long-standing division between more and less 
militant approaches to anti-fascism (Olechnowicz 2010), with the former focussing on direct 
confrontation and the latter on demonstration and education, even if they can complement each 
other. Olechnowicz contrasts the Battle of Cable Street with Labour-controlled local councils 
denying the British Union of Fascists access to halls for meetings. These tendencies are at times 
closer together - for instance, during the Popular Front era - and at times further apart - for 
instance, during the Social Fascism era, but persist, certainly into the seventies, with the Anti-
Nazi League ‘emphasising the importance of destroying the NF as an electoral force, and the 
other … emphasising the importance of a layered response to racism’ (Lloyd 1998:81). 
Lloyd (1998) gives many examples of anti-racist groups that could, at least incidentally, oppose 
far right groups. These range from third sector organisations, such as the Joint Council for the 
Welfare of Immigrants, through government bodies, such as the Commission for Racial Equality 
(now the Equality and Human Rights Commission), to those that are neither one nor the other, 
such as Race Equality Councils. While many of these may well have strong views on far right 
parties, they generally do not campaign directly against them, in many cases because they would 
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be specifically prohibited from doing so. Their actions may affect the political climate, but 
otherwise do not directly affect far right parties. Crucially, there is no substantial information 
available on how any effects that they might have would fit into the framework of supply and 
demand, or at what level, as discussed above. 
Husbands (2002:57) provides a useful breakdown of state responses to far right parties under 
three heads: control-based, education-based, and social policy-based. While some of these, such 
as proscription, are clearly outwith the abilities of non-state actors, it is interesting to note that 
some, principally in the education-based policy area, can be delivered by them. 
This provides a working understanding of what the opposition to the far right that is of interest 
to this study in both is and is not. It is active, rather than passive; it is deliberate rather than 
incidental; it is targeted rather than generically aimed at improving race relations. It is therefore 
possible to describe the subjects of this thesis as those groups that campaign against far right 
parties, or parties they perceive to be far right, specifically on the basis that they are far right, 
with a particular focus on damaging their electoral prospects and, potentially, their very 
existence. 
The historical literature on the development of opposition to the 
far right 
Having established what the far right is and why it may do well, and what opposition to the far 
right is, it is useful to very briefly give an account of the development of opposition to the far 
right in the particular case of the UK. Because the existence of the far right is almost a 
precondition for the existence of opposition thereto, the development of far right groups and 
opposition groups is intertwined. The particular historical circumstances of the case of the far 
right and opposition thereto in the United Kingdom shape how both sets of groups understand 
the world around them and each other and, consequently, how they act. The list of anti-fascist 
and anti-racist groups (AFOR, ALARM, ALCARD, ALARAFCC, ALCC, AAM, AFA, AFDA, AFL, AFRG, 
ANL, AWAFM, to list just some of those beginning with the letter ‘a’) reaches Pythonesque levels. 
To list the associations, divisions, rapprochements, and relations between the groups over the 
years would be akin to herding Geryon’s cattle. A synthesis of the broad trends in the available 
literature will therefore be used. 
The first wave of far right activity in the UK is generally associated with Oswald Mosley and the 
British Union of Fascists. This provoked a range of opposition, much of it centred around the CP 
and the Labour party (Copsey 2010). The opposition saw the British Union of Fascists. as a direct, 
physical threat to themselves, potentially interested and able to take over the country, and (at 
times) the manifestation of the most reactionary parts of capitalism. In particular, they used 
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marches as a recruiting tool and as a show of force. In response, there was inter alia direct 
physical confrontation, area denial, and restriction on access to meeting halls etc. (Olechnowicz 
2010). 
The experience of the Second World War made fascism and anything that smacked of it so 
socially unacceptable that it would remain politically unviable until the 1960s, with the rise of the 
National Front (Copsey 2000). A range of factors, not least the loss of the 1966 election by the 
relatively moderate Edward Heath and the intervention of A.K. Chesterton led to space for the 
resurgence of the far right in the form of the National Front (NF). Meanwhile, opposition to the 
far right had withered without a substantial far right to oppose (Copsey 2000). Nevertheless, the 
NF would be in turn eventually opposed by the Anti-Nazi League (Renton 2006), who followed the 
tactics that had passed into collective memory to oppose the Front. Copsey (2000) suggests that 
the Anti-Nazi League may have appeared on the scene relatively late in the day, when the NF had 
passed its zenith. The NF, in turn, would go into decline, perhaps aided by the rightward shift of 
the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher. The anti-fascist movement itself would decline, such 
that ‘[i]n October 1981 [anti-fascist magazine] Searchlight had described a situation where there 
was “no anti-racist, anti-fascist movement to speak of”’ (Copsey 2000:153) 
The next re-emergence of the far right would be the British National Party, itself the result of a 
split in the NF. Their first apogee was with the election of Derek Beackon to represent the 
Millwall ward of Tower Hamlets in 1992. This rather caught the quiescent anti-fascist movement 
on the hop, with what protests there were being described as ‘too little, too late’ (Copsey 
2000:153) and mainly after the fact. Indeed, the campaigning efforts in 1994 by the remains of the 
Anti-Nazi League were seen by some in the area as worse than the BNP (Copsey 2000). The Anti-
Nazi League would eventually be wound up in 1996. 
The BNP would become less effective until the replacement of its leader, John Tyndall, with the 
more charismatic Nick Griffin in 1999, which was the prelude to another rise for the far right in 
Britain. As it grew, two new organisations were set up. One, Unite Against Fascism, was formed in 
2003. In an interesting historical parallel, it emerged a year after the music-based campaign, Love 
Music Hate Racism, it would later shepherd, much as the Anti-Nazi League emerged after Rock 
Against Racism. In 2004, Hope Not Hate (HnH) was set up, as a split from Searchlight. Long a 
magazine, Searchlight had become more active in campaigning since the nineties (Copsey 2000), 
crucially differing from groups such as Anti-Fascist Action (which would gravitate to UAF) in 
seeing the state as a potential ally, rather than a partial cause of the racism on which the far right 
capitalised. UAF adopted the methods and mores of the tendency previously found in the Anti-
Nazi League and, before that, the CP-organised protests against the British Union of Fascists. HnH 
58 
would adopt a more moderate strategy that had started with Searchlight in the late 1990s (Hope 
not Hate 2014a). 
Both UAF and HnH would later include UKIP amongst their targets of opposition (Unite Against 
Fascism 2014; Lowles 2004). Without wanting to pass judgement on whether UKIP actually are far 
right, UAF and HnH act on the basis that the party is a far right party. 
As a crude indication that these are not fly-by-night organisations, Hope Not Hate has received 
support from popular singers, comedians, politicians, businesspeople, trade unions, and 
newspapers. Hope Not Hate Educational, the charitable wing of Hope Not Hate, attracts grants 
running into six figures and has received funding from the Department for Communities and 
Local Government (Hope Not Hate 2015). Unite Against Fascism similarly lists MPs, MEPs, peers, 
and the general secretaries of trade unions amongst its officers. 
This section has set out the historical context of the far right and opposition to the far right in 
the United Kingdom, particularly how they have interacted. However, it is necessary to 
understand the why as well as the how. In the next section, the literature on social movements is 
examined as a possible explanation for why these opposition groups have evolved and behaved as 
they have done. 
This has set out the second part of the literature review, concerning opposition to the far right. 
The next section looks to the literature on social movements as a means to understanding the 
groups that engage in that opposition. 
Social movements 
The first two sections of this chapter have given an overview of the literature on the far right, 
and particularly of the focus in that literature on the different factors that cause far right parties 
to be more or less successful, and located some of the gaps in that literature, especially around 
opposition and meso-level explanations. It has then given a historical account of opposition to 
the far right (qua opposition, rather than incidentally to other objectives) in the particular case 
of the United Kingdom. While this gives what has happened and explains some of the particular 
events and narratives that have emerged, it does not explain the internal dynamics of groups 
opposed to the far right, either in general or in the specific cases of Hope not Hate and Unite 
Against Fascism, and so how the act and react. 
In order to do this, it is useful to understand Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism as social 
movements (Tilly 2006), and to consider the dynamics between those two opposition groups and 
far right parties, both in general and the pair that are the focus of the present study, and the 
state as contentious politics (Tarrow 2011). In this manner, we can explain much of the rise of the 
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opposition groups through the lens of political opportunity structures (McAdam 1982). This 
section begins by looking at definitions of social movements, before expanding their focus 
beyond the state. It then considers how they can have impact and how that impact can be 
measured. 
What is a social movement? 
Prior to the work of the triumvirate of Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam, both separately and in 
combination, analysis of what would later be called social movements engaged in contentious 
politics was compartmentalised, according to interest in revolution, strike, protest, and the like, 
or in single case studies of historical interest. It was not systematically studied as a phenomenon 
in its own right (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). 
These three would synthesis these into a broader phenomenon – the social movement – engaged 
in contentious politics. These terms warrant further analysis. For Tilly (2006:21), ‘Contentious 
politics occurs, then, when connected clusters of persons make consequential claims on other 
clusters of persons or on major political actors, just so long as at least one government is a 
claimant, an object of claims, or a third party to the claims’. This definition allows us to make 
some determinations as to both the nature of the contestation and the participants in it. Firstly, 
because these groups of individuals must be connected, they are acting together for more than a 
moment; a single petition would not indicate contentious politics, but a series of petitions and 
other activities from the same group on the same or similar issues, seeking change in the actions 
and activities of another group, would indicate contentious politics. By the involvement of the 
state, even if just as a third party, we can also see that these are inherently political activities. 
From the cases studied by Tilly and Tarrow, which are returned to below, it can be seen that 
contentious politics are often taken to be dealing with issues of the greatest import – the high 
politics of the nature and even the existence of the state when faced with revolution or 
widespread internal dissent. However, the definition does not require such grand themes to be at 
play; to take a banal example, a one-off petition for (say) a cycle lane on a particular street would 
not be contentious politics. A sustained campaign by an organised group to improve cycling 
provision across a district would be, not least because it has the state, even if manifested through 
municipal government, as target and a change in its behaviour (at least as regards the use of the 
public highway) as object.  
This sets out the broad dynamic of contentious politics; it will be returned to below in the 
discussion of political opportunity structures. What, then, is the social movement? For Tilly 
(2005:369), it is ‘the deliberate, ostentatious mounting of a sustained challenge to powerholders 
60 
in the name of a disadvantaged population living under the jurisdiction or influence of those 
powerholders’. 
Prima facie, this offers little beyond the understanding of contentious politics set out above. 
However, where contentious politics sets out the broad, political, and social context in which this 
manner of disputation occurs, the description of these actors as social movements shifts the 
focus to them as agents. It focuses on their actions – what they actually do (Kriesi 2009). 
The key here is that there is contestation going on; this contestation is not merely ‘market 
relations, lobbying, or representative politics’ (Tarrow 2011:4) of a transactional nature, but 
actions that represent either a challenge to power – power is being exercised in the wrong way – 
or a threat to power – power is being exercised by the wrong people. Moreover, it both depends 
on and builds solidarity and connection between the participants (McAdam 2013). The 
phenomenon of contentious politics both requires groups, rather than collections of individuals, 
and then deepens the bonds of trust and, indeed, kinship between them so that they have the 
ability to act as a collectivity and have motivation to act as such, even if it is not necessarily in 
their own personal interest. In this, we see an answer to a question raised by Mancur Olson’s 
Logic of Collective Action (1971). If, pace Olson, it is not in an individual’s personal interest to, for 
instance, attend a protest calling for a given change, or it is too easy to free ride and allow others 
to do the unglamorous work of standing in the rain to collect signatures for a petition, why would 
people bother? Essentially, such activity becomes a requisite of group membership and signifier 
thereof. This can then be either a psychological necessity, or, from a view perhaps more palatable 
to Olson, a valid expenditure of time because of the social benefits it brings. 
It is important to note that much of the focus of Tarrow, McAdam, and Tilly was on politics that 
sought to change or influence the state qua the state. This means looking at movements that 
sought to change what activities the state did or did not engage in, to promote acting in certain 
ways or deter acting in others, to deal with certain groups of people but not others, and, indeed, 
who occupied positions of power and influence within the edifice of the state. Much of this come 
from the particular cases from which conclusions about broader trends were drawn; in the case 
of Tilly, protests against the French ancien régime, from the peasant uprisings in the Vendée 
(Tilly 1964), or, for Tarrow, revolutionary France and America, and Britain of the same period 
(Tarrow 2011), or the American civil rights movement of the twentieth century (McAdam 1982). 
The civil rights movement has remained a fruitful avenue of research concerning social 
movements up till now (for instance, Wasow’s (2020) paper on the particular effects of violent, as 
opposed to peaceful, protest). This gives a view of contentious politics as always being state-
focused; McAdam and Tarrow (2018) look at openings in regimes and, crucially, how states 
respond to contentious politics. The locus is clearly placed on the state.There are three elements 
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to this conception of the social movement; the campaign, a ‘social-movement repertoire’ (Tilly 
2006:53), and displays of ‘worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment’ (Tilly 2006:53), or WUNC 
displays. 
The campaign is largely self-explanatory; rather than a one-off event, it is a series of co-
ordinated events by a group that has at least some temporal persistence that makes claims on the 
state or on other groups. In this, little distinguishes it from what we would expect to see from 
contentious politics. 
A key feature is the repertoire of actions is a set of well-understood and well-practiced means of 
protest; well-understood by both those engaging in them, and those at who they are aimed. They 
are ‘routines that apply to the same claimant-object pairs’ (Tilly 1986:2), whether those pairs be 
rival political factions or people in an economic relationship. This repertoire varies from time to 
time, place to place, and group to group as it is ‘rooted in the shared subculture of … activists’ 
(Della Porta 2018:465). A repertoire might involve a march to a traditional gathering place – 
Trafalgar Square in London has variously served as location, starting point, or destination for 
protests and marches in the United Kingdom since the Chartists arrived there at the end of their 
1848 march (Weinreb and Hibbert 1983). Even within a single field – for instance, industrial 
relations – there is the variety of sabotage, lock-out, strike, work to rule and so on. However, only 
one or a small number of these will form a particular repertoire. 
While the defining feature of these repertoires are their recurrence – a one-off performance is 
definitionally not a repertoire – they are not static in time or in place. Indeed, they are both 
modular and transferable (Wada 2012). That is to say, the repertoire of one time and place can 
reappear, deliberately copied, in another (it is transferable) and parts of one repertoire can 
reappear, rather than the whole concert being taken (it is modular). For instance, the cacerolazo, 
or noisy protest of banged pots and pans, typifies protests in South America against right-wing, 
military dictatorships in the latter half of the twentieth century (Meléndez-Badillo 2019); it 
would translate to Spain, initially used as a protest against Spain’s engagement in the Second Iraq 
War and to indicate the protestors’ views of the then-Prime Minister of Spain, Jose-Maria Aznar 
(El País 2003). What drives a repertoire is precisely its familiarity; there must be, at least, a 
substantial portion of any protest or similar that is familiar enough to its participants for them to 
know what to do. Because these repertoires act on a relationship between ‘claimant-object pairs’ 
(Tilly 1986:2), the way in which objects of protest, whether the state or a third party, they will 
change in response to the reactions of said objects of protest, or the public at large, media, and so 
on. 
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However, this process of innovation is slow (Tilly 2006). Such innovation in tactics and strategy 
that occurs is slow. The features of protest – the routes that are marched, the songs that are sung, 
the slogans that are chanted, but also the fact that there is a march, there is a song, there is a 
slogan – are handed down from generation of activists to generation of activists (della Porta 
2013). Indeed, the aforementioned march to London goes well back before Trafalgar Square’s use 
as a rallying point by the Chartists, perhaps as far back as the Peasants’ Revolt of Wat Tyler in 
1381. In a less extreme version, the manifestations of protest seen in contemporary left-leaning 
groups today have roots back into their forebears on the left. 
A further feature is the WUNC display, with WUNC representing worthiness, unity, numbers, and 
commitment (Tilly 2006:53). The idea is simple enough; the demonstration of a substantial 
number of worthy people who are unified in message and committed to a cause are more likely to 
achieve the change they desire. The importance of the number of people present is largely self-
explanatory; a substantial number of people suggests that the issue at hand is important to many 
and, so, may be of importance to the bystander and the politician – democratically elected or not 
– whether because of the issue itself or because it is of import to those under them. Unity 
similarly suggests that there is agreement on the issue’s importance and, perhaps, the manner in 
which it can be remediated. Commitment – repeatedly raising the issue, or inconveniencing 
oneself by raising the issue – again suggests that the issue matters enough to raise a fuss over. 
Worthiness refers both to the manner in which participants conduct themselves and the people 
who are chosen to represent the movement, perhaps as speakers; if they are people of standing, 
recognised by the community, they are likely to have greater weight in convincing people of the 
importance of the cause, particularly if supported by people acting in a sober manner. 
Worthiness is, however, very much in the eye of the beholder. A manner of protest that might be 
considered entirely appropriate by, say, an organiser might be seen very differently by others; 
what is a carnival atmosphere to one is unwelcome rowdiness to another. Similarly, the choice of 
a particular parliamentarian as a speaker might be made by organisers on the basis of their 
stature and because they and people likely to attend the protest consider them worthy, while 
that opinion is not shared by the public at large. 
It should be noted that a gathering of people together does not, in and of itself, constitute a social 
movement; rather it is the organisation and persistence of action, taking a cue from existing 
relations and building on them, that turns it into a social movement (Tarrow 2011). 
Social movements beyond the state 
Thus far, contentious politics and social movements have targeted the state. However, the 
delimitation of contentious politics has been such that it does not look at activity that concerns 
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itself with the government or the state, even when the processes at work in the organising 
groups are the same (Snow 2004); it is necessary to broaden the scope of social movements 
(Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Indeed, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) accept that their take on 
the phenomenon may be too rigid. Snow modifies the classic definition of a social movement to 
be collective challenges to ‘extant systems of authority, or resisting change in such systems’ 
(Snow 2004:11).  
In short, while contentious politics may often have the state as target, they do not necessarily 
have to. Indeed, Tilly makes it clear that, for his definition, governments do not have to ‘figure as 
the makers or receivers of contentious claim’ (Tilly 2008:7); rather, it is sufficient for 
governments to be ‘monitoring and regulating public contention, and preparing to step in if the 
claim making gets unruly’ (Tilly 2008:7). This reduces the necessary role of the state to little, if 
anything, more than any other activity that private individuals undertake within a given state. 
Even the most quotidiarian task takes place against the backdrop of a state that regulates the 
manner in which goods and services may be sold, what may or may not be included in products, 
how water will be delivered to the household, and so on; most importantly, it regulates how 
grievances against the state or against other private actors may be expressed. Indeed, if the role 
of the state in this definition may be as limited as Tilly suggests, the requirement for a state to be 
involved is essentially met by the mere existence of a functioning state. Even if the state were so 
reduced as to not meet the classic Weberian (Weber 2014) minimum of a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence, the state would, definitionally, be under contestation and so would 
conceivably be more assertive in its actions. 
In any case, the state largely gives or, at the very least, shapes the laws. The state may not say 
that a particular form of protests is good or bad, effective or counter-productive, desired or not 
desired, but it certainly says, even if implicitly, whether a protest is legal or not. Indeed, police 
are often deployed at protests specifically to maintain law and order; to ensure that the 
gathering stays within the boundaries of what the state deems acceptable and to detain and 
potentially prosecute those who go beyond those bounds. 
A starting point in shifting away from the exclusive focus on the state is to look at the relations 
between social movements and political parties. Although Tilly (2006) sees members of the polity 
and participants in social movements – that is to say, those who already have access to the state 
and those who must combine in order to pressure the state to achieve their preferred outcomes 
or, more simply, insiders and outsiders – as quite separate, the division is not necessarily so clear 
cut (Hutter et al 2018). There are relations of different sorts between political parties and social 
movements. Political parties can grow from social movements; this is typified by the pattern of 
Labour and Social Democratic parties growing out of the trade union movement. Political parties 
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and social movements can also be allies; a social movement can seek to achieve its aims through 
an existing political party or by establishing its own, as with many green parties. Equally, 
political parties can use mobilised social movements as a means to demonstrate the extent of 
their support in bargaining with other political parties, not least as a signal to strength and depth 
of feeling (Hutter et al 2018). 
However, this presupposes a positive relationship between the party and the movement, with the 
one trying to support or, at least, exploit the other. No allowance is made for an explicitly hostile 
relationship, where the aim of the social movement is the diminution of the party’s power, votes, 
and relevance. Nevertheless, the insights from the theories set out still hold. The focus can be 
shifted away from the state further - for instance, with movements for corporate social 
responsibility (Soule 2009), Wal-Mart openings (Ingram et al 2010), and universities (Walker et al 
2008) - and still allow for the use of social movements as a lens for understanding. The target may 
also influence the tactics and strategies that groups use (Walker et al 2008); different targets have 
different abilities to respond and are vulnerable in different ways, both from each other and from 
the state. 
How can social movements have impact? 
Whether social movements have any impact is a vexed question (Amenta et al 2018); with 
findings that they do matter (Gamson 1990) and that they are not particularly important (Giugni 
2009). Social movements can be causal agents; they can have impact. However, ‘they are not 
likely to be dominant causal forces’ (Amenta et al 2018:449). It is therefore useful to look at 
different manners in which social movements may have impact. 
Most work on the consequences of social movements has been about policy (Giugni 1998); for 
instance, McAdam and Boudet’s (2012) work on granting of licences for the construction of 
liquefied national gas infrastructure in the United States, Giugni’s (2004) research on the policy 
outcomes of the anti-nuclear, green, and peace movements in Europe, or Burstein and 
Freudenburg’s (1978) study of the effects of protest on votes concerning the Vietnam War in the 
United States Senate, variously looking at how different state structures, incentives, and types of 
mobilization work, but also Rochon and Mazmanian (1993), Schumaker (1975), Rudig (1990), and 
others. 
At first glance, it appears that work on the internals of social movements and the tactics they use 
give contradictory findings. However, this may be explained by looking at context; a strategy that 
works in one setting may not work in another (Giugni 1998). The political opportunity structures 
against which a social movement takes place mean that the same action or set of actions will not 
necessarily have the same result (Kitschelt 1986). 
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Amenta and Young (1999) argue that states with different structures and capacities will react to 
social movements in different ways, with more or less openness and responsiveness. This opens 
up an important consideration; it is possible for a social movement to be effective in its aims, to 
not have any particular effect, and to actually make it harder for its stated aims to be achieved. In 
Amenta and Young’s (1999) formulation, this is because the state may, essentially, respond to 
challenges repressively, but the logic can be extended beyond the state. If the target of a social 
movement is the public at large, its actions may drive some or all away from the protest and even 
towards the opposite position. In some cases, this would lead to a negative outcome, from the 
movement’s perspective, because of the effect on the state (Giugni and Yamasaki 2009), but 
where the state is not needed as an actor and the intention of the movement is to change voting 
behaviour, it can have its effect directly. 
In this regard of changing public opinions as expressed at the voting booth as the objective 
rather than a concrete change in state policy, the nearest comparator for the policies of a state 
would be the individual perspectives of voters when the aim of a movement is limited to 
convincing people to vote in a particular way with the objective of preventing a given party from 
achieving electoral success, rather than an instrumental means of changing government policy. 
This focus is broadly common across the literature that looks at the impact, rather than the 
generation or maintenance, of social movements, and is seen in how success and failure is 
understood; Gamson’s (1990) search for concessions granted by targets to challengers. This is 
extended by Amenta and Young (1999) to allow for collective benefits, or ‘benefits from which 
members of the intended beneficiary group cannot be readily excluded’ (Amenta & Young 
1999:155). 
Clearly, there are other means of having impact aside from policies. This includes the ‘influence 
of movements on elections, political parties, administrative agencies, and courts and legal 
systems’ (Amenta et al 2018:459-460). Although the focus of the activities of the groups under 
consideration do not cover administrative agencies or legal systems as a substantial part of their 
activity, the process is similar to seeking policy changes from the elected, legislative part of the 
state, although the dynamics by which public pressure is brought to bear are different, with 
elected representatives potentially acting as a conduit to state functions that are usually at one 
remove from the public. The relations between social movements and political parties, 
particularly at elections, are discussed below. 
It is worth considering some of the means by which social movements seek to make change, and 
the activities they engage in to do so. In a review of transnational, and particularly European, 
anti-racist coalitions, Stefano Ruzza (2006) highlights the varied nature of anti-racist and allied 
movements and the actions they undertake, from extra-institutional protest actions to working 
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alongside or very close to policy-making and enforcing institutions. In particular, Ruzza 
emphasises that it is hard to pin down compared to other movements that might broadly come 
under the heading of social justice, as it waxes and wanes, and is not bookended by signal events 
that give it clear demarcations in the manner that, for instance, anti-nuclear protests were 
galvanised by the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl (Ruzza 2006:116). In short, anti-racist and allied 
movements wax and wane over time and space, with their methods and focuses likewise 
changing. 
However, we can begin to categorise the methods used by protest groups by using Rootes’ five-
fold categorisation of conventional, demonstrative, confrontational, minor attacks on property, 
and violence (Rootes 2003b). As the category names suggest, there is an implied increase in 
militancy up the scale. Conventional methods might also be understood as polite forms: writing 
letters and signing petitions, distributing leaflets and holding public meetings. The next step up 
is the demonstrative: ‘street matches, rallies, and vigils’ (Rootes 2003b:31) followed by the 
confrontational – ‘occupations and physical obstructions’ (Rootes 2003b:31). The penultimate 
category is minor attacks on property, and the last is outright violence, including property 
damage that could pose a risk to life. 
Clearly, these are not hard and fast categories. There is a grey boundary between property 
damage that could and could not pose a risk to life. A street march necessarily takes up space on 
the public highway and is therefore very close to a physical obstruction, the difference being 
whether the prime intention is to cause the obstruction or not. The difference between a public 
meeting and a rally can be whether a hall is booked or a meeting point is chosen in a park. 
However, besides the increasing militancy, other features can be seen.  Firstly, there are different 
targets.  In some cases, the target is the public at large; in others, it is the state in its various 
different manifestations.  This leads to the second feature; the theory of the case.  In some cases 
the aim is simply to change public opinion as an end in and of itself.  This is clearly of benefit for 
a campaign that seeks to change attitudes such as one concerned with racial and ethnic 
integration, for instance.  However, shifting public opinion can also be an intermediary step in 
changing the opinions or the actions of politicians, or both, by encouraging the public at large to 
communicate their preferences two elected and other officials. Changing the decisions made by 
public officials by directly lobbying them is a further avenue. All of these aims can be seen in the 
different categories, though a connection may be drawn between increasing militancy and the 
extent to which the group perceives the urgency of their campaign or their distrust of the state. 
(Rootes 2003a:2). Ultimately, a violent action may be calculated to directly hinder the ability of a 
target – the state or a non-state actor, such as a company or political party – to go about its 
business. 
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Although social movements might not think in terms of WUNC displays (Tilly 2004), the range of 
actions they can take – from as unthreatening an action as handing out a leaflet all the way to 
acts tantamount to terrorism do give us insight into how they may see themselves, and who they 
think they are appealing to. 
Conclusion 
This review has looked at the three principal literatures that impact on the question: what effect 
does opposition to far right parties have? These are the literature on the far right itself, on anti-
fascism and anti-racism, and on social movements. In looking at the literature on the far right, it 
has identified a split common to the literature between an older form of the far right descended 
from the fascism of the 1920s and 1930s and a newer form based on populism, authoritarianism, 
and nativism (Mudde 2007). Support for this newer form, that now dominates the far right, can 
be explained in terms of demand and supply. Demand factors are felt to be helpful and sometimes 
necessary, but not sufficient, for the far right to do well. These can be understood at different 
levels - macro, meso, and micro. While the macro level offers many potential explanations for 
why people might vote for far right parties, they are generally poorly connected to the 
individual. The meso level, which remains understudied, can potentially offer this connection. In 
particular, the role of opposition is understudied. Much of the literature is historical, focussing 
on anti-fascism from the 1920s to the 1980s, rather than in the world of the populist radical right. 
The development of opposition to the far right was briefly discussed, with attention being paid to 
its long roots in anti-fascism, and how this shapes more and less confrontational forms today. 
Finally, possible explanations for this were found by identifying opposition groups as social 
movements, with all that entails, including the development and maintenance of repertoires of 
contention. Taken together, this provides the basis for the next parts of this research.  
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Chapter 3 – Research design, data, and methods 
Introduction 
While voting behaviour in general, and why people vote for far right parties in particular, is a 
well-studied area, the effect of opposition on voting for the far right is understudied. There is not 
a broad range of readily available theories that can be tested in a particular circumstance, or 
even a dataset against which to test. This leads to two different kinds of questions: what is 
happening, and why is it happening? Plano Clark and Badiee argue that one ‘should start with 
research questions, and all methods decisions should follow directly from these questions’ (Plano 
Clark and Badiee 2010:278). In order to answer these two different kinds of question, this thesis 
adopts a mixed-methods approach; more specifically, it adopts an explanatory sequential 
research design (Cresswell 2014), consisting of a quantitative analysis of far right electoral 
performance in the United Kingdom between 2005 and 2015, accounting for opposition group 
activity, followed by a qualitative case study of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham to 
explain the results. 
This chapter sets out the rationale for using a mixed methods approach, and the specific instance 
of an explanatory sequential approach. It then identifies the variables measured for the 
quantitative section and how they are operationalized, together with how data are sourced and 
processed. Next, it provides further details on the methods used and the rationale for them, 
before setting out expectations as to what will be seen in the quantitative analysis. 
Throughout this study, there is a focus on the local level because of the manner in which 
campaigns and opposition take place, and because, as set out in the review of the literature, it is 
held that using national-level data obscures the variation that is seen within a country. By using 
local level data, we also increase the number of cases; instead of a relatively small number of 
countries, data for hundreds of constituencies or thousands of wards is used. This adds 
robustness to the quantitative methods described below, both through the mathematical 
operation of a larger N and because of the theoretical reasons set out here. 
Why a mixed methods approach? 
Although we can develop informed expectations, the effect of opposition groups on the electoral 
performance of far right parties is unknown; thus, the first questions to answer concern what is 
actually happening. Do we see a diminution of votes for far right parties where opposition groups 
are active? Does it matter how the opposition manifests, or what kind of far right party it 
targets? These are questions about what is happening; are there correlations between the activity 
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under investigation and the electoral results we are measuring? With these answered, we can 
turn to the second kind of question – what explains these results?  
Quantitative and qualitative methods provide different views of data and have their own 
advantages and disadvantages. In short, quantitative methods are useful for analysing large 
amounts of data, with relatively few variables, and provide generalizability. However, 
quantitative methods cannot provide the understanding of particular cases that qualitative cases 
can. Moreover, qualitative methods can show the causation that quantitative methods cannot. In 
this instance, we can use quantitative methods to analyse what is going on at elections, and then 
qualitative methods to understand why it is going on. Adopting mixed methods provides ‘breadth 
and depth of understanding and corroboration’ (Johnson et al 2007:123).  
However, satisfactorily answering the research questions also requires an approach tailored to 
the specifics of the questions given the state of knowledge about the particular subjects. 
There are, of course, very many possible research designs, even when just considering mixed-
methods approaches; when categorizing just mixed-methods research designs, Cresswell and 
Plano Clark (2017) identify fifteen different typologies of research designs, including four by 
Cresswell, Plano Clark, and their various co-authors. However, Cresswell and Plano Clark’s (2017) 
most recent typology of mixed-methods research designs is also, their most parsimonious, and 
gives an indication of the broad approaches available. Of the three they identify – explanatory 
sequential, exploratory sequential, and triangulation – an explanatory sequential design is most 
appropriate. 
An explanatory sequential research design begins with quantitative research and then seeks to 
explain the results from that numerical portion with qualitative research. (Ivankova et al. 2006). 
The qualitative section selects cases from the quantitative research that are particularly apt for 
explaining the broad trends seen. Because this approach uses the results of the quantitative 
investigation to guide selection of the qualitative research, it is particularly appropriate for an 
under-studied field. 
In short, the extensive, quantitative research uses a large number of cases to determine, in a 
robust and generalizable manner, what correlations exist, while the intensive, qualitative 
research uses a single case study to explain those correlations. Although luminaries such as King, 
Keohane, and Verba (1994) decry the use of case studies, this extensive-intensive approach that 
makes use of case studies is also used elsewhere in the study of political parties generally (such as 
Katz 1980) and the far right in particular (for instance, van Kessel 2015; Vasilopoulou 2010). 
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Time period 
The aim of this study is to determine the effect of civil society opposition on the electoral 
performance of far right parties. In the process of narrowing down this very broad question to 
our exemplar of the situation in the United Kingdom, and the particular groups and parties – 
Hope not Hate, Unite Against Fascism, the British National Party and the United Kingdom 
Independence Party – the geography of the study is set for us. It is necessary to also determine a 
time period in which to conduct this study. Because this study focuses specifically on the 
electoral performance of the two parties and the effects of the opposition groups thereupon, it 
makes sense to use elections as cut-off dates as campaigning specifically for an election ends with 
that election. 
Nick Griffin’s election as leader of the British National Party saw him start on a process of 
modernizing the party. By 2002, this was starting to yield success, with the first candidates 
returned to office since Derek Beackon in Millwall in 1993, in Burnley. The British National Party 
would continue to see electoral success, leading to the formation of Unite Against Fascism in the 
mould of the Anti-Nazi League in 2003. Searchlight started what would become Hope not Hate 
following race riots in the north of England in 2001. Lowles (2014) marks 2004 as the start of Hope 
not Hate. However, both these groups took time to organize themselves, fundraise, employ staff 
and engage volunteers, and begin the process of campaigning, and specifically campaigning at 
elections. It is therefore appropriate to take the next set of elections, on 5th May 2005, as the 
starting point for the study. 
On winning an absolute majority in the House of Commons on the 7th May 2015, David Cameron 
began implementing his party’s pledge to hold a referendum on the United Kingdom’s continued 
membership of the European Union. The necessary legislation, the European Union Referendum 
Act 2015, began its journey through Parliament only twenty-one days later when it received its 
first reading in the House of Commons on 28th May 2015. It would complete that journey shortly 
before the end of the year, receiving Royal Assent on 17th December 2015. The passing of the Act 
and the beginning in earnest of the Brexit referendum would mark a sharp discontinuity in 
British politics; the public debate would shift from the breadth of policy to focus almost 
exclusively on the plebiscite. Accordingly, the close of polls at eleven o’ clock in the evening on 
7th May 2015 at the last election before the beginning of the Brexit process marks an appropriate 
end date for the present study as British politics would substantially shift, with the saliency of 
issues changing very quickly thereafter. 
The case study of Barking and Dagenham looks at a period within this period; specifically, 2006 to 
2010. This covers the electoral cycle from the British National Party’s greatest success, becoming 
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the largest opposition party on the council in 2006, to the loss of all their seats in 2010. This 
period represents a high point for activity by the opposition groups and so gives the best 
opportunity to identify and understand them. 
Elections 
The elections under consideration are as follows. 
For the entirety of Great Britain, the Westminster elections of 5th May 2005, 6th May 2010, 
and 7th May 2015; 
For the entirety of Great Britain, the European parliamentary elections of 4th June 2009 
and 22nd May 2014; 
For England, the local elections of 5th May 2005, 4th May 2006, 3rd May 2007, 1st May 
2008, 4th June 2009, 6th May 2010, 5th May 2011, 3rd May 2012, 2nd May 2013, 22nd May 
2014, and 7th May 2015; 
For Wales, the local elections of 1st May 2008 and 3rd May 2012; 
For Scotland, the local elections of 3rd May 2007 and 3rd May 2012. 
The governments of Wales and Scotland have instituted a single system of local government 
across their respective jurisdictions with one level of municipal government with all-out 
elections below Holyrood and Cardiff Bay, and so there is, with the exception noted below, one 
set of local elections every four years. England retains a complex, patchwork quilt of two-tier and 
different types of unitary arrangements, with some councils having all-out elections and others 
electing by halves and thirds. Hence, there are local elections somewhere in England almost 
every year, although generally not across the entirety of the country. 
The local elections that took place in the rest of Wales on 3rd May 2012 did not take place in 
Anglesey/Ynys Môn as the council had had executive functions suspended; the elections were 
delayed until 2nd May 2013. They are included in the data set. 
Northern Ireland is excluded from this study for a variety of reasons. The political situation is 
substantially different; none of the Northern Irish parties contest elections in Great Britain, and 
the parties in Great Britain do not contest elections in Northern Ireland. The electoral system for 
European elections is different to the rest of the UK. Moreover, the BNP and UKIP did not make 
great efforts in Ulster. The BNP did not contest either the 2009 or 2014 European elections there, 
and UKIP only contested the 2014 elections. UKIP ran a single candidate at the 2007 Stormont 
elections despite there being 108 seats. At the 2011 Stormont elections, UKIP ran only six 
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candidates and the British National Party three, again out of a possible 108 seats. UKIP ran ten 
out a possible eighteen candidates for the Westminster parliament in 2015 while the BNP did not 
stand at all in that year. Neither UKIP nor the BNP stood any candidates for the Westminster 
elections in 2005 or 2010. Most importantly, neither Hope not Hate nor Unite Against Fascism 
undertook any activities there.  
Case study: Barking and Dagenham 
A case study, per Gerring (2004:341), is ‘an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to 
generalize across a larger set of units’. Because case studies are conducted on a low, perhaps 
singular, number of cases, time- and resource- intensive analysis is possible (Katz 1980). 
There are several criteria on which to choose a case study; these include the typical, diverse, 
extreme, deviant, influential, most similar, and most different (Seawright and Gerring 2008:297-
298). As the function of the case study here is a broad analysis of a particular unit within the 
broader universe of cases, the ‘extreme’ strategy is most appropriate (Seawright and Gerring 
2008). The particular case chosen is the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham in the period 
from 2006 to 2010. It is extreme in two ways; it represents the greatest success obtained by the 
British National Party, becoming the official opposition in a local council for the first and only 
town, and it represents the greatest intensity and consistency of activity by both Hope not Hate 
and Unite Against Fascism.  
The time period for this thesis is from 2005 to 2015. As set out above, this represents a relatively 
distinct period of activity opposing the far right. The far right had, before the late nineties, been 
quiescent, with its opposition therefore being the same. By 2005, both the far right and the 
opposition thereto in the UK was back. The 2015 general election marked the beginning of the 
Brexit process and the end of that period of the history of the far right in British politics. The 
case study only looks at the period from 2006 to 2010 as it represents the complete, four-year 
cycle of local elections in the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham. It focuses on the BNP 
because of the geographically concentrated nature of its support, which allows intense forms of 
activity by both Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism against it, which does not apply to 
UKIP, who have a more traditional, mass communication-based form of campaigning. 
As the results from the quantitative analysis suggest that any effect of campaigning by the 
opposition groups is subtle, choosing Barking and Dagenham gives us the greatest chance of 
seeing and explaining those effects precisely because there is the largest number of votes for 
their campaigns to act on, and the greatest amount of campaigning by them. 
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There are further benefits to using Barking and Dagenham as a case study. As the name suggests, 
Barking and Dagenham is a municipality that covers two areas. Hope not Hate largely 
campaigned in Dagenham, while Unite Against Fascism largely campaigned in Barking. We thus 
have two areas, largely similar in terms of social and economic conditions, where the opposition 
groups are conducting their campaigns, but under a single municipal government. This 
effectively holds many of the possible variables, from rates of immigration to history of economic 
decline to relative position to central London, that could affect the vote for the British National 
Party constant. A quirk of the Labour Party’s internal administrative structures also means that 
Hope not Hate were largely campaigning in an area represented by one Labour Member of 
Parliament, and Unite Against Fascism in an area represented by another, providing useful 
avenues for gaining information. 
 
Variables and operationalization 
This section sets out the variables that are included in the quantitative study and how they are 
operationalised, looking at consistency and intensity of activity by the opposition groups, 
electoral performance of the far right parties, and the socio-economic and demographic control 
variables. It pays particular attention to the difficulties of measuring the activities of social 
movements. 
Measuring the activities of social movements 
Measuring – quantitatively analysing – manifestations of social movements such as protests and 
demonstrations has immediate appeals, not least in that large numbers of events that are 
geographically and temporally spread can be analysed from the desktop in a comparative 
manner. In particular, a form of content analysis, protest event analysis, ‘is an unobtrusive 
technique, it can handle unstructured matter as data, it is context-sensitive and it can cope with 
large volumes of data’ (Hutter 2014:337). It is ‘a way of measuring the effect of political 
opportunities in comparative design’ (Klandermans and Staggenbord 2002:xi f, cited in Hutter 
2014:336). Connected to the political process approach, the method allows us to ‘see how protests 
co-vary with … changes in the economy’ (Hutter 2014:336). 
Hutter (2014) identifies four generations of the use of protest event analysis: the pathfinders, 
who looked at broad ranges of indicators, who were in turn succeeded by a generation that made 
greater use of protest data with greater categorisation. A third generation began to use 
automated approaches made possible by developments in computing to speed up the process, 
including searching for keywords in archives, and allowing for the bias present in newspaper 
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reporting (and, indeed, non-reporting). A final generation ‘abandon[s] the strict focus on 
(aggregates of) protest events as their coding unit (Hutter 2014:338). 
The available literature suggests several considerations that must be borne in mind for using 
protest event analysis, particularly around selection and sampling, bias, geography and time, and 
coding. 
Newspapers are used across many studies (Earl et al 2004), both because of the positive 
advantages described above and because they give frequent, regular coverage. Equally, there is 
often either little alternative or no alternative at all (Koopmans 1995). The emergence of readily-
accessibly and readily-searchable online collections of newspapers – often covering entire 
countries, and including both national and local press – such as Factiva and Lexis-Nexis do help 
to ameliorate earlier problems around data collection (Hutter 2014), particularly when 
technological and time limitations meant that sampling was necessary (Earl et al 2004). Hutter 
highlights the utility of keyword searches, finding ‘a comprehensive list of keywords to be both 
more efficient and consistent with the manually selected data sets’ (Hutter 2014:352). 
However, there are particular problems with using newspapers for this form of analysis. The 
journalist’s aphorism that ‘if it bleeds, it leads’ is at work; newspapers are more likely to cover an 
event that is violent, large, or otherwise unusual. This leads to the broader issue of selection bias. 
Newspapers have their own political preferences and their own views of what will appeal to their 
readerships and, ultimately, sell copies; they therefore do not report on all events equally or, 
indeed, at all (Earl et al. 2004). Whether or not a particular newspaper has a reporter in the area, 
or whether a particularly dramatic photograph emerges, can also affect whether a given event is 
covered or not. Downs (1972) indicates that whether a topic is particularly relevant at the time 
may affect whether it is covered or not. Even if a particular event is covered, the same processes 
may affect the manner in which it is covered, leading to description bias, although this is less of 
an issue when looking at counts of events. 
Selection bias can be mitigated by using all events that a newspaper or set of newspapers report 
(Earl et al. 2004). Particularly important is triangulation (Earl et al. 2004): using multiple media 
sources and, if possible, alternative sources of information to both verify reports in particular 
newspapers and to provide broader coverage. Attention must also be paid to the selection of 
geography and time (Hutter 2014) to ensure that both will capture the desired effects without 
unjustifiedly removing cases while keeping numbers of cases manageable. 
There are alternatives to using newspapers – Earl et al (2004) suggest police reports – but these 
are much less readily available, and prohibitively difficult to obtain across multiple local areas or 
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even an entire country. The issue of data availability is also highlighted by Amenta et al (2018), 
particularly at the subnational level.  
A further necessary step is coding, the process of taking words and categorising them to indicate 
desired information in a manner that is, ultimately, machine-readable. These were traditionally 
done against an inventory, based on Tilly’s repertoires of contention, that covers the various 
activities in which protest groups might be expected to engage, although more recent studies 
have adopted not protests as the unit of coding, but ‘ “political claims”, “core sentences” or 
“semantic triplets”’ (Hutter 2014:342). 
Although there has been much work studying social movements, there are gaps that future work 
can address. Giugni (1998) suggests comparing different movements over relatively long periods 
of time and across different countries, allowing an understanding of how the same actions might 
have different consequences given different circumstances. A further gap is unintended 
consequences (Giugni 1998); do social movements sometimes not only fail to achieve their aims, 
or see them achieved but not by their action, but hinder or prevent them from coming to pass, or 
also lead to other consequences that the movement would consider negative? 
A particular method of protest event analysis is used by Rootes (2003a, 2003b) and collaborators. 
Coding protest events from a newspaper (in the case of the UK, the Guardian on Mondays), this 
uses a typology of different types of action engaged in by protest groups. These have several 
advantages; they are, by design, usable across different countries and different situations. 
Although originally calibrated to the environmental movement, they deliberately cast a broad 
net across all the activities that protest groups could engage in, from the very direct to the very 
formal. Risks of bias and selectivity are limited by triangulation with other sources. However, it 
still selects a single newspaper from each country as principal source based on quality (Fillieule 
and Jimenez 2003), which will bring in bias based on the political preferences of that newspaper. 
As with opposition to the far right, this presents a systematic problem. Coverage of 
environmental protest is more likely to be in left-leaning newspapers – indeed, the selection of 
the Guardian, El País, La Repubblica and the like was deliberately that there is coverage of said 
protest – which will have a particular view on the worthiness or otherwise of green causes. This 
is remediable by drawing on a broader range of sources though, naturally, this increases the 
work involved considerably. 
Thus, although there are challenges to using protest event analysis in the study of social 
movements and pitfalls to be avoided, it does provide a useful means of building a data set that 
can be analysed. However, quantitative analysis is not a panacea. For one, causality must be 
established to avoid the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc; that an organisation campaigned for 
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a change and then that change happened does not mean that the campaign necessarily caused 
the change, either in whole or in part (Giugni 1998). Amenta et al. (2018) further question the 
chain of causality; if the organisation did actually achieve the change through its activities, did it 
rely on persuading another actor to make the change? As Doherty and Hayes (2018), qualitative 
research is not just desirable but necessary for understanding social movements. This extends 
beyond the issue of causality. Quantitative approaches of necessity reduce widely varied 
phenomena to categories and codes; more data can be analysed, but there is a loss of information. 
The meaning given to the same action by different people may be different and, in particular, ‘it 
cannot answer the question of how social movements make tactical choices, or imbue them with 
meaning’ (Doherty and Hayes 2018:274).  
This provides an overview of the literature of social movement, and how they may be 
understood, analysed, and measured. 
 
Independent variables: Consistency and intensity 
As this study looks at the effects of activities by groups opposed to the far right, and as a 
quantitative approach is taken, it is necessary to operationalize those activities. A simple count of 
activities by electoral circumscription over the electoral cycle will not suffice. As set out in the 
discussion on consistency and intensity of action, we can adopt these measures to allow for the 
different effects of different patterns of campaigning, with consistent campaigning more likely to 
form relationships between voters and parties than a flurry of activity in the run up to an 
election. As set out below in Chapter 5, a certain amount is known about how Hope not Hate and 
Unite Against Fascism operate, and how the United Kingdom Independence Party and the British 
National party campaign, and that makes this form of measurement that allows for different 
strategies all the more important. 
As set out in the review of the literature on measuring campaigning at the local level, when 
campaigning takes places matters as much as how much of it takes place. A burst of activity in 
the weeks before an election and prolonged, but perhaps less dramatic, campaigning over an 
entire electoral cycle might come to the same number but represent very different patterns of 
activity. It is not unreasonable to expect that knocking on doors, week in and week out, to have 
conversations with voters will have different effects to a flurry of contacts in the immediate run-
up to an election, regardless of what kind of party or organisation is campaigning. 
It is particularly important to pick up on this patterning in the instances of groups that oppose 
the far right precisely because of the manner in which the two far right parties under study 
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campaign and because of how the activities of the opposition groups under study will interact 
with that campaigning. More specifically, the British National Party adopted a strategy of 
inculcating itself into local communities over a long period, picking up on issues particular to 
those communities to establish itself as an organisation that would achieve results and to present 
itself as an acceptable party for which to vote, drawing on a relatively small number of very 
committed activists. The United Kingdom Independence Party adopted a more traditional 
campaign based on large-scale messaging, particularly through broadcast and print media, with 
bursts of activity in the short campaign, suited to volunteers who could commit for a short, 
intense period but not for longer stretches. Campaigning that takes place against the parties can 
therefore be expected to have different effects according to whether it matches and engages with 
the consistency and intensity of the parties against which it is directed. Indeed, it is also plausible 
that consistent campaigning by the opposition groups may form an inoculation against later 
campaigning by far right parties.  
This observation also matches to the different styles of Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate; 
the latter will work an area for a period of time, while the former prefers large, carnival-style 
events. By further separating out Hope not Hate from Unite Against Fascism, we can also 
determine if the particular styles and contents of the respective campaigns, whether delivered 
intensely, consistently, or both, impact how they affect votes going to the British National Party 
and United Kingdom Independence Party. 
In order to account for this important patterning of campaigning, the measures of consistency 
and intensity developed by Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019) are used, though with months instead 
of weeks to account for the longer timespan under consideration and the relative amount of 
activity. The means by which these are calculated are set out below under data sources. In simple 
terms, intensity is the number of incidents of interest per number of units of time, while 
consistency is the number of units of time with activity as a share of the total number of units of 
time. 
Intensity is calculated as  




and consistency is calculated as 





where i is intensity of action, c is consistency of action, Mt is the total number of months observed 
and Ma is the number of months with opposition group activity. Details on how Mt and Ma are 
derived are given below. It should be noted, as in the review of the literature above, that Ellinas 
and Lamprianou apply this method to activities by the Golden Dawn in their 2019 paper. 
However, they establish that the Golden Dawn is an unusual party, seeking to be as much social 
movement and welfare organisation as political party, and so its campaigning style requires 
analysis in this manner in order to understand where particular party units of the Golden Dawn 
do more or less well.  
This method, then, allows us to distinguish between campaigning once a month, every month, for 
a year in the same area, and campaigning twelve times in the twelve days before an election, and 
so to account for the potential variation in effects of the patterning of campaigning by the 
opposition groups. 
Risks of multicollinearity are avoided as consistency of action and intensity of action are 
measured separately. Because they are measured separately, it is also possible to distinguish 
whether it is simply the pattern of presence, in terms of intensity and consistency, of these 
opposition groups that has an effect, or whether the materials and style of campaigning also 
matter. 
These variables are included as cHnH for consistency of action by Hope not Hate, cUAF for 
consistency of action by Unite Against Fascism, iHnH for intensity of action by Hope not Hate, 
and iUAF for intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism. 
Dependent variables: elections 
As set out above, the effects of civil society opposition on the electoral performance of far right 
parties are understudied. While, as below, expectations can be generated based on the available 
literature and analysis of the manner in which the parties and opposition groups operate, a 
deliberately broad net must be cast to determine what effects actually occur.  
Electoral performance is captured in three different ways: absolute share of vote, simple change 
in share of vote, and change in share of vote relative to the previous election for that 
circumscription.  
The essential difference between the absolute share of vote and the two measures for change in 
share of vote is the difference between ‘doing well’ and ‘improving’, or ‘doing badly’ and 
‘worsening’. To take a fictional example, a party might, on average, receive five per cent share of 
vote across all constituencies it contests, but in a particular constituency might receive twenty 
per cent share of the vote. By comparison with other constituencies, it is doing well in this 
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particular hypothetical location. However, that twenty per cent share of vote might represent a 
loss of several thousand votes. Even though it represents a good performance, it is worse than the 
previous performance for that constituency.  
This allows us to determine how the activities of Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate impact 
the British National Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party across the range of 
possible circumstances, from growth in a new area to a failure to capitalize on inroads in another 
area to continuing to work an area of considerable success. 
An inverse correlation between activity by the opposition groups and the share of vote for the 
parties would suggest that there is a correlation between the opposition groups being present 
and the parties doing badly at a given election. An inverse correlation between activity by the 
opposition groups and the change in share of vote measures would suggest a correlation between 
the opposition groups being present and the situation for the parties having worsened since the 
last election.  
By adding in relative change in share of vote, we can understand how the parties fare at an 
election given how they did at the previous election while accounting for a (say) two per cent 
increase from a base of two per cent being intuitively more significant than from a base of (say) 
eight per cent share of vote. This allows an understanding of what affects votes for the far right 
parties given their previous success or otherwise in a given electoral circumscription 
Control variables 
Manifestly, it is not just the effect of direct opposition from particular groups at election times 
that affects how many people vote for UKIP and the BNP. Other factors that may influence how 
people vote must be accounted for. 
Previously, following Kitschelt and McGann (1995), the factors thought to drive voting for the far 
right were split into two, demand and supply. Supply is further divided into external and internal 
factors (Mudde 2010). The precise factors are briefly enumerated here. In terms of demand, they 
are losers of modernisation (Betz 1994; Ford and Goodwin 2014a); crisis, which can be 
unemployment (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002), immigration (Golder 2003), political 
dissatisfaction (Dahl 2000), political system change (Kitschelt 2002); ethnic backlash (Golder 
2003), authoritarian legacy (Mudde 2000), attitude (Adorno et al. 1980), and crime and insecurity 
(Kinnvall 2014). In terms of supply, the external factors are the electoral system (Eatwell 2000; 
Duverger 1972), party convergence (Minkenberg 2001), the cultural context (Mudde 2010), while 
the internal, all from Mudde (2010), are ideology, leadership, organisation, and 
internationalisation. 
80 
Some of these can be dispensed with in short order. The United Kingdom does not have an 
authoritarian legacy in the form of communist or fascist rule as do, for instance, Poland or Spain. 
In any case, this would be the same across the whole country, and so can be set aside. Similarly, it 
is possible to, as mentioned above, discount attitude as being correlative rather than causative. 
The empirical basis for a link between crime and insecurity, and voting for the right is not found, 
per Mudde (2010). Both party convergence and the cultural context show a lack of clarity in 
definition. In any case, they would be constant across the United Kingdom geographically, if not 
temporally, and are hard, if not impossible, to measure.  
Similarly, the electoral system for each election is held constant across the country; members of 
the Westminster parliament are always elected on a plurality system, members of the European 
Parliament by the d’Hondt system, and so on, mutatis mutandis. 
Internal factors - that is to say, a party’s ideology, leadership, organisation, and 
internationalization - do bear some consideration. However, these are, again, hard to define with 
any precision and, particularly given the notorious reluctance of the far right to engage with 
academics or even outsiders in general, hard to research. While not necessarily held constant 
over time, they are held constant over geography for each election as there is only one leadership 
at any given point in time. They are not operationalizable for the purposes of the current study. 
It is contested above that while the manner in which it presented its politics changed, the core 
ideology of the British National Party did not change. This is somewhat different in the case of 
UKIP, where it is argued that it moved over time from being a perhaps marginal instance of a 
populist radical right party, particularly given its roots in the Anti-Federalist League, to a fully-
fledged member of that grouping as different parts of its piebald makeup come to the fore 
(Tournier-Sol 2015).  To the extent that internationalisation plays a role, it is with respect to the 
BNP, which learnt greatly from the French Front National. However, this process of learning was 
complete by the beginning of the time period in question. 
In both UKIP and the BNP, the respective leaders did, however, exert a great deal of control over 
their parties for most of their time in office. Nick Griffin of the BNP did have to contend with a 
leadership challenge in 2011, but he was able, in 2013, to set his own time of departure from the 
head of his party. The internal organisation, because of the outsized influence of their leaders, of 
both parties is largely similar and consistent over time. General improvements or deteriorations 
in the capacity and professionalism of the organisations are captured by the number of seats a 
party is able to contest. 
This leaves three other variables to be controlled for. These are the effects of modernization, and 
particularly on those who do not benefit from it; ethnic backlash; and crisis.  
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Although crisis is variously used as an explanation for an increase in popular propensity to vote 
for the far right, the term is nebulous. It can be a sharp event, or an ongoing situation; Brexit, for 
instance, could conceivably be either or both. Two of the possible sources given for crisis - 
change in the political system and political dissatisfaction - are excluded from consideration. The 
former is excluded by virtue of not having happened; the latter, aside from again being nebulous, 
does not have data available at the geographic levels required. However, two of the possible 
causes of crisis can be used; these are unemployment, and immigration or ethnic backlash.  
Unemployment, or at least economic activity or inactivity, as mentioned below, and immigration 
are suggested both as independent motivators for an amelioration in the fortunes of far right 
parties and as explanations for crisis. This further suggests that, as far as crisis is concerned, it is 
a convenient term for unfortunate political developments rather than an objective reality. Crisis 
is therefore not specifically operationalised. Nevertheless, some of what may lead to crisis is 
included in the measures for the left behind and racial threat. 
The logic of immigration, or ethnic backlash, or racial resentment, having an effect on votes for 
the far right is relatively straightforward. It is a combination of simple racism, concern about 
change per se, and the perception that immigrants are receiving preferential treatment from the 
state in its various manifestations. The reasons for this are varied, including latent attitudes, lack 
of understanding of the operation of the welfare state, misinformation about what benefits or 
support certain groups are in fact receiving, a general societal narrative about immigration, a 
media and political narrative about immigration, and so on. These are, of course, capitalised upon 
by far right parties in manners that range from presenting a one-sided view of a matter to 
making things up out of whole cloth.  
The ‘left behind’ is a rather more complicated set of drivers. Per Ford and Goodwin (2014a), there 
are two broad parts. One is a shift in people’s social and economic situation, and consequent gap 
between expectations of how life would turn out and reality. The classic example of this would be 
the loss of jobs caused by the closure of the Ford plant in Dagenham, which saw well-paying, 
steady, skilled jobs of high status replaced with either no jobs at all, or with casual and zero-
hours work, affecting both individuals and generations. This gap is particularly pronounced 
amongst certain sections of the population: white, older, with fewer socio-economic resources, 
and less education. The second part is a broader attitudinal shift amongst such people, 
occasioned by those circumstances, and perhaps aggravated by the rejection of said values by 
bien-pensants liberals and by the mainstream political parties, particularly Labour (which would 
previously have represented them as solid members of the working class).  
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As set out above, then, behind the ‘left behind’ lie concerns around immigration and lost 
economic opportunity. Crisis is a different combination: economic privation and the effect of 
immigration. Immigration is also given as a driver in and of itself of votes for the far right.  
Unemployment can be directly measured as the proportion of the working age population that is 
actively seeking work. It is included as the UNEMP variable. 
The phenomenon of the left behind, however, is not just one of unemployment, but of 
disconnection from the economic life of a community. This can be captured by the economic 
activity rate of an area. The economic activity rate measures the proportion of the working age 
population that is either in employment or actively looking for work. The remainder are those 
who are unemployed and, crucially, not looking for work. This includes discouraged workers – 
those who have been looking for work without success for some time and have simply given up – 
and those who have been driven onto disability benefits by the inability to find work. It is 
included as the ECON variable. 
The ethnic backlash/immigration driver is operationalised by looking at the proportion of the 
population that is both white and British-born. This variable is coded as ETHNIC. 
As has been mentioned, using low-level geographic data is important; unemployment rates will 
vary widely across a country, as will the number of immigrants in given areas. As data is available 
at much lower levels than the national - indeed, down to the individual ward - the opportunity 
for finer-grained analysis presents itself.  
It is not just the absolute level that bears consideration. Ford and Goodwin (2014b) suggest that 
far right parties do not necessarily target areas that have high levels of ethnic diversity or exhibit 
relative economic privation. Rather, both UKIP and the BNP target areas that are changing - 
becoming more economically insecure, becoming less white. Kaufmann further argues (2017) that 
it may indeed be change, rather than absolute level, of both immigration and economic condition 
that affects votes for far right parties. Accordingly, data were used for both levels and changes. 
For the ETHNIC variable, the change variable is CHETHNIC; for UNEMP, it is CHUNEMP; for ECON 
it is CHECON. 
In short, these variables allow us to capture the expected effects from the ‘left behind’, economic 
crisis, and racial backlash. 
As described above, a broad net must be cast to pin down what effects are at work. The breadth of 
this net comes in part from the use of not just absolute values for socio-economic and 
demographic indicators, but also how those values have changed over the year preceding an 
election. A far right party might, in absolute terms, do well in a given ward that has a large non-
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white population. However, that success might be relatively less than the previous election. 
Alternatively, an area might have a relatively high share of vote for a far right party, even though 
(say) that area is becoming more diverse from a starting point of low diversity. The share of vote 
variable would capture that this is still an area where far right parties are likely to do well; 
however, the change in share of vote variables would capture that the situation is worsening for 
the party in a manner that correlates with the change in the ethnic makeup of the area. 
 
With the variables and their operationalisation set out, we turn to data sources. 
Data sources 
Because this study uses a new data set, attention is paid in this section to data sources and how 
they are processed, beginning with consistency and intensity of action by the opposition groups 
before moving to elections and finishing with the control variables. 
Consistency and intensity 
In order to calculate the consistency and intensity variables for Hope not Hate and Unite Against 
Fascism, a new data set had to be built of instances of opposition by these groups that was then 
coded and matched to electoral circumscriptions. This then allowed consistency and intensity 
variables to be calculated for each opposition group as appropriate. 
Collection 
Attention is given below to how the raw data is geocoded and operationalised. In order to 
determine the effect of the opposition on far right parties, information is needed on what kind of 
activities they are undertaking and where they are happening. Almost by definition, 
organisations like Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not Hate would be expected to seek public 
attention. Tilly (2004) suggests that social movements engaged in a campaign engage in ‘WUNC 
displays’; that is to say, ‘concerted public representations of worthiness, unity, numbers and 
commitment’. Such displays ‘[convey] crucial political messages to a social movement’s targets 
and the relevant public’ (Tilly 2004:54). This methodology is similar to that employed by Rootes 
(2003b). However, instead of just using the Guardian, searches were conducted using the Nexis UK 
database. This included the Daily Telegraph, The Times, Guardian, Financial Times, The Independent, i, 
The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, The Daily Mirror, the Daily Star, the Morning Star, and their 
respective Sunday editions; newswires including Agence France Presse, Associated Press, and the 
Press Association; magazines like New Statesman; and various local newspapers. The total number 
of publications in the Nexis service for the United Kingdom is 1,225.  
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Therefore, the first port of call was a search of newspapers and other periodicals for mention of 
Unite Against Fascism or Hope Not Hate. This was conducted using Nexis UK, using the search 
terms described below. 
First newspaper search 
The first search term was ‘Unite Against Fascism’ OR UAF OR ‘Hope Not Hate’ OR HnH. In plain 
English, this would return any article that had the name or the abbreviation of either HnH or 
UAF. This yielded 5,667 results. However, these results had a very high signal-to-noise ratio, with 
many rent-a-quote style contributions that did not suggest any actions by the groups in question. 
An illustrative example comes from Wales on Sunday (McCarthy 2012); the article reports that a 
publican had accepted a booking for a music event, not knowing that it was a memorial for a far-
right music group, ‘Violent Storm’, and includes quotes from Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not 
Hate: 
‘A spokesman for Unite Against Fascism was appalled by the show at Newport's Riverside 
Tavern earlier this month. 
He said: ‘It is a disgrace that fascists and neo-Nazis are organising in Wales. 
‘We believe they are linked to racist and anti-Islamic attacks.’ 
[...] 
Simon Cressy is spokesman for anti-racist organisation Hope Not Hate. 
He said: “People travel great distances to go to see these bands so it is possible there were 
people from Belgium there.” ’ 
While of some general interest, this does not say anything about Hope Not Hate or Unite Against 
Fascism beyond that the press is aware of them and that they provide comment. It was also not 
possible to meaningfully locate, with any useful level of precision, where these incidents would 
have taken place when there was some geographic indication (along the lines of ‘South Wales’ or 
‘Yorkshire’). Moreover, many of these results were comment pieces looking at the UK-wide 
situation, with comment from Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not Hate. 
Second newspaper search 
In order to narrow it down and find instances of where Hope Not Hate and Unite Against Fascism 
were actually engaging with the BNP and UKIP, even if not directly, a second search was 
conducted with the term as (‘unite against fascism’ OR ‘uaf’ OR ‘hope not hate’) AND (‘bnp’ OR 
‘british national party’ OR ‘ukip’ OR ‘united kingdom independence party’ OR ‘uk independence 
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party’). This yielded 1,971 results; on a brief survey, there was much more signal and much less 
noise. However, there were many results that presented essentially the same problem as with the 
first search, except that comments were given on the BNP and UKIP. An illustration would be an 
article from the Independent (Rawlinson and Macerlean 2013): 
‘Matthew Collins of the Hope not Hate anti-extremism campaign group said: “The more 
people look at Ukip, the more shady it appears.” ’ 
As with the first search, this returns a lot of comment; much of it is more directed, but is still of 
limited utility. 
Third newspaper search 
This needed further refining, and so the third search term was (‘unite against fascism’ OR ‘uaf’ OR 
‘hope not hate’) AND (‘bnp’ OR ‘british national party’ OR ‘ukip’ OR ‘united kingdom 
independence party’ OR ‘uk independence party’) AND (‘protest’ OR ‘demonstration’ OR ‘police’ 
OR ‘violence’ OR ‘confrontation’). In plain English, this search would return any newspaper 
article that had the name of one of the opposition groups, the name of one of the parties, and one 
or more of the words ‘protest’, ‘demonstration’, ‘police’, ‘violence’, or ‘confrontation’. 
This yielded 1,180 results that largely gave the information required: instances of actions taken 
by Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not Hate regarding the BNP and UKIP. 
This was the starting point for the near-Sisyphean task of coding these newspaper entries; this is 
further discussed below. 
Other sources 
While many activities of Hope Not Hate and Unite Against Fascism would be expected to have a 
view to seeking public attention, not all of their activities would. In any case, they might want 
attention from newspapers, but not find it. It would appear that, as they tend to engage in 
confrontational tactics, Unite Against Fascism activities appear in the press relatively more 
frequently. 
Moreover, some relevant results could have been excluded in narrowing down from the second 
to the third search; for instance, if Unite Against Fascism had organised a gathering outside a 
BNP event that was reported as a ‘gathering’, or somesuch. The data from the newspaper search 
were therefore supplemented with the publications of Hope Not Hate and Unite Against Fascism 
themselves, both physical and electronic. 
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The Unite Against Fascism website retains extensive archives of all their activities, including a 
comprehensive news archive (Unite Against Fascism 2017). It was thus straightforward to find 
their account of their activities and to include them for coding. 
The Hope Not Hate website has had various redesigns over the years, which made the process 
rather more difficult, but their calendar of events was, until recently, available online. Although 
that is regrettably no longer available from their website, it is largely reconstructable through 
the archives of the British Library (Hope not Hate 2009, 2013, 2014a). 
Both Unite Against Fascism and Hope Not Hate also publish magazines - Unity and Hope not Hate, 
respectively, both starting in 2012 - that were included. Of the various books published by Hope 
Not Hate, only one, Lowles (2014) was relevant in its description of events and was coded. 
Coding 
Each instance was given a unique serial number, and the publication, publication date, article 
title, and by-line were recorded, along with the date it took place, what organisations were 
present, and whether there was any violence reported. The incident was coded using Rootes’ 
(2003b) typology of direct action/demonstration, petition, media campaign, lobbying, judicial 
action, participation in formal consultation, participation in decision-making, providing 
expertise, and public meeting. However, in practice almost all of the incidents were direct 
action/demonstration, with a few public meetings, and a smattering of judicial action. There 
were so few instances of the latter two that there would not be sufficient numbers to make 
comparison worthwhile. 
This coding process yielded a spreadsheet of all the incidents. In some articles, and particularly 
in the books and on the websites, more than one incident was recorded; each appearance receives 
a separate entry. This provides a list of incidents, with what took place and who was there, as 
well as a location. 
Geography 
As has been noted, one of the intended, principal contributions of the present study is the use of 
sub-national data. The social and economic conditions of Kensington are very different from 
those in Whitechapel, ten kilometres to the east, to say nothing of the difference between both of 
those and Aberdeenshire. It is possible to provide a more fine-grained picture than one would 
otherwise obtain by using national-level data. 
The electoral circumscriptions being used open up the first part of that possibility. It is important 
to note that reporting units can be smaller than electoral units. European Parliamentary 
constituencies in the UK are very large both geographically (in excess of eighty thousand square 
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kilometres for Scotland) and in terms of population (in excess of eight million people for 
London). However, they are reported at a much lower level, based on local government 
boundaries. Parliamentary constituencies are on the order of seventy thousand voters; wards are 
a few hundred. 
The process of geocoding instances of activity by the opposition groups is discussed below. 
Considerable care was taken in matching up opposition group activity, election results, 
immigration status, and economic indicators. 
This was done in blocks for Westminster elections, European elections, and the different levels of 
local elections. The process is the same in each case, and relies on the VLOOKUP function. 
VLOOKUP looks for a given term (in this case, the electoral circumscription of interest) in a 
separate sheet (the list of socioeconomic data) and returns the requested data. A simplified 
example appears below as Table 3.1. 
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Barking 10 A 
 
Barking 10 A 
Westminster 20 B 
 
Islington 40 D 
Camden 30 C 
 
Westminster 20 B 
Islington 40 D 
    
 
This process could, of course, be done manually, by checking one sheet against another. However, 
this would be a very laborious process. By automating matching as described, many hundreds of 
searches can be done almost instantaneously. 
Intensity and consistency of activity by the opposition groups must be calculated for the 
purposes of the analysis, using the formulae given above (Ellinas and Lamprianou 2019). To do so, 
the data were geocoded. Geocoding is the process of converting a human-readable address or 
location to a systematic, machine-readable address. The most convenient, standardised, 
machine-readable location for this purpose in the UK is the post code. 
The location of the incident was recorded to the greatest level of detail available in the article; in 
some cases, this was very specific (the B&Q car park on London Road in Crawley being an 
example (Unite Against Fascism 2008)). In other cases, it was not quite as exacting, but still 
sufficient to pin the location down to within a few tens of metres. Where there was a march 
leading to a static demonstration - very much part of the traditional left-wing representation of 
Tilly’s repertoire of contention (2003) - the final location was recorded; this represents the focal 
point of the protest as well as typically being the point of longest dwell. This was converted to a 
post code using the Google Map Application Programming Interface (API). 
Taking, as an example, 10 Downing Street (with no other information), the Google Maps API 
returns data on the Prime Minister’s residence in the UK. A less famous address, such as the 
prosaic ‘1, Station Road’, returns a result in the USA. However, if given the address as ‘1, Station 
Road, UK’, every building in the UK that has that address is returned. Changing it to ‘1, Station 
Road, Barnet’ only gives a single address. Thus, with relatively sparse information a postcode can 
be obtained. Where a street is given as the input without a number, the postcode of the 
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geographic centre of the road is returned. As described above, addresses were recorded to the 
greatest level of accuracy available. 
Individual calls to the Google Maps API can be made using a web browser, but to speed up the 
process of converting addresses to postcodes, GNU Wget (a small programme that retrieves 
information from a server) was used to run the API calls in batches. The output is in the 
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format. JSON is a structured means of communicating data that 
contains human-readable data but can still be parsed by a computer. 
In order to more easily process this data, the JSON output was converted to a spreadsheet format, 
Comma Separated Values (CSV), using the free service at konklone.io/json. 
This provides the same table with postcodes added. The next step is to identify the electoral 
circumscriptions for each incident. This was done with postcodes.io. 
Postcodes.io is a regularly-updated, open-source means of conducting the reverse geocoding with 
easy API access.  
Postcodes.io provides more information than is necessary (for instance, which Care 
Commissioning Group, a type of body within the NHS, is responsible for the location). For the 
purposes of this thesis, the relevant outputs are Westminster constituencies, European 
constituencies, local council (unitary, London borough, county, district, etc.) by name and code, 
and NUTS information. The output from postcodes.io is again a JSON, which was converted to 
CSV. As the order of data inputs was the same, these could be simply copied across onto the main 
spreadsheet but, in order to make sure this was done correctly, the VLOOKUP function, as 
described above, was used. 
Calculating consistency and intensity 
As set out above, the calculation of intensity and consistency of opposition requires us to know 
the number of incidents in the electoral cycle leading up to a given election. That is to say, 
sorting is required such that it can be identified that there were n incidents by (say) Hope Not 
Hate in electoral circumscription e so that consistency and intensity variables can be calculated. 
This was done with pivot tables. 
A pivot table is similar to a crosstab in that information about one table is displayed in another 
table. It differs in that a crosstab is static, displaying the frequency of entries in each category, 
where a pivot table is dynamic, allowing different operations to be conducted on the data in the 
original table. This means a table of incidents can readily be produced, sorted by which 
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opposition group ran them, with totals by month up to a given date (that of the election) for each 
electoral circumscription. 
Once the pivot table is built, it is straightforward to adjust the dates and geographies being used 
for each set of elections. This yields (for instance) the number of instances of opposition by Unite 
Against Fascism in the Cities of London and Westminster parliamentary constituency in the 
electoral cycle that finished with the general election in 2010 (ten). This then allows the 
calculation of the consistency and intensity values for each electoral circumscription for each 
electoral cycle of each level of elections. It is then straightforward, again by the use of VLOOKUP, 
to copy across the appropriate values to the spreadsheet of elections (which already has 
socioeconomic data included). 
There were some issues in putting together this dataset. A lot of the manipulation of the data to 
put it in the required format is quite sensitive to errors, and so considerable time had to be spent 
checking everything had worked properly; this was either by repeating the process on a copy of 
the data to check results were the same, or by following an individual piece of data through the 
process, checking that changing it resulted in an appropriate change to the final outputs. 
A particular problem was that of names. Because some places have similar names – Newcastle-
upon-Tyne and Newcastle-under-Lyme, for instance - searches and processes such as VLOOKUP 
have to be set to look for exact matches. Although a human will recognise Newcastle upon Tyne, 
Newcastle Upon Tyne, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and Newcastle-Upon-Tyne as all referring to the 
same place, a computer regards them as being different. There is no canonical list of what 
councils are called, with even different parts of the government using different orthographies, 
and some just reporting the common name of a council, while others will specify that something 
is, for instance, a district council or will append ‘DC’. Parliamentary constituencies with cardinal 
directions in their name are sometimes reported as ‘East Barnsley’, and sometimes as ‘Barnsley 
East’; commas are sometimes included and sometimes omitted, as in ‘Birmingham, Edgbaston’ 
and ‘Birmingham Edgbaston’. A canonical list of councils and constituencies, and converted all 
the variations on names of councils and constituencies to that list as data was imported from the 
various sources. 
All the data required is available - where UKIP and the BNP ran, how they fared in the elections, 
the socioeconomic and demographic data for where they ran, and how many opposition incidents 
took place where they ran - and in the format required, allowing statistical analysis thereof. 
Elections 
The dependent variable is the electoral performance of the United Kingdom Independence Party 
and the British National Party. Further consideration is given to operationalisation and 
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geographic metainformation below; for the present, three sets of data are needed. These are the 
votes for UKIP and the BNP; turnout; and the electoral circumscription. The number of votes for 
the parties is straightforward. Turnout is either directly reported or imputed from number of 
votes cast and the total electorate where possible. The electoral circumscription consists of the 
type of election, the body to which the elections are being held, and information on what 
geography is used to report votes. 
Raw election data for elections to the Westminster and European parliaments are readily 
available and were taken from the Electoral Commission (2005, 2010, 2015, 2017b). For local 
elections, data from the Local Elections Archive Project (LEAP) (Teale 2017) were used. 
Both the Electoral Commission and LEAP make their data natively available as CSVs. In both 
cases, some work was required in Excel and GNU Emacs (a text editor) to remove superfluous data 
(principally, votes for other parties and elections where neither the BNP nor UKIP ran) though a 
total turnout had to be first calculated for the LEAP data by adding all the votes cast for all the 
parties. 
The boundaries for Westminster constituencies have changed over time. The Fifth Periodic 
Reviews took place around the time of the 2005 election (Boundary Commission for Wales 2005, 
Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland 2007, Boundary Commission for Scotland 2004, 
Boundary Commission for England 2007). England, Wales, and Northern Ireland used the 
boundaries established in 1995 for the 2005 election, while Scotland used the boundaries 
established for constituencies north of Hadrian’s Wall in 2004. By the 2010 election, all parts of 
the United Kingdom were using the new boundaries. 
Aside from requiring care in selection of boundaries for data, one of the effects of the reviews is 
that it makes some comparisons effectively impossible. The name of the Aberconwy constituency, 
for instance, did not change between the 2005 and 2010 elections, but the boundaries of the seat 
were very substantially redrawn, such that the ‘new’ constituency encompassed an area more 
than 45% different from the ‘old’ (Press Association 2010). 
Changes to the 2005 election therefore cannot be calculated because UKIP and the BNP were not 
significant players. Changes to the 2010 elections can be calculated based on the notional results 
for the 2005 elections on the 2010 boundaries from Rawlings and Thrasher (Press Association 
2010). A similar issue occurs with the elections to the European parliament in 2009; as the 2004 
elections were reported at the European constituency level, it is not possible to calculate change 
in vote etc. to the 2009 elections. 
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The Electoral Commission records the number of eligible voters for Westminster and European 
elections, and so turnout and share of vote relative to the number of electors can be calculated. 
Because local authorities generally do not record this information by ward (and do so 
inconsistently when they do) and the Local Elections Archive Project uses local authority data, 
details of the size of an electorate are not available for local elections, meaning that share of vote 
can only be calculated relative to people who actually voted, rather than electors, and turnout 
cannot be calculated. 
For first past the post elections, the number of votes for each candidate was used. For elections 
conducted using the single transferable vote – namely, Scottish local elections – the number of 
first preference votes was used. As voters can give a preference to all candidates, any other 
option could see the total share of votes exceeding one hundred per cent, or even all candidates 
receiving one hundred per cent. 
Levels of reporting 
For Westminster elections, the lowest level of reporting – that is to say, the smallest geographical 
unit for which data is available – was the parliamentary constituency. For local elections other 
than county council elections, the lowest level of reporting was the ward; for elections to county 
councils, it was the county division. 
In 2009, the lowest level of reporting for the European elections to Wales’s single constituency 
was Westminster constituencies. For Scotland’s single constituency, it was the council area. For 
London’s single constituency, it was the London borough. For the remaining eight constituencies 
of England, the lowest level of reporting was either the lower tier (i.e., district council or 
metropolitan borough) in the two-tier, shire counties; or the unitary district in the remaining 
areas. 
The lowest level of reporting for the 2014 European Parliament elections was the same, except 
that Wales reported by principal areas. Principal areas are similar to English unitary authorities; 
they are referred to as principal authorities because they are styled by many different names in 
two languages, and the matter is further confused by the eight, traditional counties of Wales 
which are still culturally significant. 
Processing 
The next step was to match up elections in a given year with the last time they had been run in 
that ward or constituency in order to calculate share of vote. For elections to Westminster, this 
was, subject to the note above about which elections are under consideration, straightforward, as 
all the elections took place at the same time. The same holds true for European elections. 
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The picture is rather more complicated with local elections. While some councils have ‘all out’ 
elections every four years, where all seats are re-elected at the same time, others elect ‘by halves’ 
or ‘by thirds’. Where the ‘by halves’ system is used, half the seats are elected for four years every 
two years. Where the ‘by thirds’ system is used (typically the lower level in a two tier area, but 
also metropolitan districts and 17 of the 55 unitaries), one-third of seats are elected for a four 
year term in years one, two, and three, with no election in the fourth or fallow year (typically 
when county council elections are held in two tier areas). 
It is therefore not possible to simply look back one or four years for the last election. Instead, a 
spreadsheet of election results sorted by council, ward, and year, was prepared and the IF 
function was used to return the results of the previous election if it was in the same ward and 
council. This gives when the last election in that circumscription took place, and by a similar 
method whether UKIP or the BNP ran. Like is compared with like. 
Calculating the absolute share of vote 
The absolute share of vote is straightforward. It is the number of votes cast for a party divided by 





Where A is the absolute share of vote, P is the number of votes cast for the party in question, and 
V is the total number of votes cast for any party. 
Votes that are cast but not counted for, as with the traditional end of the returning officer’s 
announcement, want of an official mark, voting for too many candidates, writing by which the 
voter can be identified, etc. are excluded. While these figures are available for Westminster and 
European elections, they are only sporadically available for local elections and so they are left out 
to maintain consistency. This is because local councils, which hold the information for past local 
elections, do not always keep full data available. This is reflected in the LEAP database that is 
used.  
The result is a figure from zero to one inclusive, with zero indicating that a party contested an 
election but did not receive a single vote and one indicating that it received all available votes 
(neither of which actually happened). 
This provides an indication of how the party did at the moment of the election; how many people 
could they convince to mark their ballot paper next to the UKIP or BNP candidate, as compared 
to people who went for one of the other parties, given the level of opposition from Unite Against 
Fascism and Hope Not Hate and the underlying socioeconomic conditions. 
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Calculating the simple change in share of vote 
The simple change in share of the vote is the increase or decrease in share of vote. It is effectively 
the absolute change in share of vote for a given election less the same figure for the previous 








Where C is the simple change in share of vote, Pt is the vote for the party at the election, Vt is the 
total number of votes cast at the election, Pt-1 is the vote for the party at the previous election, 
and Vt-1 is the total number of votes cast at the previous election. 
By previous election, the last election to the same seat to the same body is meant. For instance, 
this would mean that a district council seat would be compared with the last time that district 
council seat was up for election (and not, say, a coterminous county council seat).  
The simple change in share of vote represents how a party’s vote has changed over an electoral 
cycle. It can vary from +1 (indicating that the party received no votes at the previous election and 
all of the votes at the present election) to -1 (indicating that the party received all of the votes at 
the previous election and no votes at the present election). Again, neither of these outcomes 
occurred.  
The change in share of vote can reflect the effect of a campaign or other changes on voters who 
might place their mark next to one of the parties under consideration at the ballot box, or who 
definitely would if they were to vote. It excludes those who will always go to the polls and will 
always vote for the party in question.  
Calculating the dependent variable in this manner does, though, come with a health warning. If a 
party did not contest a given race in one election but did do so in the next, or vice versa, the 
change in share of vote is from or to zero. The reason for not contesting one of the elections 
could be the party assessing its chances as slim, and so dedicating resources elsewhere, which 
might indicate that a very low or zero vote total is appropriate. It could also, however, be because 
resources were less than sufficient to contest every viable seat, or because of a lack of a willing 
candidate, or because of the administrative overhead involved in running for an election. 
Calculating the relative change in share of vote  
The use of the relative change in share of vote is in the simple notion that an increase in the 
share of the vote from (say) 2% to 4% is more significant than from 8% to 10%. The former, 
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intuitively, should have more weight, as a doubling of the vote, than the much more modest 
relative increase in the latter.  













Where R is the relative change in share of vote, Pt is the vote for the party at the election, Vt is the 
total number of votes cast at the election, Pt-1 is the vote for the party at the previous election, 
and Vt-1 is the total number of votes cast at the previous election. 
While this is potentially more useful, it does present a problem if the party did not contest the 
previous election. In this case, the denominator of R resolves to zero, meaning that R as a whole 
is undefined. These cases are not considered in the analysis as there is no meaningful value that 
can be assigned to R. 
There is a further limitation. It is unclear what pattern, if any, there is to why the BNP contested 
certain seats at certain times but not others. Given the administrative and financial overheads 
involved in running for the House of Commons, however, it is likely to be where they have a 
presence, believe they have a receptive audience, or both. A prerequisite is a willing candidate, so 
potentially viable seats for the BNP would go uncontested for lack of a candidate. 
As such, the effective exclusion of some seats on a non-random basis means caution must be 
exercised with models using this measure of the dependent variable. 
However, where R can be used, an indication is given of how the party has performed relative to 
its previous performance. 
A particular issue presents itself with the variables for change in share of vote and relative 
change in share of vote. Clearly, in order for there to be a change in share of vote, there must be a 
previous vote; that is to say, the party must have contested the previous election in the electoral 
circumscription under consideration. Where, for whatever reason, a party did not contest that 
prior election, there is no value for change and relative change in share of vote. 
Control variables 
Data for unemployment and immigration were taken from NOMIS, a database of labour statistics 
maintained by the University of Durham for the Office of National Statistics; as well as being 
authoritative, data are readily available for a range of geographies, including those that have 
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changed. However, there are many possible ways, even with the data provided by NOMIS, of 
measuring the effects that this study sets out to capture. 
Data were taken from the Annual Population Survey; the reasons for using it are set out with 
admirable clarity by the ONS itself: 
• ‘the sample size is approximately 320,000 respondents 
• has the largest coverage of any household survey and allows the generation of statistics 
for small geographical areas 
• uses data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
• the data sets consist of 12 months of survey data and are broken down on a quarterly 
basis 
• the first APS data set was published for the period January to December 2004’ 
(Office for National Statistics 2012) 
In short, it is the most reliable set of data that provides local information with the requisite 
frequency. 
The specific datasets taken from NOMIS were rates for economic activity and unemployment; and 
percentages of the population who were white and UK born. NOMIS also has data for people who 
are white and not UK born; of an ethnic minority and UK born; and of an ethnic minority and not 
UK born. Because survey rather than census data are being used, error ranges are reported in the 
data. In some cases, data are suppressed as they are felt to be insufficiently reliable or, in a very 
few cases, because there are so few people in a given category in a given area that it would 
identify them. This is particularly true for non-white people not born in the UK in very 
homogeneous parts of the country. The white UK born is therefore contrasted with the 
population that is white but not born in the UK, not white but born in the UK, and neither white 
nor born in the UK, on the basis that both are potential drivers for the far right. 
The datasets were used with different geographies: parliamentary constituencies (on the 2010 
boundaries) for Westminster elections, and the lowest level of local council for European 
elections (which report on those boundaries) and municipal elections. 
Datasets were used for the years of the present study, reported by the appropriate geographies. 
For Westminster elections and the Welsh European elections of 2004, this was Westminster 
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Parliamentary constituencies. For local and other European elections, it was the various council 
boundaries as discussed above. Data is not available at the ward level. 
Data were used for the quarter in which the given election took place. The change variable was 
calculated on one year previously. This gives both absolute values and changes (Kaufmann 2017). 
The economic activity and unemployment rates were taken because they capture the same 
phenomenon - engagement in the economy - in slightly different ways. Unemployment is 
measured as a rate compared to the workforce (that is to say, excluding those in the first age, the 
third age, or education). The economic activity rate is the number of people employed and 
unemployed but seeking jobs as compared to the total number of people in a given area; it 
indicates how many people are involved in the economic life of an area, and as such may give a 
better estimation of, in Ford and Goodwin’s (2014a) celebrated phrase, ‘the left behind’. 
In short, indicators for ethnic makeup and economic status of areas down to the second tier of 
local government, that closely match the elections in time, and can be used for both absolute 
levels and for changes in levels, are available. 
Methods 
With the variables set out above, this section sets out both the quantitative and qualitative 
methods that are used in this study. 
The broad logic of the explanatory sequential mixed methods research design of this study is set 
out above. In this section, greater attention is paid to the specifics of the quantitative and 
qualitative aspects. 
Quantitative 
The aim of the quantitative portion of this study is to determine the effects of activity by the 
opposition groups on the performance of the far right parties at elections, while accounting for 
other factors that the literature suggests are relevant. This requires a model where one 
dependent, or response, variable is explained by multiple independent, or explanatory, variables, 
such as regression analysis (Hutcheson 1999). However, there are multiple types of regression 
analysis (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013) that are appropriate for different situations. The most 
popular of the various regression analyses is ordinary least squares (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013), 
including in the study of the far right (for instance, Söderlund and Kestilä-Kekkonen 2009, 
Vlandas and Halikiopoulou 2019, and Ellinas and Lamprianou 2019). Mathematically, this seeks to 
find the best relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable by 
98 
determining a linear relationship between them that minimizes the sum of the squares of the 
differences between the dependent variable and the linear function (Hutcheson 1999). 
While ordinary least squares is an appropriate method, it does have certain requirements, 
including that the dependent variable range, in theory, from negative infinity to positive infinity, 
or, mathematically, an interval of [-∞,∞] (Ferrari and Cribari Neto 2004). In practice, this 
condition is not strictly met as infinities are rare in the social sciences, but the analysis produces 
usable results when the response variable operates in an interval from negative to positive or, 
mathematically, in an interval of (-∞,∞). This does not present a problem for the change in share 
of vote or relative change in share of vote, which could range across positive and negative values. 
However, the absolute share of vote for a party does not meet this requirement as, no matter how 
badly a party does, it cannot receive negative votes; that is to say, the interval is [0,1]. 
Therefore, ordinary least squares is used for the analyses with change in share of vote and 
relative change in share of vote as dependent variable, while beta is used for analyses with share 
of vote as the dependent variable. 
The regressions were conducted using the R statistics programme, which has native support for 
ordinary least squares, and using the betareg package for beta regressions (Cribari-Neto and 
Zeileis 2010). 
Qualitative 
As described above in this chapter, quantitative methods can explain the what; they cannot 
explain the how. To understand the processes at work, rather than identify and describe them, 
the use of qualitative methods is necessary. In this study, a particular case study, the London 
Borough of Barking and Dagenham in the period of the local government electoral cycle from 
2006 to 2010, was chosen for the reasons given above, with a view to understanding why Hope not 
Hate and Unite Against Fascism appeared not to have much effect, even in what should have been 
the best case scenario for them having an effect, and to understand what, instead, may have led 
to the British National Party’s dramatic failure in 2010, four years after an equally dramatic 
success. 
There were two principal sets of sources for the qualitative portion of the research. The first was 
a set of semi-structured elite interviews. The second was traditional desktop research, including 
such academic literature as exists on the far right in Barking and Dagenham; specifically, local 
newspapers, and publications from the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, Unite Against 
Fascism, and Hope not Hate. 
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Interviewees were selected based on having participated in or otherwise having knowledge of the 
opposition groups, the area of Barking and Dagenham, or both. These were a representative of 
Unite Against Fascism; the Rt Hon Lord Hain, founder of the Anti-Nazi League and a long-
standing campaigner against the far right; Dave Rosenberg, likewise a long-standing campaigner 
against the far right; and the two MPs whose constituencies lie in the London Borough of Barking 
and Dagenham, the Rt Hon Margaret Hodge MP and Jon Cruddas MP. Hope not Hate were invited 
to participate but regrettably chose not to. 
As these interviews were conducted with senior politicians, at the top of the ladder in their 
particular area and thoroughly connected to the social networks of their constituency, or with 
people whose experience or role gave them particular viewpoints and knowledge not generally 
available, these are elite interviews (Harvey 2011). 
The interviews with people with particular knowledge of the geographic areas – Rt Hon Margaret 
Hodge MP and Jon Cruddas MP – each covered five strands. These were a general background of 
the area from their perspective; what activity by the British National Party specifically in their 
area they were aware of; what activity they undertook regarding the British National Party; what 
other groups they were aware of in the area taking action against the British National Party; and 
relevant parts of the national context. As these interviews are part of the case study of Barking 
and Dagenham, which focuses on the BNP for reasons elaborated in chapter 7, they only cover 
UKIP tangentially. 
The interviews with people with particular knowledge of the opposition groups – the 
representative of Unite Against Fascism, the Rt Hon Lord Hain, and Dave Rosenberg – covered 
four strands. These were the background to and history of the organisations; how the 
organisations generally affected far right parties; national and local activities; and specific 
activities carried out at the local level. 
In order to use open-ended questions that allow the participants to cover the areas they consider 
relevant, including those that might not otherwise have occurred to the researcher, while still 
covering all of the necessary ground, semi-structured interviews were used (Bryman 2012). These 
take the form of an interview schedule, with the broad topics and sub-questions that the 
researcher wishes to cover, but without a set order. 
These interviews sought information in two broad areas. The first of these concerned the 
political situation prior to 2006, and how it evolved from 2006 to 2010, including the BNP’s 
activity and other developments in the area. This in turn included what other organisations, 
including the Labour Party and the local council, were doing. The second broad area concerned 
what the two opposition groups were doing in Barking and Dagenham and their logic for doing it. 
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This information was then combined with the information from desktop research and used to 
guide further research to build a picture of what the opposition groups had been doing, why they 
had been doing it, against what background they had been doing it, and what else was going on in 
the Borough that would explain the decline in the BNP’s fortunes. 
As set out above, this is a mixed methods design. The quantitative section informs the questions 
to be asked in the case study, and which particular case should be studied to answer those 
questions. As such, it benefits from the advantages of the quantitative element in providing a 
generalisable account of the effects of the opposition groups on the far right parties, and from 
the explanatory power of the qualitative element in the specific case of Barking and Dagenham. 
With the methods set out, we can draw certain expectations as to the effects of the opposition 
groups on the far right parties. These are set out in the next section. 
Expectations 
Based on the literature available above and the conclusions drawn in chapter five on the British 
National Party, United Kingdom Independence Party, Hope not Hate, and Unite Against Fascism, 
we can draw certain expectations as to the effects that the opposition groups will have on the 
electoral performance of the parties.  
As will be discussed at greater length below, the British National Party campaigned with a ground 
war – candidates and volunteers knocking on doors – while the United Kingdom Independence 
Party operated an air war – using the media and other forms of mass communication (Mullen 
2016). The British National Party campaigned on local issues, matching its local campaigning, 
while the United Kingdom Independence Party campaigned on national issues, in turn matching 
its national campaigning. The British National Party chipped away consistently over time, while 
UKIP campaigned at election time. 
Hope not Hate’s campaigning in the period in question was fundamentally a ground war 
campaign (Mullen 2016; Lowles 2014). It also campaigned on local issues. Some of these issues 
matched up directly with the issues that their opponents were raising; some are novel to them, 
such as putting out information on the often less-than-savoury backgrounds of candidates from 
their intelligence gathering and research.  
Unite Against Fascism’s campaigning was effectively a hybrid of air war and ground war (Unite 
Against Fascism 2018). It had neither the resources for nor the tradition of using the mass media 
for campaigning; rather, it adopted the ‘boots on the ground’ approach, but using national 
messaging, with a view to local media coverage and awareness in a broad area. 
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Because Hope not Hate campaigned against the British National Party in a manner that directly 
engaged with the latter’s style of campaigning and effectively countered their messages (Lowles 
2014), it would be expected that Hope not Hate would have a negative effect on the British 
National Party’s vote across the different measures. This is a meso level effect (Eatwell 2000), 
where Hope not Hate are playing a role in the local processes that shape people’s viewpoints 
(Goodwin 2009) and dealing with issues that are salient to the population but not generally dealt 
with by mainstream political parties (Eatwell 2017). 
However, Hope not Hate’s style of campaigning could not compete with the overwhelming 
publicity and media coverage of UKIP. The local style of campaigning, looking at individual 
personalities (Hope not Hate nd), was simply swamped by the volume of national messaging 
(Murphy and Devine 2018). Accordingly, it would be expected that Hope not Hate would not have 
any effect on UKIP’s vote. 
Turning to Unite Against Fascism, their campaigning did not effectively engage with the British 
National Party’s messaging, either in content or temporally. Although the actions of Unite 
Against Fascism may have had effects in changing national discourse and so on, for the purposes 
of the present study there is no expectation that their activity would have any effect on the vote 
for the British National Party as there is simply no causal mechanism that would lead to such an 
expectation. If the BNP are seeking to embed themselves in an area (Copsey 2008), a protest will 
not unembed them. 
Unite Against Fascism effectively reinforced UKIP’s messaging around elites and disconnection 
from politics; although aware of the risks of branding UKIP as fascist or extreme, they still did so  
(UKIP 2018), and had the further effect of legitimising UKIP by making themselves look like left 
wing extremists engaged in a post-material politics of little relevance to the lived experience of 
potential UKIP voters (Eatwell 2003). The engagements between Unite Against Fascism and, for 
instance, the English Defence League further weakened Unite Against Fascism’s ability to 
campaign effectively as they could be interpreted as two sides of the same coin as the BNP, thus 
making their position worse. UAF’s actions could also have the effect of emphasising mainstream 
convergence (Eatwell 2003), putting it in said negative light, and so leading to protest votes. The 
expectation, paradoxically, is for campaigning by Unite Against Fascism to increase UKIP’s vote.  
Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate employ different campaign strategies. This results in 
Hope not Hate generally being more consistent in their campaigning, while Unite Against 
Fascism are generally more intense in their campaigning. However, these are not hard and fast 
styles; for instance, Unite Against Fascism could return to the same area several times. 
Nevertheless, consistent action would establish a local connectedness (Ellinas and Lamprianou 
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2019) that intensity of action would not. This connection with a locality based on having spent 
time there would counter the narratives put out by the BNP, but not the overarching media 
messaging of UKIP. 
Thus, the expectation is that consistency of action would have a negative effect on the BNP; 
consistency of action to have no effect on UKIP; intensity of action to have no effect on the BNP; 
and intensity of action to have a positive effect on UKIP. 
Conclusion 
In order to provide a reliable answer to a question – to meaningfully solve a puzzle – the right 
approach must be taken in answering it. This means a consideration of the nature of the 
question, what data is available and how it can be effectively gathered and used, and then 
marshalled to answer the question. In this study, we address two questions, or sets of questions. 
The first asks what the effects of campaigning by civil society groups on far right parties – an 
understudied area – actually are. More particularly, given what is known about how the 
opposition groups campaign, with Hope not Hate adopting a more targeted, localised strategy 
while Unite Against Fascism goes for a more traditional, demonstrative strategy (Lowles 2014; 
Unite Against Fascism 2018) and how the parties operate, with local activity by the BNP and mass 
media usage by UKIP, (Lilleker 2016; Copsey 2004), does different patterning of campaigning by 
the opposition groups have an effect? Along with this, other variables that could affect votes for 
far right parties must be considered. The second set of questions ask what explains the effects 
determined in the first part. 
This chapter has established that, because of the different types of question to be asked, an 
explanatory sequential mixed methods approach is adopted (Cresswell 2015). This approach 
begins with a quantitative analysis of the effects of opposition groups. The results of this analysis 
is reported in chapter six and speaks to the expectations given above. A qualitative analysis, 
making use of interview data, then looks at a specific case study, Barking and Dagenham, in 
chapter seven to explain the quantitative results. 
This chapter has established the time period to be studied – from 2005 to 2015 – and justified it as 
capturing the emergence of Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism, and measuring their 
impacts until the beginning of the Brexit process occasioned a substantial change in British 
politics. 
It has further set out the variables used, particularly the method of consistency and intensity 
pioneered by Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019), and justified their inclusion and how they can be 
operationalized. This chapter then described the process of collecting and processing data, before 
103 
setting out the specifics of the quantitative and qualitative methods used – ordinary least squares 
and beta regression, and interviews and desktop research, respectively. Finally, it has provided a 
set of expectations for the quantitative analysis.  
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Chapter 4 - A brief history of fascism and anti-
fascism in Britain 
The only man for whom Hitler had ‘unqualified respect’ was ‘Stalin the genius’ 
- Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
Introduction   
Because of the interrelatedness of fascism and anti-fascism, or of the far right and opposition to 
the far right, and because, understood as social movements, opposition groups evolve slowly and 
remain wedded to tactics that they have used for long periods, this chapter sets out the 
development of fascism and anti-fascism in Britain. It proceeds chronologically, highlighting 
particular incidents that have entered the lore of opposition groups and act as touchstones for 
them, such as the Battle of Cable Street. 
As has been noted, opposition to the far right in Britain is understudied; there is some coverage 
of the inter-war period, rather less on the seventies, and little to nothing on its manifestations in 
the twenty-first century. The aim of this chapter is to provide some of the history that leads to 
the organisations under consideration - Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism. 
Renton (2001) asks if the winding history of anti-fascist groups constitutes a tradition. The 
answer given will be that, although intertwined, there are two distinct anti-fascist traditions, one 
more militant and one less so. 
Because anti-fascism almost requires fascism to exist, this chapter also covers some of the 
principal waves of the manifestations of fascism, and allied philosophies and organisations, in the 
United Kingdom. The chapter thus goes, in brief, from the British Brothers League through the 
British Union of Fascists to the National Front. In addition to discussing some of the earlier forms 
of opposition, this chapter largely concentrate on the second half of the twentieth century; for 
obvious reasons, the need for anti-fascism was not as pronounced immediately after the Second 
World War. The British National Party, UKIP, Hope not Hate, and Unite Against Fascism are dealt 
with in the next chapter. 
In order to properly contextualise these organisations and to explain how they may see 
themselves as inheritors of particular traditions and draw on historical memories of particular 
events, this chapter proceeds from the beginnings of opposition to the far right in the early part 
of the twentieth century. 
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For much of its existence, opposition to the far right meant anti-fascism. This question is 
manifestly more difficult today; whether the populist radical right sit within the far right 
category is a vexed question. However, prior to the third wave of populist parties that emerged 
from the 1980s onward, there were no groups of significance that contended for the space. The 
far right was fascism, and fascism was the far right.  
Opposition to the far right, therefore, meant opposition to fascism, and opposition to fascism 
meant opposition to the far right. While there is always a certain ambiguity in what, precisely, is 
meant by fascism, and so by anti-fascism, it was only with the rise of the populist radical right as 
a phenomenon that opposition by anti-fascist groups of organisations they saw as threatening 
but not fascist would be seen. 
As will be discussed below, there is considerable disagreement from anti-fascists as to what 
fascism was and the best way to oppose it.  
Early fascism in Britain 
If a date is to be set for the beginnings of fascism, 11th December, 1914, serves as well as any 
other. On that date in Milan, Benito Mussolini’s Fascio d’Azione Rivoluzionaria7 was founded; it 
would later be renamed the Fasci Italiani de Combattimento, or Italian Combat Fasci. One of 
Mussolini’s original political aims was the engagement of Italy in the First World War on the side 
of the Central Powers. Perhaps because of that initial military opposition, fascism did not take 
hold in Britain as soon as it did elsewhere. The situation is summed up well enough by the mere 
title of Richard Thurlow’s (1998:13) section on the period from 1917 to 1932 in ‘Fascism in 
Britain’: The Lost Generation. Such fascism as there was, then, ‘was little more than 
“Conservatism with knobs on”’ (Thurlow 1998:13, quoting Arnold Leese). 
This is not to say there were no fascist, or at least proto-fascist, organisations in Britain in that 
period. Nor should the racism of the period be overlooked: empire was justified in the language 
of social Darwinism. Such fascist groups as did exist were based ‘in reactions to the political, 
economic and social problems of late Victorian and Edwardian Britain, and to the disillusion 
created by the First World War’ (Thurlow 1998:14). A set of beliefs would emerge – economic and 
military strength based on an empire that meant alliances with other powers, which necessarily 
weakened Britannia, could be avoided. These would colour British fascism and similar positions 
 
7 More or less, ‘League of Revolutionary Action’. The term ‘fascio’ was used by avowedly socialist groups – 
the image of the Roman fasces, or bundle of sticks, was an obvious choice. It was only later that it became 
an unavoidably fascist symbol. 
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for decades to come, despite the efforts of Oswald Mosley in his later years and Enoch Powell to 
change that. 
A flavour of the activities of these proto-fascist groups comes from looking at three: the British 
Brothers League, the Britons, and the British Fascisti. 
The British Brothers League, founded in 1901 (Hann 2013) or 1902 (Benewick 1972), focussed on 
London’s East End, and particularly on the issue of immigration. Its leaders and supporters 
included members of both Parliament and the London County Council, members of the clergy, 
and former senior members of the Metropolitan Police (Benewick 1972). The League had a para-
military side, and would become explicitly anti-Semitic after the departure of its founder, one 
Captain William Stanley Shaw. The League supported and promoted an Aliens Bill to restrict 
further immigration (Benewick 1972). The strong Jewish community in the East End was, 
unsurprisingly, a target for the League’s hostility (Thurlow 1998:78). 
Another side of this proto-fascism is reflected in the publishing activities of the Britons 
(Benewick 1972:43). Its output was entirely anti-Semitic and largely conspiratorial, including a 
translation of the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.  
Thus, there are two traditions within what would later be seen as British fascism: a muscular 
variety and an intellectual variety. The panoply of similar organisations approaches, as is noted 
elsewhere with regard to the hard left, Pythonesque levels. The National Fascisti (as distinct from 
the aforementioned British Fascisti, from which they splintered), the British Empire Union, the 
National Citizens Union, the Imperial Fascist League, the Ulster Volunteers, and others fill out the 
list. 
The members of the British Fascisti, founded by Rotha Lintorn Orman, wore their inspiration on 
their sleeve - literally - as well as in their name, and were the first group in Britain to use a 
variant of the fasces for their nomenclature and to expressly acknowledge their debt to Mussolini 
(Benewick 1972:27). Although it began as anti-Communist and anti-red, it developed something 
resembling a political programme. It would hold public rallies, guard or steward meetings of 
friendly organisations, and publish (Benewick 1972:33). Orman’s experience with the Girl Scouts 
meant that it adopted much of the structure of that innocuous organisation (Thurlow 1987:34). It 
represented a potentially more effective combination of the two varieties mentioned above. 
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Early opposition to fascism 
As these groups grew, so did opposition to them. The two first organisations set up in Britain to 
oppose fascism qua fascism were the People’s Defence Force8 and the National Union for 
Combatting Fascism (NUCF) (Hann 2013). The former organisation was set up by the Communist 
Party in 1924 (Copsey 2017:2), while the latter was established by Alfred and Ethel Holdsworth in 
the previous year9. The NUCF saw itself as ‘Labour’s Criminal Investigation Department’ (Copsey 
2017:3) – a specialised detachment trying to investigate and expose fascism. The NUCF also 
published a journal, The Clear Light, but both journal and organisation would cease by 1925. 
Much of the opposition to the nascent fascism in Britain was undertaken by the Communist 
Party, in the form of physically disrupting meetings and engaging in other altercations. However, 
the Communist Party, operating under the instructions of the COMINTERN and its understanding 
of a Third Period of capitalism, would not work with other groups. Indeed, social democracy was 
condemned as ‘social fascism’.  
While ‘majority opinion on the left was not unduly concerned by British fascism’ (Copsey 2010:3), 
seeing it rather as a joke, the Communist Party saw it as an inherent threat to the proletarian 
revolution as a means by which capitalism would retain its power. 
The Communist Party also had perhaps more parochial reasons for wanting to confront fascism. 
In 1925, Harry Pollitt - then head of the Communist Party’s trade union movement and later 
general secretary of the whole party - was kidnapped for about twenty-four hours by a group of 
people believed to be allied to the British Fascisti (HC Deb 16th March 1925). By July of the same 
year, the Communist theoretician Rajani Palme Dutt was arguing that fascists and fascism needed 
to be taken seriously (Copsey 2010:4). 
The Communist position, however, should not obscure that there were substantial sections of the 
Labour Party and of the trades unions that wanted radical changes to the state and, in many 
cases, thought that the state and those whose interests would be harmed by those radical 
changes would be hostile to them. That is to say, there were substantial parts of the non-
Communist left who viewed the state at least as a problem to be overcome. 
The General Strike of 1926 would be seized on by both fascists and communists.  
 
8 Regrettably, there appears to be no connection between the People’s Defence Force established in Britain 
in the early twentieth century and the People’s Defense Force of Marvel Comics. 
9 Hann gives 1924 as the start date for both organisations, but The Clear Light was published from 1923. 
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On the fascist, or proto-fascist, side, this manifested in offered support for the Organisation for 
the Maintenance of Supplies (OMS). Fearing shortages of essential goods if the strike lasted as 
well as a red takeover, the OMS was set up by private actors, and rapidly co-opted by the 
Government (Perkins 2006:70). The Communist Party viewed this organisation as fascist or 
fascistic, though Labour averred (Copsey 2017:5). The government nonetheless rebuffed offers 
from the British Fascisti to help with the OMS. This would cause a split in the group, with some 
abandoning the British Fascisti to help in the OMS, with others remaining with the former 
(Thurlow 1998:35). The organisation would split when a substantial part of it left to join Mosley’s 
New Party, and it would collapse with Orman’s death shortly thereafter. 
At the same time, the Communist Party established the Workers’ Defence Corps around the 
country, preparing for a long strike and violent response from the state and para-state actors, 
including the OMS. The Workers’ Defence Corps was intended not only to handle the OMS and 
support the General Strike, but to protect - physically - other left-wing groups, particularly in the 
trade union movement, at risk from fascist intervention. Ultimately, the General Strike would 
last nine days, excepting coal miners, who continued until the winter of 1926/27. The TUC and 
labour movement lost; this was a blow to the Communist Party in general, but, from the 
particular perspective of this research, left the Workers’ Defence Corps with a tarnished name. It 
would morph into the Labour League of Ex-Servicemen (LLX) (Hann 2013). The LLX would emerge 
as a para-military force, complete with a uniform that led to questions in Parliament (HC Deb 19 
March 1928). It would defend progressive causes and meetings from any threats of fascist 
intervention.  
Even at this stage, the formation of para-military groups on both sides is seen, and a dance of 
feints and parries around the OMS, ranging from actively seeking physical confrontation to 
preparing in case their event was disrupted. This sets the scene for the next entry: the British 
Union of Fascists. 
The British Union of Fascists 
Neither fascism nor anti-fascism were particularly entrenched in British society in the 1920s. 
Such organisations as there were petered out in a few years. That would change, however, in the 
1930s with the emergence of the largest, best-organised, and best-known fascist group in Britain 
before the Second World War: the British Union of Fascists. 
The life of Sir Oswald Mosley, 6th Baronet Ancoats, is better covered elsewhere. For the present 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that he first sat in the Commons as a Unionist – the youngest 
sitting MP of that Parliament - representing the Harrow constituency, but, increasingly at odds 
with his party’s policy on Ireland, became an independent, winning re-election in both the 1922 
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and 1923 polls; after his last re-election in Harrow, he would join the newly-formed Independent 
Labour Party. He would fail in his attempt to unseat Neville Chamberlain in 1924, having moved 
from Harrow, where he did not rate his chances of election on a socialist ticket. In a prefiguration 
of the 1964 general election, Oswald Mosley would be elected at a by-election in Smethwick. 
Placed in charge of unemployment strategy, he would produce the ‘Mosley Memorandum’, 
arguing for Keynesian public works to reduce unemployment on a scale previously unimagined 
and possibly unimaginable and a radical reworking of how government operated in order to 
manage the programme (Marquand 1977:539). When the Labour Party10 narrowly rejected the 
Mosley Memorandum, the 6th Baronet Ancoats, would again leave a major party, this time to form 
his own: the New Party. 
It should be emphasised that while statism and radicalism were certainly part of Mosley’s 
political agenda, his future journey to fascism was not pre-ordained. Signatories to the Mosley 
Memorandum included, for instance, Aneurin Bevan, and the New Party attracted the financial 
support of William Morris, later Viscount Nuffield. It should also be noted that Mosley was a 
political figure of some standing; George Bernard Shaw, after initially pushing him to set up a 
new party, encouraged him to stay within Labour as he would succeed Ramsay MacDonald (Dorril 
2006:163). However, substantial parts of the British Fascisti would defect to Mosley on formation 
of the New Party, bringing with them their history, understandings, and experiences. 
They published a magazine, Action, and a film, Crisis. The National Policy developed by the New 
Party ranged across economic matters, including making the UK less dependent on imports other 
than from the Empire.; Mosley advocated more, including suspending normal civil liberties and 
peace-time living to deal with unemployment (Dorril 2006). Already wary of ‘the reds’, Mosley 
would have a personal bodyguard (Dorril 2006). 
The New Party would stage events across the country, attracting sizeable crowds. Amongst these 
crowds, however, were ‘reds’, as Mosley would brand them, intent on a violent response towards 
those whom they saw already as fascists. Mosley’s bodyguard would become the ‘biff boys’: the 
beginnings of a serious para-military, led by a popular and well-known rugby player of the day. A 
youth wing, Nupa, was formed. The Communist Party saw the New Party as proto-fascist (Copsey 
2017:8). 
The New Party contested the 1931 election without returning any candidates to Parliament, 
although two MPs did cross the floor to join them. Their best results at the 1931 election would 
 
10 The Independent Labour Party was in a protracted process of disaffiliation from the Labour Party over 
dissatisfaction with the latter. 
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be in Merthyr, where Sellick Davies received almost one third of vote casts (there being, 
admittedly, only one other candidate), and almost a quarter of the votes in Stoke, where Mosley 
was beaten into third and last place by the Conservatives and Labour. None of their other 
candidates reached five figures. The return of the National Government would spell the end for 
the New Party, both because, having been crushed electorally, they were not taken seriously by 
the public and because Mosley no longer saw a Parliamentary route to power as viable (Dorril 
2006:188). 
Following the New Party’s electoral defeat, Mosley undertook a sort of latter-day grand tour, 
visiting both Rome and Munich, heralding his turn to out-and-out fascism and the formation of 
the British Union of Fascists. The BUF was ‘the mature form of fascism in British Society … the 
only organization with any pretension to significance in inter-war Britain’ (Thurlow 1998:61). 
The BUF would largely draw members from Nupa and the British Fascisti (Thurlow 1998). The use 
of physical security and paramilitary forces in response to left-wing disruption of New Party 
events grew with the BUF into I Squad and then the Fascist Defence Force (Dorril 2006). This force 
would also be used to harass the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement’s marches due to the 
latter’s support from the Communist Party, setting the scene for the future. The BUF was an 
organisation that feared its events being disturbed, and so would assert physical control of 
venues, streets, even whole districts, to the extent of disturbing the events of groups they 
viewed, essentially, as un-British: communists, socialists, and Jews. 
These experiences would be borne down the line of organisations descending from the BUF of 
Oswald Mosley to the BNP of Nick Griffin. The electoral route to power would only ever be used 
instrumentally; it would only be used when circumstances in broader society appeared to make it 
an appealing option. As covered below, these would include the late seventies, when concerns 
about Commonwealth immigration and race relations were high; the late nineties, in the 
particular circumstances of Millwall; and, in the early part of the twenty-first century, when 
immigration from the newly-acceded members of the European Union was a concern. Even 
during this periods of electoral activity, there was an expectation that there would be physical 
confrontation with opposition from the left. Whether it was preparedness for violence first 
specifically amongst fascist groups or their opponents or, more likely, a ratcheting-up from both 
sides, is likely lost to history. However, the result is that both sides both expected violence. The 
pattern of focus on the leader of a far right group by its members so that there was little 
distinction between the head and the organization itself, already the pattern for Mussolini and 
others, would be marked on the British experience. 
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For much of this period, Mosley was not seen as a particular threat to the establishment. He was 
rather something of a curiosity, even if he did have notable supporters (many of whom, such as 
Harold Nicolson, left as he moved rightwards). The dismal failure of the New Party at the general 
election of October 1931 seemed to underline this. There was certainly criticism of both Mosley 
and the New Party in the press, but it was only the Communist Party and Labour League of Ex-
Servicemen – returners from the Great War of a communist or trade unionist persuasion, 
militantly opposed to fascism – who took direct action against them, disrupting their meetings. 
The perception of the British Union of Fascists as slightly comical would change with events in 
Germany in 1933. 
The rise of Hitler and the end of the Third Period 
As has been noted above, the COMINTERN saw social democracy as a roadblock on the way to the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, as well as sharing economic traits with fascism; it was therefore 
denounced as ‘social fascism’. This was glossed as capitalism’s Third Period, with economic 
privation leading to mobilisation and radicalisation of the working class. Yet, the revolution did 
not come, and Communism and the COMINTERN would be shocked into changing their position 
and their tactics by the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany. 
The passing of the Ermaechtigungsgezetz in 1933, essentially giving Hitler and the Nazi Party 
untrammelled power, was a shock in and of itself. According to the theory of the COMINTERN, 
there should have been a proletarian uprising, not a fascist takeover. The suppression of 
communists, as well as trades unionists, social democrats, and essentially anyone who was not at 
least willing to go along with the new regime added physical threat to theoretical confusion. 
In light of this, at the 1935 COMINTERN congress, the position changed. Henceforth, communists 
would seek a popular front with non-communists against fascism and fascists. As long as they 
shared the goal of defeating fascism, it was acceptable to co-operate with other groups. This 
would have widespread effects but, specifically, it meant that the Communist Party’s 
organisational abilities11 and personpower would be available to help other groups. 
 
11 It is sometimes necessary to remember that the Communist Party was not like the current alphabet soup 
of small, hard left groups, but was a serious organisation capable of winning seats in the House of 
Commons and London County Council. When Bob Darke quit the Communist Party in 1951, it was 
sufficiently important that his explanation of why he left, The Communist Technique in Britain, was published 
as a Penguin Special. 
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It should be noted that Hitler’s Sturmabteilung began as the Saalschutzabteilung, or ‘hall 
protection division’. The Biff Boys and the like were seen - not without reason - as being a first 
step to something similar in Britain. 
Aside from the Communist Party, opposition to the BUF and other, similar groups was informal 
and sporadic. The Labour Party very much adopted a hands-off approach formally, even if 
individual members took a different approach (Copsey 2010:52); the BUF was derided as ‘the 6,000 
stalwarts of Sir Oswald Mosley (TUC Report 1933, p321, cited in Copsey 2010:57); in any case, 
Labour argued that communist activity would provoke a fascist reaction. The Independent 
Labour Party supported the Communist Party’s popular front. Local Labour and trade union 
groups disagreed with the official party line, and in some cases supported the popular front. This 
was most common in highly unionised, industrial, urban areas: Sunderland, Tyneside, London, 
Sheffield. However, as activity was locally organised, anti-fascism was ‘loose-knit and ill-defined’ 
(Copsey 2000:12) 
A Co-ordinating Committee for Anti-Fascist Activities (Copsey 2017:22) was formed in July 1934; it 
would effectively be a means for an end-run around Labour’s official disinclination toward 
‘robust’ responses to fascism, although its intention was to get Labour to join the popular front. 
The opposition was much greater in number than previously, but still lacked coherence and 
organisation. A former member of Mosley’s New Party, John Strachey, was now running the 
British Anti-War Movement, which adopted anti-fascism as part of its pacifism. 
Local communist and allied groups would disrupt fascist meetings; a Fascist Defence Force was 
formed in response. It would reach its zenith at Hyde Park on September 9th, 1934. Anti-fascists 
would use the same tactics as they had previously to disrupt fascist gatherings - obtaining tickets 
and then either heckling the speakers or otherwise causing so much disruption that they would 
be expelled, notably at the Albert Hall, and Olympia in Kensington in 1934. This expulsion would 
be forceful, giving a pretext for a response in kind from the expellee’s associates. The gathering 
in Hyde Park was to be a signal affair for the British Union of Fascists; Lord Rothermere’s Daily 
Mail gave it favourable advance coverage, and it would be the largest gathering of Mosley’s group 
in an outdoor rally.  
Two narratives emerged. For the Communists, it was ‘a great blow against fascism’ (Daily Worker 
1934), while the Fascists saw the event as a victory for free speech and fascism. 
Cable Street 
Thus, there are two competing movements - perhaps ‘alike in dignity’ after a fashion - with 
particular histories. One, closer to the Communist Party, advocated physical responses; the other, 
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closer to Labour, saw the threat as over-stated and best dealt with within civil society. This would 
reach a zenith at Cable Street. 
The build-up to a proposed march by the BUF through the East End, against a background of 
increasing anti-Semitism from Mosley and the BUF, including physical attacks on Jewish persons 
and property, saw eighty-six different organisations (cablestreet.uk nd) come together to form 
the Jewish People’s Council against Fascism and Anti-Semitism. These would be joined by another 
half-dozen organisations, shepherded by the Communist Party (Copsey 2017:48, 51). The result 
would be the Battle of Cable Street - a confrontation between fascists, anti-fascists, and police. It 
has entered the collective memory of anti-fascism as a triumph and turning point, as a symbol of 
the working class coming together against a common enemy (Copsey 2017:57). There had been 
other, similar confrontations - notably two years earlier in Hyde Park - and would be again - in 
1937, in Bermondsey - but perhaps what does set Cable Street apart is the state’s response in the 
form of the Public Order Act of 1936. The Public Order Act banned political uniforms, required 
permission to be sought before political marches, prohibited para-militaries (‘quasi-military 
organisations’ in the language of the Act (1936)), and gave the police broader powers to deal with 
disorder, broadly construed, at protests. 
Cable Street, though, entered anti-fascist mythology. It was when anti-fascists gave the fascists a 
good kicking; when all kinds of people came together to stand up to oppose the far right; when 
the police were protecting a deliberately provocative march through a multicultural area, and 
the people of the area rose up to turf them out. Indeed, the claim of a connection to Cable Street 
remained so powerful that Jeremy Corbyn spoke of his mother’s presence there to burnish his 
credentials (Bloom 2016). 
As much as any activity by anti-fascist groups, it was the Public Order Act that ‘deprived the 
[British Union of Fascists] of the propaganda value of its paramilitary displays’ (Dorril 2006:408). 
The increasing presence of Nazi sympathisers such as William Joyce (better known as Lord Haw-
Haw) and turn to anti-Semitism meant that it was impossible for ‘respectable’ members of the 
BUF to remain. Ultimately, increasing tensions with Germany and the outbreak of war would rob 
Mosley and the BUF of support. Mosley was interned and the BUF dissolved under Defence 
Regulation 18B. 
The Second World War would, for a time, put paid to fascism in the UK. 
The departure point for many pre-war fascists was socialist or communism; Mussolini started as a 
creature of the left, and Mosley went through the Labour Party on his route rightwards. 
Certainly, the economic programmes of communist and fascist both opposed the then-extant 
form of capitalism and bore more than passing similarities, even if they placed the blame in 
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different places (the anti-Semitism amongst some communists notwithstanding). They also 
operated in similar conditions, given that they were active at the same time (important 
differences including in the organisation of international support, the COMINTERN being rather 
more effective than ad-hoc support from international fascism). It is perhaps, then, not 
surprising that there are a number of similarities between these groups. 
In brief, these similarities are militancy; an attitude towards the state as a cipher; and publishing 
as an intellectual exercise. 
The militancy is straightforward enough. Both sides wanted to dramatically change the nature, 
scope, and activities of the state and would only operate in a democratic mode if they thought it 
would achieve their ends, whether short-term or long-term. They anticipated - and, indeed, met - 
resistance from the state, and from non-state opposition, and prepared themselves accordingly 
(Copsey 2010a). 
Secondly, they each viewed the liberal state as a cipher for the other side. That is to say, 
communists viewed the state (including such organs as the police) as fundamentally hostile to 
them, if not allied to or at least sympathetic to fascism, with its liberalism a pretence (Copsey 
2017). The same was true, mutatis mutandis, for the manner in which fascists saw the state 
(Mann 2004). 
Finally, there is publishing. Both sides saw a crisis of the state and society (Mann 2004), and a new 
world to be born (Marx and Engels 2010). Exactly what and how that would be born was to be 
discovered; both sides would give their take on it as they tried to understand the world they were 
in, how they had arrived at that condition, what the world should become, and how it would be 
reached. Both sides also used this work to propagandise to the unconverted, and to inculcate 
their values into their supporters. 
Fascism and anti-fascism after WW2 
This, then, was the ground from which the British far right would draw when it started to re-
appear after it was discredited by the WW2 and the Holocaust, and hamstrung by internment. 
Concerned with control of the streets, with a view that the state was useful and necessary but ill-
managed, an anti-Semitism that ran from casual racism to frothing paranoia, and a connection to 
the working class. 
Prior to World War Two, ‘there had been widespread indifference to fascism provided that public 
order was not threatened’ (Thurlow 1998:203). The pre-war connections of leading British fascists 
to the likes of Lord Haw-Haw - traitors and collaborators - and the horrific news and cine-reel 
that came from the liberation of Nazi camps across Europe was a bromide against anything that 
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looked like fascism. There were attempts to rehabilitate and rename fascism but they were of no 
relevance. 
Such small groups as there were gave rise to the 43 Group - named for the number of people at its 
initial meeting rather than the year - that sought to physically oppose remaining fascist 
organisations in Britain. Formed in 1946, and counting Vidal Sassoon among its members, the 
group disbanded in 1950, seeing the threat as having passed (Copsey 2017:89). 
A few people like Arnold Leese notwithstanding, there were no out-and-out fascists active 
politically immediately after the war; the connection with Hitler was just too much. The League 
of Empire Loyalists, occupying the rightmost fringes of the Conservative Party and beyond, was 
formed in 1954 by AK Chesterton, a former lieutenant for Oswald Mosley. This institution 
provided a link back to inter-war fascism; it would bring in people like John Tyndall, Colin 
Jordan, and Martin Webster, and John Bean. 
The League’s stated aim was to prevent the dissolution of the British Empire. Decolonization had 
started under Labour after 1945 but stalled when the Conservatives returned to office in 1951, 
only to be restarted with MacMillan’s ‘Winds of Change’ speech in 1960 (technically, two 
speeches; the first, in Ghana, garnered little attention, while the version in Cape Town received 
much more). Colin Jordan, John Bean, John Tyndall, and Martin Webster all joined the League. 
Jordan left in 1956, and Bean & Tyndall in 1957, to form the White Defence League and National 
Labour Party, respectively (Thurlow 1998:233). These two organisations would merge in 1960 to 
form the first incarnation of the British National Party.  
The first British National Party 
This first British National Party was explicitly racist and virulently anti-Semitic (Walker 1977:34). 
It would rapidly split, with Jordan and Tyndall leaving to form the even more extreme and 
explicitly pro-Hitler National Socialist Movement (Thurlow 1998:239). The remaining BNP ‘was to 
concentrate on local political activity and building up a strong political base in constituencies 
like Southall and Deptford’ (Thurlow 1998:234). A further split would occur between Jordan and 
Tyndall over how explicitly Nazi they should be; Tyndall left to form the Greater Britain 
Movement in 1964, starting a new magazine, Spearhead. There was then a debate within the 
World Union of National Socialists as to which, NSM or GBM, would be the official franchisee in 
the UK. Tyndall, in a foreshadowing of Nick Griffin, would argue that ‘one could adhere to the 
principles of fascism and Nazism whilst presenting them in a manner in which Britons could 
identify with the cause of their own country’ (Gable 1978:2). As Tyndall gave the appearance of 
moderation, Jordan became more explicit in his Nazism. Also active was the Greater Britain 
Movement, through which Andrew Brons would be brought into the National Front. 
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The splits aside, the far right was doing better electorally than it had for a generation. John Bean 
would receive 9.3% of the vote in Southall at the 1964 general election, with other candidates 
receiving votes in four figures at the same elections, and local government candidates receiving 
up to a quarter of votes cast in some wards.  
What caused this rise in groups that ten years earlier would have been unthinkably evil? In short, 
it was immigration - the fact of it but, more particularly, the political opportunity spaces it 
opened up. 
Although HMT Empire Windrush had docked at Tilbury Docks in 1948, it became symbolic of 
post-war immigration into Britain from the colonies, particularly the West Indies, as well as the 
ressentiment at the loss of the empire. It would be augmented by the arrival of the Ugandan 
Asians in 1972. Concerns about immigration rose, although the major parties remained relatively 
liberal on the subject and race relations more generally. This could have been a space on which 
the far right could have capitalised; however, their continued adherence to the symbols and 
language of explicit Nazism made them beyond the pale for the great bulk of the British 
population, with memories of the horrors of the Second World War not yet faded. Tensions were 
there, however - race riots broke out in Notting Hill in 1958 - and a series of events would open 
up that space to the far right.  
Firstly, the rightward fringes of the Conservative Party were increasingly vocal with their 
dissatisfaction with immigration policy; it was simply not restrictive enough for them. Secondly, 
the Race Relations Act 1965, and the accompanying Race Relations Board, appeared to some, and 
were deliberately portrayed as such by others, to be clamping down on free speech and 
preventing ordinary people from voicing their concerns about immigration. Simultaneously, the 
main parties were starting to become more restrictive in language and policy on immigration. 
The ‘62 Group formed in its eponymous year, taking its inspiration from the 43 Group of Jewish 
ex-service men that formed on their return from the Second World War to combat the fascism 
they saw in Britain. They would provide the principal activities directly aimed at fascists (rather 
than, say, improving race relations more generally) of the late sixties and early seventies (Copsey 
2017:111). These would range from the now-traditional disruption of meetings to breaking and 
entering the offices of the NF (Copsey 2017:112). Perhaps the most notable member of the ‘62 
Group was Gerry Gable, who would go on to found Searchlight, which would in turn give rise to 
Hope not Hate and be associated with Unite Against Fascism. 
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Most activity regarding fascism and the far right, however, was directed at Powellism and the 
Monday Club12 tendency of the Conservative Party. The groups and people one might perhaps 
expect to be focussing on the extraparliamentary far right were otherwise engaged.  
As mentioned above, Labour was increasingly concerned about the electoral threat posed by the 
far right, as well as opposing it on moral grounds. Two Labour MPs with a history in local 
government set up Searchlight in 1964. These were Joan, later Baroness, Lestor, MP for Eton and 
Slough, who had worked her way up through local government and then the London County 
Council; and a former journalist, Reg Freeson, who had served on Willesden and Brent councils. 
This incarnation of Searchlight was an occasional publication, both warning of the dangers of 
fascism and providing exposés on the far right. It would only last until 1967. However, its 
research director, Gerry Gable, would go onto play a major role in British anti-fascism with the 
re-founded Searchlight. Gable had been a member of the ‘62 Group. 
The National Front 
In 1967, the National Front would be formed as a merger of the BNP and League of Empire 
Loyalists. John Tyndall, in a foreshadowing of Nick Griffin, would argue that the values of fascism 
could be presented in a manner that would at least not be repulsive to, and could perhaps be 
attractive to, British public opinion. There would be a definite shift away from the symbology of 
the past, and a focus on actual political campaigning, rather than marches, protests, and mass 
meetings, in areas such as Southall. 
The National Front would receive a real boost in 1968 with Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ 
speech (Taylor 2018). The speech itself legitimated hardline positions on immigration. Powell 
himself was, for all his faults, a remarkable scholar turned soldier (he was a professor of classical 
Greek by 25, and a brigadier general by 33). In addition, he had held government office as 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury in MacMillan’s first ministry, and as Health Minister in his 
second. At the time of the speech, he was Heath’s Shadow Defence Secretary. He was a 
mainstream politician advocating, in incendiary terms, substantial restrictions on immigration 
and warning of dire social problems should he not be heeded. This was further boosted by the 
reaction of what might crudely be termed polite society. Edward Heath promptly fired him from 
the shadow cabinet, and press and politicians alike condemned him for racism. The presentation 
 
12 Officially, the ‘Conservative Monday Club’. It dates from Harold MacMillan’s second ministry on the belief 
that the party had moved too far leftwards, the Monday Club became a by-word for reactionary 
Conservatism with a particularly controversial record on race issues, including support for apartheid South 
Africa and Rhodesia, and opposition to non-white immigration to the UK. The Conservative Party 
terminated its formal links with the Monday Club in 2001. 
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was that immigration could not be discussed. This legitimated the National Front, and 
encouraged it to at least attempt - even if not to the exclusion of its former violence - an electoral 
path based on the working class support received by Powell. 
Nevertheless, the National Front was relatively small for its first years. The principal group 
opposing the National Front was the ‘62 Group, as described above. The arrival of the Ugandan 
Asians, coming on the heels of the fallout from Enoch Powell’s speech in Birmingham, led to a 
substantial increase in membership of the National Front (Copsey 2017:114).  
It would be the combination of an openness to electoral politics, an increasing membership, and 
the political opportunity space afforded by the debate around immigration that would see the 
National Front start to grow further. 
At the 1970 general election, the National Front ran ten candidates; two reached five and half per 
cent of votes cast. They would contest by-elections in that Parliament with increasing success, 
with Martin Webster receiving fully sixteen per cent of the votes cast at the West Bromwich by-
election in May 1973 (Fielding 1981).  
On the back of this success, the National Front contested forty-nine seats at the February election 
of 1974, and ninety-three at the October election. By 1974, West Bromwich had been split into 
two seats, West Bromwich West and West Bromwich East, which gave the National Front their 
highest and third-highest share of the vote respectively, at 7.8 per cent and 7 per cent. By the 
autumn of that year, their best results were coming in London - 9.4 per cent in Hackney South 
and Shoreditch, 8.3 per cent in Tottenham, 8 per cent in Wood Green (Fielding 1981). The number 
of seats that the National Front were contesting also entitled them to a party political broadcast 
(Taylor 1982). 
The National Front would contest all but one of the seats on the Greater London Council in 1977 
(Taylor 1982). Although they did not receive any seats due to the majoritarian electoral system, 
they did much better than they had hoped and others had feared. Their share of vote jumped 
from half of one percent to more than five per cent, equalling approximately two-thirds of the 
vote for the Liberal party. What opposition that did exist was very local, without much 
organisation, and directed to the physical confrontation of fascists. 
Searchlight had folded in 1967. However, Gerry Gable formed Searchlight Associates to continue 
the research side of the project; essentially, digging up information about the past and present 
activities and associates of people active on the far right of politics and passing that to the 
newspapers (Copsey 2017). In 1975, Searchlight magazine would be relaunched, continuing 
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providing research and information to its two audiences: activists and the media. While the 
activity can be summed up in short order, its impact was substantial.  
There have long been suggestions that Searchlight and Gerry Gable had connections to the police 
and secret services (Campbell et al. 1980). Because such relationships are necessarily covert, it is 
impossible to definitively say whether they existed or not, and, if they did, whether they 
represented individuals passing information or a full and formal relationship or something in 
between. Nevertheless, the plausibility to many of such links suggests, if nothing else, that the 
quality of information that Searchlight was able to put out was impressively high. 
However, Dave Renton’s 2006 assessment that the most important anti-fascist organisations were 
Rock Against Racism and the Anti-Nazi League; they were the most active, the most visible, and 
had the most public support can be agreed with. 
Rock Against Racism and the Anti-Nazi League 
In 1976, a drunken Eric Clapton went, on stage, on a tirade in support of Enoch Powell and against 
immigration, laced with racist epithets (Rachel 2008). In response, a letter appeared in the New 
Musical Express, Melody Maker, and Sounds from Red Saunders, a photographer. Saunders’ 
political affiliation is given by the fourth publication in which the letter appeared: Socialist 
Worker. The letter highlighted the black roots of much of Clapton’s music, and argued that 
music, and rock music in particular, could ‘be a progressive culture’. The letter ends 
‘We want to organise a rank and file movement against the racist poison music. We urge 
support for Rock Against Racism’ (Renton 2006:32) 
An advert would appear in Socialist Worker asking for support for a ‘Rock Against Racism ad hoc 
committee’. This would lead to offers of support from across the country, concerts, a magazine, a 
fanzine, posters, and carnivals. Music ranged from Northern Soul to blues to reggae to punk to 
two-tone. While the SWP was instrumental in getting Rock Against Racism off the ground, it did 
not - or was not able to - control it. Rock Against Racism became what a modern public relations 
professional would call a viral marketing campaign. It was easy to get a few bands together, hire a 
venue, and print leaflets with ‘Rock Against Racism’13. Rock Against Racism was undoubtedly 
successful in showing that there was considerable opposition to racism and a groundswell of 
people who were willing to do something about it. It should be remembered that racism was 
 
13 This was the era, after all, of ‘this is a chord, this is another, this is a third. Now form a band’, as the punk 
fanzine, Sniffin’ Glue put it. 
120 
common, not just as an attitude amongst people, but in the form of violent attacks on non-
whites, the rhetoric of politicians, and the policies of the state. 
If the Battle of Cable Street became a leitmotif for the anti-fascism of the thirties, the equivalent 
for the seventies was the Battle of Lewisham. The National Front’s vote had been growing. In a 
by-election in Deptford ward to Lewisham council, the combined vote of the National Front and a 
breakaway, the National Party (395 and 580, totalling 975) was actually more than Labour’s 968. A 
local group, the All-Lewisham Campaign Against Racism and Fascism (known universally by its 
acronym, ALCARAF) was formed in response to the rise of the National Front and National Party. 
The Metropolitan Police launched a series of raids on black people - the Lewisham Twenty-One - 
in response to muggings in the area. A demonstration in support of the Lewisham Twenty-One 
attracted National Front supporters to a counter-demonstration; they would later organise a 
march from New Cross to Lewisham town. 
This impending march would lead to the old division between anti-fascists over tactics rearing its 
head. Those around ALCARAF favoured a demonstration removed in time and space from the 
National Front’s march; this was supported by a range of other organisations and notables, 
including the Bishop of Southwark, Mervyn Stockwood14, and Roger Godsiff, later the Labour MP 
for Birmingham Sparkbrook and Small Heath and Birmingham Hall Green, but then the mayor of 
Lewisham. The Anti-Racist and Anti-Fascist Co-ordinating Committee, ARAFCC, wanted a direct 
confrontation with the National Front. In an echo of Cable Street, the Metropolitan Police would 
try to escort the far right protest, which in the end could not reach its destination. Widespread 
disorder followed. 
The term ‘Battle of Lewisham’ directly echoes the Battle of Cable Street. The same lessons were 
taken: that many people, of all classes and races, coming together to physically confront the far 
right was effective and ‘the right thing to do’. 
Of the many outcomes of Lewisham, two particularly concern us. The first was the continuation 
of Cable Street as the ideal of opposition. The second was the formation of the Anti-Nazi League. 
Although the Socialist Workers Party were behind the Anti-Nazi League - it was, for them, a 
classic popular front - it had broad support. The Anti-Nazi League was founded at a meeting at 
Parliament in November of 1977. Its leadership would be Ernie Roberts (a former Assistant 
General Secretary of the Amalgamated Engineering Union and later a Labour MP), Paul Holborow 
 
14 Stockwood is probably best known now for his appearance criticising Monty Python’s Life of Brian on Friday 
Night, Saturday Morning, but was then known as an effective and radical clergyman associated with various 
liberal causes.  
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(an organiser for the Socialist Workers Party) and Peter Hain (best known in 1977 as an anti-
apartheid activist, a former Liberal who was in the process of joining Labour, under which banner 
he would sit in both the Commons and the Lords).  
This was combined with Labour taking a more clearly anti-racist and anti-fascist tone. There was 
widespread concern within the party that the National Front would do well at the next general 
election - eventually held in 1979 - particularly after they received more than five per cent of the 
vote at the 1977 elections to the Greater London Council. 
The Anti-Nazi League’s principal activity was disseminating propaganda exposing the National 
Front as Nazis, their criminal pasts, and various unsavoury connections. Much of this information 
came from Searchlight. Millions of pieces of literature were posted through letterboxes across 
the country (Copsey 2017:135). With increased public awareness and access to easy stories about 
them, newspapers, both local and national, started carrying stories exposing members of the 
National Front.  
The Anti-Nazi League also provided some of the administrative capacity necessary to put on the 
larger Rock Against Racism carnivals. While these did not directly impact the National Front, 
they provided both publicity for the League’s cause and acted to recruit activists. The re-founded 
Anti-Nazi League would claim that ‘two carnivals organised by the ANL and Rock Against Racism 
in 1978 were the biggest anti-racist demonstrations in Britain since the 1930s’ (Anti-Nazi League 
2001). 
The National Front was further hampered by local councils, particularly but not exclusively those 
controlled by the Labour Party, refusing to make their premises available for meetings (Copsey 
2017). Often the only meeting halls of sufficient size in provincial towns, this would prove to be 
an effective tactic against the Front. This also put pressure on private venues, particularly public 
houses, to follow suit and not take bookings from the Front. 
Prior to the formation of the Anti-Nazi League, individuals within the Socialist Workers Party had 
started forming small groups engaging in what was euphemistically referred to as physical anti-
fascism. This was squaddism, or violent attacks on far right groups, particularly the National 
Front. This continued up to and past the 1979 general election, although the leadership of the 
Anti-Nazi League and, increasingly, the Socialist Workers Party was hostile to the idea. 
In the run-up to the 1979 general election, the Conservatives, under Margaret Thatcher, were 
becoming increasingly tough on immigration; in an infamous interview for Granada television in 
1978, she would talk of Britons’ fears of being ‘rather swamped’ (Thatcher 1978) by immigrants 
from the Commonwealth. 
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Combined, this meant that the political opportunity space for the National Front on the right was 
now the subject of competition; Labour were working to ensure their traditional voters did not 
leave them for the Front; newspapers, the Anti-Nazi League, and Searchlight were giving people 
information and reason not to vote for the Front; and their organisational and campaigning 
efforts were hampered. 
The net result of this activity was that at the 1979 general election the National Front declined to 
0.6 per cent share of the vote. The Scottish National Party received more than double that share 
of vote, at 1.6 per cent, despite only contesting Scottish seats. The National Front was effectively 
finished. 
As has happened previously, with the spectre of fascism defeated, anti-fascists would themselves 
sleep. Largely from a lack of support, the Anti-Nazi League would close in 1981, the same year as 
Rock Against Racism’s last carnival, in Leeds. Much of the left-wing activism behind the 
organisations would transfer its energies to opposing the government of Margaret Thatcher. 
It would be wrong, however, to view Rock Against Racism and the Anti-Nazi League as being 
effectively the same organisation. While they certainly co-operated extensively and there was 
much crossover in personnel, the attitudes of the organisations towards the state were 
substantially different. Rock Against Racism saw the state as either enabling of or responsible for 
fascism in the form of the National Front. ‘The ANL, by contrast, subscribed to the 1939-1945 
legend of British anti-fascism. Its leaflets criticized the [National Front] as shame patriots. 
Ultimately, it colluded with the state.’ (Renton 2006:ix). 
How much of the National Front’s failure was attributable, in whole or in part, to the activities of 
the Anti-Nazi League and Rock Against Racism is very hard to assess. Some of its effect would 
have been mediated through other channels. Martin Webster, the National Activities Officer for 
the National Front, would admit in 1982 that the Anti-Nazi League ‘stuffed’ them (Vulliamy 
2007)15. 
What is certain, however, is that Rock Against Racism and the Anti-Nazi League would become 
two more touchstones in the collective memory of anti-fascism. The Anti-Nazi League would later 
be resurrected, while the idea of Rock Against Racism would come back to life as Love Music Hate 
Racism. Beyond that, there was a clear call back to the hagiography of Cable Street - many people 
of all kinds coming together to deal - physically when necessary - with fascism and fascists. There 
was, however, an innovation in the nexus of Rock Against Racism and the Anti-Nazi League. The 
 
15 The circumstances of the admission bear remarking upon. Peter Hain had sued Webster for libel over 
some of the latter’s remarks about the tactics of the ANL.  
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focus was shifting from targeting the far right itself to targeting those who might be receptive to 
the far right’s clarion with a countervailing narrative, and on encouraging very large numbers of 
people to help in getting that message across. 
The 1980s 
The 1980s were a fallow period for the far right and, consequently, its opposition. There was still 
some activity, however. 
The squaddists would be expelled from the Socialist Workers Party, and would form Red Action 
(as was traditional for the left, Red Action was officially the name of a newspaper). Red Action 
would be the nucleus of Anti-Fascist Action, who would continue violent attacks on the remnants 
of the National Front while seeking to spread their vision of class consciousness amongst the 
working class. Part of the split was, as previously, based on different opinions on how to engage 
with the capitalist state writ large (so including, for instance, what is now called the third sector, 
other political parties, the media, and so on) (Hann 2013).That the left was returning to its 
traditional internecine conflict, and in an echo of Cable Street and Lewisham, there would be a 
disagreement over which protest to attend on 16 October 1993. The Anti-Nazi League called for a 
protest in Welling in south east London, outside a bookshop operated by the British National 
Party; the Anti-Racist Alliance, meanwhile, called for a protest on Trafalgar Square. The former 
protest became violent, with both attendees and police being injured. 
On the other end of the political spectrum, a series of splits and mergers were taking place. John 
Tyndall left the National Front to form the New National Front in 1980; the National Party also 
splintered from the National Front, as did the Constitutional Movement and the British 
Democratic Party. Various groups would come together in a Committee for Nationalist Unity 
(Copsey 2004:34) which would then go on to become the second incarnation of the British 
National Party under Tyndall’s leadership in 1982. Their ranks would be swelled by defectors 
from the British Movement, British Democratic Party, and National Party. They would eschew 
democratic and electoral politics for the first years of their existence. This would change in 1993 
with the election of the British National Party’s first councillor, Derek Beackon, at a by-election 
for Millwall ward on the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. 
Millwall and the second British National Party 
The unexpected election of the first British National Party councillor in Millwall sent shockwaves 
through the political classes. The far right was meant to have been holed below the waterline in 
the late seventies, and yet they were not only back, but winning elections. Indeed, it had barely 
acknowledged electoral politics.  
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At the 1990 local council elections, Labour took all three Millwall seats. Tower Hamlets council 
consisted of thirty Liberal Democrats and twenty Labour representatives. However, the share of 
vote was extremely close, with the Liberal Democrats only coming three tenths of one percent 
ahead of Labour across the borough. As often happens, a by-election was needed in Millwall ward 
- there would be five by-elections across the London Borough of Tower Hamlets over the course 
of the four year term - to fill a vacated seat. The by-election was held on October 1st 1992. The 
British National Party candidate, Barry Osborne, received twenty per cent share of the vote; they 
had not even stood a candidate at the 1990 elections. 
Turnout at the 1990 election was 41.3%. Unsurprisingly, the turnout for the by-election was 
lower, at 33.8%; however, this is not dramatically lower (Boothroyd nd). What, then, explains the 
British National Party’s success? 
Millwall sits at the western half of the Isle of Dogs, a peninsula of north London sticking out into 
the Thames. A former industrial area based around the docks and later printing, it bore many of 
the features of similar urban areas in decline, not least unemployment. Docklands was starting to 
grow as a financial centre and the contrast between the wealth of the immediate north - the 
then-tallest building in the country, One Canada Square, was opened in 1991 - and the relative 
poverty of Millwall was stark. The Isle of Dogs also suffered from poor transport connections; it 
was literally the end of the line - the Docklands Light Railway terminated at Island Gardens - until 
1999. It had a sense of community and distinct identity, perhaps best captured by the popular 
chant of Millwall Football Club: ‘No-one likes us, we don’t care’. 
The BNP’s campaign in Millwall was called ‘Rights for Whites’. It capitalised on a perception that 
public monies in the borough were disproportionately going to Asian groups. Beyond this, 
however, the BNP ran a local campaign - targeting very specific areas where they believed their 
voters to be, addressing very local issues, and presenting themselves as a realistic choice to 
represent Millwall on Tower Hamlets council. Beyond the concerns over immigration and 
perceived favouritism towards non-white residents, the BNP also highlighted crime, disorder, 
and anti-social behaviour as issues they would address. 
Following the British National Party’s (relative) success in Millwall, the Anti-Nazi League was 
restarted in 1992. Because of prior disagreements, Searchlight and Gerry Gable were not invited 
to take part, and the re-founded Anti-Nazi League was seen as very much a front group for its 
principal organisers, the Socialist Workers Party.  
In an accident of history, another councillor would resign from Millwall ward in 1993. The by-
election would be held on September 16th.  
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The re-formed Anti-Nazi League started working the Isle of Dogs. However, they did not have a 
history or presence in the area, and did not understand the effect that people coming in from 
outside would have. Copsey (2017:174) cites a local priest: 
‘Like the BNP, they brought in large numbers of people from outside this well-boundaried 
and insular community to canvas [sic] door-to-door. On weekends near to the May 
elections there were running battles between rival groups. Islanders hated it, and the 
Anti-Nazi League got the reuptation of being worst [sic] than the BNP who had done their 
best throughout to seem respectable and to appear as a party of law and order’. 
Simultaneously, the Liberal Democrats distributed leaflets alleging favouritism to Asian 
communities; the then-leader of the Liberal Democrats, Paddy Ashdown, effectively disavowed 
the leaflets (BBC 1993), but the damage was done. 
The total effect of social and economic disadvantage, legitimisation of the talking points of the 
far right by a mainstream party, a counter-productive campaign by opposition groups, and a 
British National Party that had been carefully campaigning for some time in the area was that the 
far right party would achieve its first electoral success.  
Beackon’s tenure as a councillor was neither long nor glorious. Besides the expected 
condemnation from leading public figures, a cordon sanitaire was established by all other Tower 
Hamlets councillors, refusing to work with him in any way, and his lack of experience and 
knowledge of local government prevented him from being effective in his aims. Beackon would 
lose his seat at the scheduled 1994 local elections. 
What explains the loss of the British National Party’s only councillor? In a word, turnout. 
Turnout in 1994 was 66.4% in Millwall (Boothroyd nd), and 53.6% across the borough (Boothroyd 
nd a), compared with 41.3% and 46.1% respectively at the previous scheduled election (a 
significant amount of the increase in the latter figure being the increase in the former). 
With financial support from the Rowntree Trust, churches in the Isle of Dogs did a lot of work 
(Copsey 2017:176) registering voters and encouraging them to actually go to the polling station. 
There was a perception that the shock and opprobrium of having allowed themselves to be 
represented by a fascist caused turnout to go up itself (Rosenberg 2018). The Liberal Democrats, 
while still fielding a candidate, essentially did no campaigning in order to give Labour a clear run 
at the seat to defeat Beackon. Labour started addressing some of the issues of disconnection and 
anomie and highlighted what the British National Party stood for and its roots, in an echo of the 
articles in Searchlight. While there were still people coming in from outside to support the 
campaign against the British National Party, the organisation and leadership of the campaign had 
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a clear, local face. With that local lead from the Labour Party, other groups were not as likely to 
cause problems either between themselves or with the British National Party. 
The British National Party’s raw vote actually went up between the 1993 by-election and the full 
election in 1994, from 1,480 to 2,04116. However, Labour’s vote more than doubled. Increasing 
turnout had diluted the vote for the far right party such that their share of vote was 
approximately one-quarter. A two-thirds turnout at a local election is stunningly high - only five 
percentage points short of the 71.3% across the country who voted at the next general election in 
1997. The average turnout for the 1994 local elections was 41.5% (Boothroyd nd). 
The late nineties 
Despite the brief tenure of their councillor, the BNP were set to return to electoral politics. They 
would be doing so by attempting to change their image of being neo-Nazi thugs to one of 
speaking up for local people abandoned by the metropolitan elite and prohibited from speaking 
on the issue of immigration by a liberal consensus. This was established at a meeting of the BNP 
in January 1994 (Copsey 2017:177).  
John Tyndall, the veteran fascist and still leader of the British National Party, contested the 
Dagenham by-election in June 1994 (Boothroyd nd). While Labour, predictably, won the seat with 
fully seventy-two per cent of the vote, Tyndall received over 1,500 votes, or just over seven per 
cent share of the vote.  
Similarly, parts of the opposition to the far right also realised that their tactics would have to 
change to match the change from the British National Party.  
The British National Party did not do particularly well at the 1997 general election, receiving a 
total of a little over thirty-five thousand votes across the fifty-seven seats they contested. They 
only exceeded five per cent share of the vote in three constituencies - Poplar & Canning Town 
(the constituency that included the Isle of Dogs and Millwall), the neighbouring Bethnal Green & 
Bow, and the Yorkshire seat of Dewsbury. Beyond this, the national political environment was did 
not favour the BNP. It was widely expected that the Labour Party, under Tony Blair, would win 
the election, though the magnitude of the victory took even them by surprise. The Conservatives 
under John Major did not tack right on immigration (Copsey 2017:180).  
However, the British National Party were refining their campaign strategies, and ran enough 
candidates to garner both a party political broadcast and a free mailshot. This further 
 
16 2,041 votes went to Derek Beackon. The votes for the other two BNP candidates were 1,775 and 1,713. 
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emphasised the need for the left to change tactics: the traditional anti-fascist response was not 
possible as there simply were not meetings and marches to disrupt. 
Opposition to Tyndall’s leadership of the British National Party grew after 1997; the modernisers 
who had pushed for new campaign strategies in Millwall saw him as a block to future success, 
both because of his less than enthusiastic reception of those strategies, and because he was 
inescapably linked to the very image of neo-Nazi thuggery that they wished to avoid. Thus, in 
1999, he was successfully challenged for the leadership of the British National Party by Nick 
Griffin. 
That Griffin won as a moderniser indicates the change in his own politics. At the time of the 
Millwall by-election, Griffin said that 
‘[t]he electors of Millwall did not back a post modernist rightist party, but what they 
perceived to be a strong, disciplined organisation with the ability to back up its slogan 
‘Defend Rights for Whites’ with well-directed boots and fists’ (Eatwell and Mudde 2003:69) 
Griffin himself had joined the British National Party at Tyndall’s behest, and edited their two 
publications - Rune and Spearhead. He had been associated with the ‘political soldier’ faction 
within the Party, ultimately deriving from Julius Evola’s almost vanguardist ideas. Nevertheless, 
he had seen, perhaps following on from Millwall, that a different route might actually achieve 
results for the far right politics he espoused or, at least, something close to it (Copsey 2004). 
It took some years for the changes happening in the British National Party to come to fruition. 
With Millwall an apparent blip, by the late 1990s, the ARA, ANL, and others had split, disbanded, 
or otherwise disappeared from the scene. Red Action would go on to form its own political party, 
the Independent Working Class Association. 
Meanwhile, the British National Party was starting to make inroads outside of London. They 
embedded themselves, in a manner not unlike the Golden Dawn of Greece, providing services and 
support to local communities from Tipton to Burnley to Oldham (Wilks-Heeg 2009).  
This, then, sets the stage. The British National Party is moving on from a long traditional of, 
essentially, violent and physical control of streets as a means and end of political activity, with a 
view to overturning the state. It is taking on a new, decentralised, community-based form of 
campaigning. Meanwhile, the opposition to the far-right and fascism - the question of non-fascist 
parts of the far right not yet having been raised by UKIP - was abeyant and divided, and in large 
part still wedded to tactics that dated back to the 1920s. 
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Conclusion 
A question was asked at the start of this chapter, following Renton (2001): do the practices of 
anti-fascist groups over time amount to a tradition? 
In order to determine whether there is an anti-fascist tradition, the fascist tradition and 
relationship between it and anti-fascism was considered. For much of its existence, fascism 
focussed on physical control of areas; electoralism was a secondary consideration. 
This chapter has sought to show that there are, in fact, three traditions to anti-fascism; 
intertwined, certainly, but nevertheless distinct. These, broadly, are physical confrontation, 
demonstration of opposition, and interference of operation. 
The first, physical confrontation, comes from two parts. One is the desire for a direct challenge to 
the mere presence of fascists. The second comes from a similar view of the way in which society 
and the state are likely to develop - with a revolution - and the need to prepare the ground for 
that change. 
Demonstration of opposition is essentially the manifestation of moral outrage, and to show that 
there are great numbers of people who wish to make it clear that the far right are not 
representative of the broader populace. In short, these are demonstrations of worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitment (WUNC) (Tilly 2004:53). 
These traditions of interpretation can be seen coming together in Cable Street. What was it about 
Cable Street that mattered? Was it many people and peoples coming together, or was it that ‘the 
fash’ was turfed out of the area? Both answers would have their adherents; they would give rise 
to the WUNC-style concerts of Rock Against Racism and protests of the Anti-Nazi League, and 
they would give rise to the militancy of Lewisham. In both cases, however, there would be focus 
on signal events. 
The third tradition dates back as far as Alfred and Ethel Holdsworth: finding out information 
about the far right that they would rather was not shared, and then sharing it. This continues 
with Searchlight, and with the Millwall campaign in 1994. 
With the change in tactics from the British National Party in the closing years of the twentieth 
century, parts of the opposition to them realised that what mattered was not lots of people 
coming together as at Cable Street, Lewisham, Trafalgar Square, and countless other places, but 
getting lots of people to do the dull, unglamorous, unexciting work of campaigning: knocking on 
doors, managing databases, and getting voters to polls. 
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Certain other trends can be discerned. Firstly, there is a symbiotic relationship between fascism 
and anti-fascism. This manifests in two forms. One is that both regard the other as a particular 
threat and particularly infamous. They regard each other as a particular evil, in a manner that 
the long political stretch between them is not. Frequently, they have similar views about the 
state, though to different ends, as a liberal cypher. As such, not just frequent, physical 
confrontation between them is seen, but an active desire to fight the opposition. The second is 
that anti-fascists have been incapable of maintaining a substantial level of activity, awareness, 
and preparation when there is not a clear and present threat from fascists. As the threat fades, so 
does anti-fascism. 
This chapter has set out the interconnected history of the far right and groups that oppose the 
far right. The next chapter provides more detail on the specific parties and opposition groups 
under study: the British National Party, United Kingdom Independence Party, Hope not Hate, and 
Unite Against Fascism.  
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Chapter 5 - The parties and the opposition groups 
To the sea the barbarians drive us, to the barbarians the sea drive us; 
Between these two our burials are to be butchered or be drowned 
-Gemitus Britannorum, or the Groans of the Britons, 
as recorded in Gildas’ On the Ruin of Britain 
 
Introduction 
This chapter details UKIP, the BNP, Hope not Hate, and Unite Against Fascism. It sets out their 
development, worldview, and how those affect and inform how they campaign today. 
In the literature review, a dichotomy within the far right party family are identified. The two 
sides are variously called neo-fascism and neo-populism (Taggart 1995), authoritarian and 
libertarian (Betz 1994), and traditional and post-industrial (Ignazi 2003). As the precise nature of 
the split and the specific characteristics of the two groups are of secondary importance for the 
purposes of the present study, the simpler, if less specific, terms of fascist and populist radical 
right are adopted. 
For the purposes of this chapter, a fascist party is one that has ‘[a]n ideology that strives to forge 
social rebirth based on a holistic-national radical Third Way, though in practice fascism has 
tended to stress style, especially action and the charismatic leader, more than detailed 
programme, and to engage in a Manichaean demonisation of its enemies’ (Eatwell 1996:313). 
A populist radical right party is ‘nativist, authoritarian, and populist’ (Mudde 2007:22). Nativism 
is nationalism and xenophobia combined (Mudde 2007); populism is a division of society into ‘the 
pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’ (Mudde 2004:544). 
Essential differences are attitudes to democracy and the quasi-mystical. Though it may 
participate in elections as a means to advance its goals, a fascist party is fundamentally anti-
democratic; the will of the people, manifest in a leader, is not to be stymied by bureaucratic 
machinations. A populist radical right party may advocate a particular form of direct democracy 
and advance many doubts about current structures, but it is in some manner committed to the 
idea of a popular mandate verified at the ballot box.  
A fascist party also has a quasi-mystical offering of a national rebirth - Roger Griffin’s 
palingenesis (Griffin 1991) - and that the shadowed world in which we live will be swept away to 
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create a place for new men. Populist radical right parties may want radical changes to the 
political establishment, but their ambitions are less esoteric. 
There is broad agreement in the literature that the British National Party may be understood as 
fascist (for instance, Sykes 2004, Copsey 2004, Goodwin 2011) and that the United Kingdom 
Independence Party may be characterised as populist radical right (Ford and Goodwin 2014a, 
Gruber and Bale 2014, Clarke et al 2016). This agreement is not, however, complete, with Mudde 
(2007) considering the British National Party as populist radical right. 
The United Kingdom Independence Party 
How did UKIP come to be? 
The history of UKIP can be summed up in relatively short order. It was founded by Alan Sked in 
1991 as the Anti-Federalist League to oppose British participation in the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), better known in the UK by the name of the Dutch city in which it was signed in 
1992: Maastricht. When TEU was eventually passed by the House of Commons by the narrowest of 
majorities17, it became apparent that a different tack would be needed. Rather than limit itself to 
scepticism about the European project, the new United Kingdom Independence Party, founded in 
1993, would have as its leitmotif the withdrawal of the country from the European Union. 
UKIP’s first years were challenging. With few supporters, little money, and hardly any 
organisational capacity, it limped along, in Michael Howard’s words, as cranks and gadflies. From 
shortly after its formation until the death of its founder, Sir Jimmy Goldsmith, in 1997, they had 
to compete with (and were out-competed by) the Referendum Party, a mix of pressure group and 
political party (Carter et al. 1998). After the 1997 General Election, Alan Sked would leave both 
the leadership and the party itself, seeing it as best hopeless and at worst beset by racists. UKIP 
itself could not decide whether to be a single issue group, looking to force a shift against the 
European project amongst the Conservative Party, or whether it wanted to be a proper party in 
its own right (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:25) 
With the turn of the millennium, UKIP’s fortunes would start to change. The 1999 elections saw 
their first representatives returned to the European Parliament. A new leader, Michael Holmes, 
provided funding and a degree of stability. However, internecine struggles would rear their head 
again for UKIP, as Holmes and the other two MEPs elected in 1999, Nigel Farage and Jeffery 
 
17 By a single vote. The original count on Labour’s Social Chapter amendment was 317 in favour and 317 
against, and Speaker Boothroyd cast a deciding vote against the amendment. A later check revealed that 
there had actually been 316 votes in favour. John Major’s substantive motion fell by eight votes, forcing 
him to re-hold the vote the next day as a confidence vote. 
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Titford, disagreed over the direction of the party. Such was the acrimony that Holmes became the 
second leader not just to stand down but to leave the party. 
Ford and Goodwin (2014a:12) sum up the situation: ‘the party repeatedly undermined their own 
prospects through fierce infighting, strategic miscalculations, single-issue obsessiveness and a 
failure to build an effective campaign organisation’. 
In 1997, the Labour Party returned to power after eighteen years of Conservative 
administrations. Alongside the implementation of major policy changes during their long 
absence from Downing Street, Labour had changed its image. While this appealed to a certain 
demographic necessary to win elections, it alienated, or risked alienating, much of the 
traditional, ‘Old Labour’ bases of support.  
The period of the Blair ministries would translate into a pair of factors would combine to give 
UKIP the space to flourish. One is the phenomenon of the ‘left behind’ (Ford and Goodwin 2014a); 
a group of people, generally older, white, less educated, with less secure or no employment, 
whose expectations of how their lives would develop were not met, and who, losing their natural 
political home in the Labour Party, became alienated from politics more broadly. The other was 
the decision by the Labour government not to impose transitional controls on the rights of 
citizens from the so-called A1018 - the ten states that joined the EU in 2004 - to move to and work 
in the United Kingdom (Evans and Mellon 2019).  
In 2004 UKIP achieved its best election results to date, coming third in the European elections 
with sixteen per cent of the vote and returning a dozen MEPs to Brussels. With the advice of the 
veteran American political consultant, Dick Morris, UKIP ran an extensive billboard campaign. 
The same year saw the faintly surreal episode of a former Labour MP turned talk show host, 
Robert Kilroy-Silk, joining UKIP, being elected as an MEP on their ticket, trying to take over as 
leader, failing, and then leaving and forming his own party, Veritas. Despite the strangeness of 
the events, UKIP did appear to benefit from Kilroy-Silk’s brief dalliance. He was well known 
through his day-time television programme, and the very fact of a former Labour MP saying that 
UKIP was the party for him was significant. 
While Labour opened space for UKIP, its opposition did not for some time. The Conservative 
Party had gone through a long period of introspection following the disaster of the 1997 General 
Election. It had, under William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith, and Michael Howard, adopted tougher 
and tougher stances on Europe and immigration (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:38), culminating in the 
 
18 Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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‘Are You Thinking What We’re Thinking?’ series of billboards of the 2005 general election 
campaign, which included ‘It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration’. Under David Cameron, 
the party would attempt to detoxify itself, including on immigration. 
The following year, Nigel Farage became UKIP leader. Farage would act as a figure around which 
the party could rally and provide stability and organisation, as well as attracting funding. With 
the exception of a year in which Lord Pearson of Rannoch ran the party, he would serve as leader 
for ten years. 
The result, after a difficult first few years, was a party that both recognised the importance of the 
media and knew how to use it and how to drive it; that had a developing organisational capacity; 
that had political space between it and its closest major party, the Conservatives; that had a 
narrative from the governing party of disconnection from its traditional basis of support; that 
had a rising concern about immigration and Europe. European elections would remain the high 
water marks for UKIP, with the MPs expenses scandal of 2009 making that year’s elections 
something of a spring tide. 
What does UKIP stand for? 
The principal raison d’etre for the United Kingdom Independence Party has been the United 
Kingdom’s independence from the European Union. Whether it should develop a broader 
platform than that was one of the internal debates in the party’s early years. By the time of Nigel 
Farage’s ascension to the leadership, the matter had been settled in favour of UKIP presenting 
itself as a full-service party, with policies across the range of government functions, rather than a 
single-issue campaign group. 
While Europe remained the theme that linked them, UKIP did develop a range of other policies. A 
tension with UKIP was between a libertarian, market-oriented tendency (Ford and Goodwin 
2014a:7) and the more populist variant that would win out. The libertarian tendency was in 
favour of a small state with limited taxation and government spending. It saw the EU as 
increasingly a project of ‘big government’ with an expansive vision of social policy. This was 
coupled with concerns about the perceived lack of democratic accountability in the functioning 
of the European Union. These concerns merged into sovereigntist concerns - essentially, that the 
demos and the polis should be coterminous in order for the polis to be properly represented. This 
also shows a connection between the libertarian and populist tendencies. The populist tendency 
was essentially a text-book rendering of Mudde’s (2004) understanding of the term: a 
counterposition of a ‘pure people’ with a ‘corrupt elite’ coupled with the view ‘that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde 2005:543). 
Thus, plebiscitary politics, hostility to the elite’s projects, and a range of ‘common sense’ policies 
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that would appeal to the broader population but not bien-pensants liberal elites such as support 
for capital punishment, would emerge. 
The libertarian and populist tendencies could appear to be in tension, as the former focuses on a 
small state and the latter allows, at least in certain circumstances, for a very large state. Given 
the experience of Thatcherism in Britain, which itself merged free market economics and 
traditional values19, and the connections with the United States, where the Republican Party 
managed these two wings through the doctrine of fusionism, this tension could be managed. 
However, the more populist variant won out. As early as 2004, as well as concerns about the EU 
spending British money, UKIP was talking about immigration (Ford and Goodwina 2014:60). As 
migration increased as a concern, so did UKIP’s focus on it (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:64). By the 
2009 election, with the scandal around MPs’ expenses having damaged the standing of the 
political elite in society, UKIP was further pushed to emphasise the classic distinction made by 
populists between mass and elite. 
The libertarian tendency manifested in support for flat taxes, but UKIP’s principal area of 
interest became the populist staples of the disconnected elite, Europe, immigration, and Islam 
and their effect on autochthonous culture. 
Beyond the above, the strategy under Nigel Farage was to pick up those issues that the 
mainstream parties either could not touch for ideological reasons or would not touch because of 
their toxicity (Lynch et al 2011). This strategy had the effect of giving UKIP unique positions and 
talking points across a broad range of issues. 
How does UKIP campaign? 
It is useful here to distinguish between two broad areas of campaigning in British politics: the air 
war, or national-level, broadcast media and similar; and the ground war, or the time-honoured 
practice of locally-organised volunteers knocking on doors and having conversations with voters 
(Mullen 2016).  
The air war is, to paraphrase Joseph Kennedy, Sr, selling candidates like soap flakes. It uses mass 
communications - television spots, seeking coverage in the press, billboard posters, and the like - 
to transmit the party’s messages to as many people as possible.  
An important distinction within the air war is between earned and unearned coverage. Unearned 
coverage is that which is simply paid for by an organisation (Stephen and Galak 2012). Earned 
 
19 Margaret Thatcher specifically said she was trying to bring back Victorian social mores, and famously 
described FA von Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty as ‘this is what we believe’. 
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coverage is that which an organisation – in this case, a political party – has not paid for, but has 
obtained by being newsworthy, or by shifting the media agenda to cover areas where it feels it 
has relative strength. The example par excellence of earned media is Donald Trump. 
The ground war operates with varying levels of sophistication. At its most basic, it consists of a 
clipboard, a list of addresses, a stack of leaflets, and a stout pair of shoes. It ranges up to 
databases matched with demographic segmentation and information on whether people vote and 
how often, using mobile apps, to allow precise targeting of messages. The aim is to have 
conversations (or the appearance of conversations) with as many potential voters as possible, 
with the intention of making sure your voters turn out and convincing others to vote for you. 
The two different domains of campaigning have different requirements. The ground war is 
organised at a very local level, often by individual ward. Above all, it needs volunteers who will 
spend time on this laborious exercise. The air war depends on having a clear set of messages - 
these are often used as part of the ground war, but are set at the national or regional rather than 
local level - and communicating them to as many people as possible. This means a national media 
operation and, of course, money. 
UKIP faced a similar problem to the Social Democratic Party. In 1981, four senior members of the 
Labour Party - David Owen, Shirley Williams, Roy Jenkins, and Bill Rodgers - left, soon to form the 
Social Democratic Party, unable to stay in the tent as Labour moved to an increasingly hard left 
position. Although the Liberal-SDP Alliance would receive around one vote in ten at both the 
1983 and 1987 General Elections, they would only manage to see six and then five MPs returned.  
Given their situation, the ideal choice for UKIP would have been to soak particular areas. It did 
make efforts to do so at by-elections (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:243). However, by-elections, by 
virtue of being outside the usual electoral calendar, operate differently to scheduled elections. 
Because, for instance, by-elections to the parliament at Westminster will generally be the only 
poll happening on that day, the national parties can dedicate a great deal of resource - including 
rounding up supporters from across the country to come and campaign - to the seat. The same 
applies for local parties and council by-elections.  
UKIP did make attempts to copy the successful tactics of the Liberal Democrats, who had also 
learnt from the problems faced by their predecessors in the Social Democratic Party, in working 
particular areas over a period of time, particularly after that tactic proved successful in Ramsey 
(Ford and Goodwin 2014a:94). However, UKIP lacked the dedicated base of supporters and 
organisers to make this a viable strategy across the country. 
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This local strategy was not what UKIP, ultimately, used. This was partially for the deficit 
mentioned above, but also because of the resources it had at its disposal. 
What UKIP did have was money, both from individual rich donors who gave substantial amounts 
of money, like the aforementioned Lord Pearson of Rannoch, and from larger numbers of donors 
of more ordinary means. This would allow for an effective air war campaign, including large 
numbers of posters in UKIP’s distinctive purple and yellow colours, as Dick Morris advised. 
UKIP also talked about issues that other parties did not, and talked about issues that other parties 
would cover, but in different ways (Lynch et al. 2011). This is immediately attractive to the press 
on the ‘man bites dog’ principle20. It also allowed it to express its distinctiveness to voters. The 
result was that UKIP placed far more relative importance than any other party on ‘impacting the 
media agenda [from 2009 to 2015]’ (Lilleker 2016:88). 
It should be emphasised that one of the main targets of UKIP’s criticism (which would appear to 
have found some popular favour) was a disconnected, metropolitan, liberal elite. This broad 
criticism of the political class was a simple-to-understand, eye-catching story that the media - 
and certain parts of the media in particular - would spread. This is a hallmark of populism: the 
honest, good mass of people let down by the machinations of a small elite. 
Having a clear set of messages from the central party also helped to deal with the crankish 
tendency within UKIP, both by convincing members to stick to a narrative and so that unusual 
proclamations by candidates could easily be disavowed21. 
There is a question as to which way the arrow of causation falls between media coverage and 
public interest. It is argued in general both that the media follow the lead of the public (Pauwels 
2010) and that the media, in fact, lead the public (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007). In the 
specific case of UKIP, it appears that media interests largely drives public interest (Murphy and 
Devine 2018). Either way, ‘mass media is widely considered to be an important resource for social 
movements’ (Davidson and Berezin 2018:487) - including their manifestations as political parties. 
The above was summed up by Farage on taking over the leadership of UKIP: ‘I said I would do the 
three M’s: media, messaging and money’ (Ford and Goodwin 2014a:90). 
 
20 ‘When a dog bites a man, that is not news, because it happens so often. But if a man bites a dog, that is 
news’ (Bartlett and Kaplan 1992). 
21 Such as when a UKIP candidate for the Commons advocated repealing the Representation of the People 
Act 1832, better known as the Great Reform Act, which greatly extended the franchise (Bienkov 2014). 
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The British National Party 
The British National Party in the Twenty-First Century 
Partly because of its longer history, the British National Party and its antecedents are more 
studied than the United Kingdom Independence Party. The British National Party is therefore 
treated at greater length above and it would be otiose to more than recapitulate it. The key 
features are that it is the latest in a long line of parties that trace their lineage back to the fascism 
of the period immediately before the Second World War and beyond (Eatwell and Mudde 2003); 
that it remains a fascist party; that it has a history of confrontation with anti-fascist groups based 
on a particular understanding of the motivations of said groups; it has a particular, 
Fuehrerprinzip-like focus on the leader of the party; it expresses opposition to immigration qua 
immigration rather than about its effects on culture; and, despite its protestations to the 
contrary, maintains a fundamental belief in a biological difference between races, and the 
superiority of certain races over others (Copsey 2017).  
The BNP had long expected a crisis - which, in the end would arrive at approximately the same 
time as Godot - and so their strategy had been to appear ‘strong’ so that they could capitalise 
upon it when it arrived (Goodwin 2011:71). 
Most recently, it had, following the sparks of some success, started a turn towards electoral 
politics after years of either total disengagement with electoral politics or a desultory 
acknowledgment of it. 
The British National Party’s first flash of electoral success came, as mentioned, in Millwall in 
1992. The success came from a couple of sources. One was the particular nature of the area - 
insular, working-class, with housing as a particular issue, and with a Liberal Democrat campaign 
that had legitimised racialized discourse on housing. The particular, aggressive style of 
campaigning by groups opposed to the BNP inflamed the matter. The second was that the BNP 
were already ensconced in the area, with the local organiser, Eddy Butler, having led the party to 
capture one-fifth of the vote at the 1990 local elections. 
The BNP would not capitalise on that spark for some time. Its founder and leader, John Tyndall, 
remained wedded to a worldview that was becoming out of date even for the BNP. It would not be 
until 1999 that the BNP would begin to change, with Nick Griffin elected as leader after a group of 
moderates ousted Tyndall in the party’s first leadership election. Griffin was an unlikely choice of 
new broom. He had been brought into the British National Party by Tyndall himself; he argued 
that the BNP’s success in Millwall had been due to the party’s readiness for violence (Eatwell and 
Mudde 2003:69). 
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Griffin learnt, however, from the French Front National, which had moderated its image to 
successfully compete at the ballot box (Copsey 2011a). Having been a member of the Julius Evola-
inspired Political Soldier faction, Griffin now wanted to make himself and his party more saleable 
(Panorama, 2001), though without changing their commitment to, for instance, mass repatriation 
of non-whites (Panorama, 2001). Combined with the ballot-box successes that the BNP had had by 
moderating is image, this was enough to convince Griffin (Goodwin 2011:66). He would lead the 
BNP by aping the FN (Macklin 2011:19). 
This strategy manifested itself in several ways. The party tried to professionalise itself, so as to 
share best practice, campaign more effectively, solidify its espirit de corps, and avoid people 
going off-message with its first annual college in October 2001 (Copsey 2004:136). Nick Griffin 
tried to brand the BNP’s areas of interest as ‘security, freedom, identity, democracy’ (Rhodes 
2011b:63) as less scary than out-and-out racism, even if in the BNP’s hands they amounted to the 
same thing. This was part of making the BNP more media-friendly (Copsey and Macklin 2011:83). 
From 2007, Jim Dowson came in as the BNP’s fundraiser at Griffin’s behest (Gable 2012), though 
they would fall out by 2010 (Gable 2012). Dowson, later connected with Britain First (Electoral 
Commission 2017), had been associated with hardline unionism and anti-abortion activism in 
Northern Ireland. 
A training programme and media monitoring unit - largely a media response unit - were 
established (Copsey 2004:107). ‘Circles’, or front groups, through which supporters could be 
brought into the party from particular groups - veterans, families, businesspeople, and so on - 
were established (Copsey 2004:108). This also allowed plausibly independent groups to put out 
messages that just so happened to accord with the BNP’s viewpoints. 
A new membership system, Voting Membership, was introduced (Copsey 2004:171; Goodwin 
2011:90). Before members were eligible to vote on, for instance, the party’s policies or leadership, 
they had to have been a member for two years, then spend a further year as probationer during 
which time they were expected to attend educational sessions, make financial contributions, and 
fulfil a certain amount of campaigning. This effectively built a cadre of core members on which 
the party could rely - for money, for working, and for not rocking the boat.  
How does the BNP campaign? 
By 2001, the BNP was running a reasonably professional campaign (Copsey 2004:139), making use 
of electoral rolls (Copsey 2004:120) and engaging in the process of doorknocking and canvassing. 
It would make use of such opportunities as it had to broadcast its message - at the inaugural 
election of the Mayor of London, it spent the £20,000 necessary on a deposit for a candidate, 
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Michael Newland, with the effect that every elector in London received a copy of its election 
address.22 
The BNP had the opposite of UKIP’s resource situation. The clouds of opprobrium around the 
party meant that, excepting the occasional bequest, finances were always tight. It never 
succeeded in persuading the media to push their narratives, or at least present them for 
discussion. Indeed, Griffin and the BNP had to deal with outright hostility to them and their 
messages when they did appear in the media (Goodman and Johnson 2013). However, the same 
stigma that affected the BNP in broadcasting has the perverse effect of helping the party when it 
came to campaigning. The very act of publicly associating with a party perceived by most people 
as beyond the pale forms an in-group, and strengthens members’ identification with the group. 
This makes them more willing to undertake activities for the party (Moreland and Levine 1982). 
The effect is that, while lucre was short, committed volunteers are not, at least relative to the size 
of the party. 
The BNP could not campaign across the country - it did not have the resources - so it chose 
particular areas (Goodwin 2011:71). Based on experiences dating back to Millwall, the National 
Front in Bury St. Edmunds (Goodwin 2011), and elsewhere, the BNP developed a community-
based campaign strategy in areas it felt could yield results.  
The aim of this strategy was to build from the lowest levels of government up; by starting with 
single councillors and growing, the intention was to take whole councils, European 
parliamentary seats and, perhaps, seats in the Westminster parliament. 
The BNP targeted ‘Old Labour’ wards - not the poorest, but those that were likely to be concerned 
about the future and disconnected from politics. They were not wards with a large immigrant 
population (Goodwin 2011). In this, they were seeking a similar base of support to UKIP’s ‘left 
behind’. In particular, they sought areas that Labour had not assiduously worked. 
The campaign started with very basic, low-level campaigning - litter picking, concerns about dog 
fouling - that allowed the BNP to present itself as non-threatening and ‘getting the job done’. This 
would build to voter identification, and into a traditional, ground war campaign (Goodwin 2011). 
 
22 Although the cost of production is borne by the candidate, the Representation of the People Act 1983 
provides for candidates to certain elections to have an election address delivered to every elector. They are 
sometimes combined together into a single booklet. The practice was originally provided for in the 
Representation of the People Act 1918, which has since been repealed. 
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The opposition groups 
One of the arguments made in the present thesis is the lack of study of opposition to the far right 
in general, and of recent forms of opposition in particular. Indeed, addressing this gap is one of 
the aims of this thesis. However, this does mean the available literature on the two particular 
groups of interest to this study is very limited. Including references to newspaper articles and the 
occasional use of the term without reference to the organisation, Google Scholar only yields 
slightly more than three hundred mentions of Unite Against Fascism, and a little more than four 
hundred for Hope not Hate. By contrast, the singer Barry Manilow returns more than two and a 
half thousand results. The following two sections regrettably rely, therefore, on a limited 
literature, supplemented by the organisations’ own publications and interviews.  
How Unite Against Fascism campaigns 
The stated aim of Unite Against Fascism was to increase voter turnout to dilute any vote for the 
far right (Copsey 2011b:134; Unite Against Fascism 2018). This aim was to be achieved through a 
variety of means: rallies, protests, concerts, carnivals, leafleting (Unite Against Fascism 2018). 
The specific heritage of Cable Street and hallowed traditions of anti-fascist protest were driving 
forces behind this strategy (Unite Against Fascism 2018). There was co-operation with Love Music 
Hate Racism - a revival of Rock Against Racism - and using celebrities and people generally in the 
public eye to attract attention to campaigns was a deliberate strategy - ‘getting high profile 
people speaking out’ (Unite Against Fascism 2018). 
The importance of working with local people was emphasised by Unite Against Fascism (2018). 
However, this aim appears to have been more aspiration than achievement, with Unite Against 
Fascism themselves acknowledging that their inspiration were national campaigns and that 
localisation was secondary (Unite Against Fascism 2018). 
The messaging around the BNP was that it was a Nazi party, and so the BNP and what it stood for 
had to be rejected in toto. A difference was recognised between the BNP and UKIP, in that UKIP 
was not, for Unite Against Fascism, a fascist party (Unite Against Fascism 2018). A separate 
campaign, Stand up to Racism, was established in 2014 so that similar groups to Unite Against 
Fascism could work against UKIP without labelling it as fascist, which was felt would lead to 
either confusion or rejection of their messaging. However, Unite Against Fascism was itself 
engaged in activity against UKIP at least as early as 2004 and Unite Against Fascism promoted 
Stand Up to Racism on their own website (Unite Against Fascism 2013). 
A particular feature of Unite Against Fascism campaigning was the desire for physical control of 
streets. This tactic originates in the perceived threat of far-right mobilisation in the 1930s and 
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1970s, and became part of the repertoire of anti-fascism. Although Unite Against Fascism 
acknowledge that, by the 2000s, the BNP were campaigning in a novel way, Unite Against Fascism 
maintained the desire to keep opponents it considered beyond the pale from carrying out their 
activities. 
This leads to a broader point. The very nature of this style of campaigning invites controversy; 
physically contesting control of streets, regardless of the cause, will not be universally popular. 
Physical damage is done to the public realm, a day’s takings are lost to local business, and the 
local constabulary must shoulder the cost of policing the event. These consequences may affect 
an organisation’s image - in this case, Unite Against Fascism’s - even if it was physically 
confronting (say) the English Defence League instead of UKIP.  
In this was an explicit criticism of previous, less militant anti-fascist activity - ‘what’s the use of 
demonstrating the day before or the day after the fascists are in town?’ (Unite Against Fascism 
2018) - where direct, physical confrontation with their opponents had been avoided, as happened 
at Cable Street, Lewisham, and elsewhere. Unite Against Fascism deliberately maintain a 
connection to this tradition - ‘You know it’s principle for us. We don’t give up the streets if 
possible to fascists, and when they come to town we should be there’ (Unite Against Fascism 
2018) - and implicitly criticise the more hands-off tradition and its descendants in Hope not Hate. 
The aim, in short, is to draw as much attention as possible to the campaign in a given area in as 
short a time as possible. The campaign therefore also tends to move around the country, 
spending relatively little time in one area, and generally congregating in metropolises. Unite 
Against Fascism’s campaigning is also against a variety of targets - UKIP and the BNP, but also the 
remnants of the National Front and the English Defence League and its splinters - as well as (for 
instance) demonstrating outside the Greek Embassy in regards to Golden Dawn and marching for 
justice for the murdered black American teenager, Trayvon Martin. Because of the relative lack 
of focus, there is manifestly the potential for spill-over - where perceptions of one particular 
campaign affect perceptions of another, including negatively. 
As will become clear when compared with Hope not Hate, Unite Against Fascism is a relatively 
informal organisation. It is not registered either with Companies House or the Charity 
Commission and so, technically speaking, is an unincorporated association by default. 
Relations with other groups 
There is a relationship between the Socialist Workers Party and Unite Against Fascism. Indeed, 
one of UAF’s founders, Weyman Bennett, was a senior figure in the party. This relationship has 
attracted comment because of the Trotskyite tendency towards setting up front groups, with the 
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suggestion that Unite Against Fascism is effectively a cipher for the Socialist Workers Party 
(Toube 2009). 
Founded by Tony Cliff, The Socialist Workers Party emerged from the International Socialists, 
which in turn emerged from the Socialist Review Group (Birchall 2010). The doctrinal differences 
between the Socialist Workers Party and other groups on the far left are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but it sits within the Trotskyite tradition (Høgsbjerg 2019). This tradition, dating to its 
eponymous founder, saw the Communist Party as the means for the proletariat to achieve class 
consciousness (Hallas 2018); this would later be transferred from the party of Lenin to a variety of 
successor parties. Because of the need to promote this class consciousness, later Trotskyite 
groups, including the SWP, would engage in the practice of setting up front groups (Kelly 2018) as 
a means of reaching people with particular issues who might not otherwise be interested in the 
class struggles, a Trotskyite view of the world, or a given Trotskyite party. The implied criticism 
of such front groups is that they are there to advance the interests of the party behind them, 
rather than the cause itself. 
It is not in doubt that there is a close relationship between the Socialist Workers Party and Unite 
Against Fascism. The question, in essence, is whether Unite Against Fascism has a life of its own, 
or can only be understood as acting to promote the Socialist Workers Party’s view of the world .  
Kelly (2018:200) identifies three types of social movement in which Trotskyites are involved : 
‘broad social movements’, in which Trotskyite groups are present but not dominant; ‘social 
movements initiated and led by Trotskyists’; and ‘Trotskyist front organisations’. Kelly (2018:200) 
gives Unite Against Fascism as being a member of the second group, and describes the Anti-Nazi 
League as being in the same group, suggesting a certain continuity between the two. This 
category into which the UAF falls dates back to the ‘united front’ agreements on pressing issues 
with social democrats in the twenties (Kelly 2018:21) 
As with the Anti-Nazi League (Hain 2018), the Socialist Workers Party did not set up Unite Against 
Fascism alone; indeed, even Searchlight/Hope not Hate were involved with it (Lowles 2014). This 
suggests a perceived need to work with other groups because of the importance of the issue: 
opposing fascism. Fascism is seen as uniquely bad because of the specific antagonism towards 
communism (of whichever variety) and its capacity to divert the proletariat from class 
consciousness. It must be opposed because it is the antithesis of the good represented by the 
party. Beyond this, from the 1970s on, there was an increased focus on the nexus of race and class 
on the far left (Virdee 2014); how much of this was because the increased diversity of the working 
class in the UK led to new perspectives and an increased appreciation of the connections between 
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race and politics, and how much was simply capitalizing on an opportunity to gain members is a 
difficult question to answer; however, the effect happened. 
In short, Unite Against Fascism’s aims and the Socialist Workers Party’s aims were, in this 
terrain, largely the same; the SWP were genuinely concerned about an emerging far right threat 
and returned to the tactics that it felt had successfully halted the National Front in the 1970s. 
That is not to say that the Socialist Workers Party did not benefit from Unite Against Fascism 
activities. It strains plausibility to suggest that members of the Socialist Workers Party would not 
strike up conversations with attendees at demonstrations, at least occasionally with a view to 
gauging someone’s politics and prospects as a member or supporter. Nor is it to say that the 
Socialist Workers Party did not seek greater control over Unite Against Fascism; Renton (2014) 
highlights disputes with Sabby Dhalu of the National Association Against Racism (influenced by 
another Trotskyite group, Socialist Action) over black leadership of anti-fascist activity, as well as 
the aforementioned falling out between UAF and Searchlight/Hope not Hate. Moreover, SWP 
members would have shaped the UAF’s own worldview. However, the close cooperation with 
Labour in Barking (Hodge 2018) suggests that there must have been a preparedness to work with 
others without worrying about the effects for the SWP. 
The relationship with the SWP would include some compatibility of worldview. This may further 
explain Unite Against Fascism’s failings; McGowan and Keith (2016) find a limited ability for 
radical left wing parties to draw on the same social bases of support as far right parties – 
principally white men. This lack of understanding or appeal on the electoral stage may also apply 
when seeking votes against a party instead of for one. 
A particular problem with examining this relationship is that representatives of Unite Against 
Fascism are unlikely to admit that they were, should it be true, running the organization in the 
interests of the Socialist Workers Party. However, the fact that Unite Against Fascism is 
influenced by, rather than dominated by, the Socialist Workers Party, with other organisations 
involved in it; and that there is a genuine opposition to fascism, however understood, within 
Trotskyism suggest that Unite Against Fascism was principally operating in accordance with its 
nomenclature rather than just to advance the interests of the Socialist Workers Party qua the 
Socialist Workers Party. The presence, however, of members of the SWP in the leadership of 
Unite Against Fascism would shape exactly how those interests were understood, and do not 
mean that the SWP did not make the most of the opportunities afforded to it by Unite Against 
Fascism’s campaigns. 
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How Hope not Hate campaigns 
Based on an understanding of changing drivers for votes for the far right and coupled with the 
experiences of the Millwall by-election, Hope not Hate developed a particular style of 
campaigning based on three strands. These were briefing and working with local stakeholders in 
at-risk wards; mobilising a network of leafleters; and voter ID or canvassing to find anti-BNP 
voters. 
At-risk wards were identified through a mixture of reasoned guesswork, knowledge through local 
contacts, and Hope not Hate’s own investigative capacity. Working with stakeholders was to 
establish a degree of trust and understanding, and to give access to volunteers. These groups 
would include trades unions, local Labour branches, faith groups, community groups, and the like 
(Copsey 2011b:133). Voter ID was similar to that described above as part of the ‘ground war’ in 
campaigning, but was with the purpose of campaigning against rather than for a party.  
Partly because of the desire to show local links, and partly because of the simple lack of people to 
set up groups everywhere, Hope not Hate initially worked with pre-existing local groups. It would 
later set up locally-branded groups itself. Thus, leaflets about specific local issues and 
newspapers for specific local areas were produced (Lowles 2014). These leaflets would deal with 
‘difficult topics’ (Copsey 2011b:133), including issues around the sexual grooming of minors 
associated with Asian gangs. This would be a source of conflict with Unite Against Fascism in 
future. 
Hope not Hate would also pioneer new types of campaigning made possible by developments in 
information technology (Grindrod and Rusling 2007:x), including retaining the services of Blue 
State Digital (Lowles 2014:130), which had spun off from Howard Dean’s pioneering campaigning 
in his (ultimately unsuccessful) bid to the Democratic nominee for President of the United States. 
Much of this would become standard fare for British political parties and, indeed, non-party 
campaigns, but was novel in 2005. 
One of Hope not Hate’s intents was to remain actively engaged in an area. Sending out small 
groups ran into the problem of interference and intimidation from BNP campaigners. Their 
solution was the day of action (Lowles 2014:56); sending out lots of people across a given area, 
such that numbers provided safety. These would be repeated at intervals, often with large 
numbers of people - into the hundreds (Goodwin 2011:14); Hope not Hate also worked with local 
media, particularly local newspapers, providing information from their own intelligence and 
trying to turn them against the far right. 
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In short, Hope not Hate’s campaigning was localised, information-driven, and engaged with 
‘difficult’ issues. 
Relations with other groups 
Hope not Hate had critiques of both the Labour Party and Unite Against Fascism. In the case of 
Labour, Hope not Hate saw its leadership as viewing the BNP as a transient electoral threat rather 
than anything else, and not recognising that it represented a more fundamental change in voting 
behaviour (Copsey 2005:198). This criticism was shared by several Parliamentarians (Hodge 2018; 
Cruddas 2018; Hain 2018), who all claimed to have raised the issue of the BNP with the then Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, and the Downing Street Director of Strategy, Alastair Campbell.  
The relationship with Unite Against Fascism was strained. Where Unite Against Fascism retained 
a traditional style of anti-fascist campaigning, Hope not Hate, as described above, was trying 
something new. More of a problem was a set of disagreements that predated the period of time of 
the study over how to deal with (perceived) anti-white racism. Hope not Hate produced a leaflet 
setting out a position against all racism and violence in Oldham (Lowles 2014:32) that the Anti-
Nazi League refused to hand out. At the same time, the ANL held a march in Manchester city 
centre - not Oldham - that Hope not Hate saw as a waste of time and resources (Lowles 2014:42). 
The trade unions would broker a meeting between Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism in 
2004 with the former joining the latter’s steering committee for a time. No real reconciliation 
would emerge, and by 2005 the groups would again work separately, with Unite Against Fascism 
calling Hope not Hate Islamophobic, and Hope not Hate seeing Unite Against Fascism as not 
willing to tackle difficult subjects (Lowles 2014:77). Unite Against Fascism saw Hope not Hate as 
giving ground - literally - to the BNP and EDL (Unite Against Fascism 2018) 
A specific criticism made by Hope not Hate of Unite Against Fascism was that other national 
groups came and went without putting down roots in a community (Macklin 2011b:32). 
Moreover, Hope not Hate argued that it was insufficient to simply brand the BNP in particular as 
Nazis; it did not match what people were experiencing from BNP campaigners on their doorstep.  
As mentioned, Hope not Hate had relations with the Labour Party - sometimes strained at the 
national level, but often effective at the local level. This should not be taken as it being a cipher 
for the Labour Party; Nick Lowles, for instance, helped with speechwriting for the then-leader of 
the Conservatives, Michael Howard (Lowles 2014:55). 
The final major group with which Hope not Hate enjoyed close relations was the trade union 
movement. Unite provided office space for Hope not Hate (Cruddas 2018); various unions 
provided monies to the organisation, through direct grants and advertising in Hope not Hate’s 
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magazine. Local union branches were also contacted by Hope not Hate when they started looking 
at an area, both for information about the area and as a source of volunteers.  
Having set out information on the two parties and two opposition groups in this chapter, chapter 
six presents the results of the quantitative analysis. This chapter has set out information on the 
British National Party and United Kingdom Independence Party on the one hand, and Unite 
Against Fascism and Hope not Hate on the other. As well as setting out some of the history of the 
BNP and UKIP, it has focussed on how they campaign and why they campaign in their respective 
manners. Furthermore, it has set out how the two opposition groups campaign against the BNP 
and UKIP, building on their historical development as set out in chapter four. In the next chapter, 
the results of the quantitative analysis of the effects of activities by Unite Against Fascism and 
Hope not Hate on the United Kingdom Independence Party and the British National Party are set 
out in order to show what measurable effects they have. 
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Chapter 6 – Quantitative results 
Thus must we toil in other men’s extremes, 
That know not how to remedy our own. 
- The Spanish Tragedie, Thomas Kyd 
Introduction 
This chapter reports the results of the quantitative section of the analyses conducted for this 
thesis set out in the chapter of research design, data, and methods. 
It presents the output of each regression in turn along with a description of the results of each 
regression, before providing a more thematic summary looking first at each type of election – 
European, Westminster, and local – and then the effects of the opposition groups across the levels 
of election. Finally, it looks at some of the implications of these findings. The chapter will suggest 
that the effects of the opposition groups on the far right parties are relatively limited. This will 
be further explored with the case study in chapter seven. 
Because different levels of elections and different parties are being studied, and using more than 
one means of operationalising the dependent variable, the results are presented across a large 
number of analyses. These are the permutations of level of election (European, Westminster, and 
local), dependent variable (share of vote, change in share of vote, and relative change in share of 
vote), and party (UKIP and BNP). 
As described above, standard linear regression analysis is used, substituting beta regression 
where appropriate. This is noted below. 
Throughout this section a decrease is taken to mean a move down the number line, and an 
increase is a move up the number line. In other words, a change from (say) -1 to -5 would be 





Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for share of vote for the British National Party and United Kingdom Independence 
Party at European, Westminster, and local elections 
 European Parliament Westminster Local 
Party BNP UKIP BNP UKIP BNP UKIP 
Cases 777 777 346 1172 2345 7184 
Mean 0.037 
 
0.23 0.037 0.088 0.082 0.14 
Median 0.024 0.21 0.034 0.059 0.069 0.11 
St. dev. 0.034 0.10 0.020 0.068 0.069 0.11 
Minimum 0.0033 0.036 0.0021 0.00065 0.00012 0.00015 
Maximum 0.19 0.52 0.15 0.44 0.41 0.64 
Variance 0.0011 0.010 0.00040 0.0046 0.0048 0.012 
 
Results from statistical analysis 
Tables 
The following tables present the results of the statistical analyses. Absolute share of vote was 
modelled with beta regression; change in share of vote and relative change in share of vote was 
modelled with ordinary least squares. 
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Table 6.2: Results of analyses of European Parliament elections 
 Absolute share of vote (β) Change in share of vote Relative change in share of vote 
 BNP UKIP BNP UKIP BNP UKIP 






































































































































Multiple R2   0.25 0.29 0.12 0.20 
Adjusted R2    0.21 0.25 0.071 0.15 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.16     
p-value < 2x10-16 < 2x10-16 0.00000015 0.0000000015 0.0099 0.000020 
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Table 6.3: Results of analyses of Westminster elections 
 
 Absolute share of vote (β) Change in share of vote Relative change in share of vote 







































































































































Multiple R2   0.52 0.024 0.76 0.14 
Adjusted R2    -1.078 0.0040 -0.0469 0..13 
Pseudo R2 0.67 0.24     





Table 6.4: Results of analyses of local elections 
 
 Absolute share of vote (β) Change in share of vote Relative change in share of vote 
 BNP UKIP BNP UKIP BNP UKIP 








































































































































Multiple R2   0.045 0.030 0.0042 0.011 
Adjusted R2    0.041 0.027 -0.00023 0.0073 
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.068     




The following sections set out the effects described in the quantitative analysis above and place 
them into context. They proceed by looking in turn at the effects of Hope not Hate, Unite Against 
Fascism, and then the socioeconomic control variables. 
Summaries 
Effect of Hope Not Hate on the BNP 
At European Parliament elections, consistency of action by Hope not Hate is strongly and 
substantially correlated with a reduction in the share of the vote gained by the British National 
Party (-39.06***). It is also correlated with a reduction in the change of share of vote for the BNP 
(-1.58**). It should be noted that the magnitude of the effect is very much less because the scales 
being used are shorter, where the absolute share of vote might be in tens of percentage points 
while the change in share of vote is generally in single digits. There is no significant effect on the 
relative change in the share of vote. 
Turning to intensity of action by Hope not Hate - that is to say, lots of activity in a given area in a 
shorter period of time - there is a correlation with an increase in the share of the vote for the 
British National Party (30.90***) at European elections as seen in table 6.2. There are no 
significant effects on change in share of vote or relative change in share of vote. 
The headline figure of -39.06% for European Parliament elections seems astonishing at first - 
something that purports to represent a diminution of the vote for a far right party by more than 
a third would be remarkable indeed. It should be borne in mind, however, that to achieve the 
necessary one point increase in consistency of activity, given how it is measured, would require 
vastly more work to be done, far beyond the capacity of a small, non-governmental organisation. 
It would also likely increase the intensity of activity, given how both measures are calculated. 
In terms of Westminster elections, a broadly similar pattern is revealed (table 6.3). Although the 
significance level is lower, there is again a correlation between consistency of action by Hope not 
Hate and a reduction in the absolute share of vote for the BNP (-52.39*), and a positive 
correlation between intensity and absolute share of vote for the BNP (66.09*).For local elections, 
at table 6.4, consistency of action is correlated with a decrease in share of vote for the BNP (-
2.75*), while intensity correlates with an increase (1.33*). These results are important in two 
ways. Firstly, even when coming from Hope not Hate – the more community-oriented, less 
confrontational of the two opposition groups – intensity of action can be actively harmful. 
Secondly, the results are relatively weak, even in the field where Hope not Hate would expect to 
have greatest impact. 
153 
Effect of Hope Not Hate on UKIP 
In broad terms, the effects of opposition by Hope not Hate on UKIP are similar to those of 
opposition by the same on the BNP; that is to say, consistency of action hinders them, while 
intensity of action helps them. 
Looking at European elections (table 6.2), this is the case with the absolute share of vote, where 
consistency of action correlates with a decrease for UKIP (-12.73*) while intensity correlates with 
an increase (12.97**). Both the significance and magnitude are less in the case of UKIP than in the 
case of the BNP, but are nonetheless there. There were no significant results in terms of change 
in share of vote or relative change in share of vote. The results would appear to indicate that 
there are similar effects at play for the BNP as for UKIP, but that the effects are less substantial.. 
Moving to elections to the Westminster Parliament (table 6.3), the pattern is repeated. 
Consistency of action by Hope not Hate correlates with a decrease in the share of vote for UKIP (-
34.17**), while intensity of action correlates with an increase (16.49*). The correlation with 
intensity of action is relatively weak at 16.49, and is again only at the ten per cent confidence 
level. There is also a correlation between consistency of action and the relative change in share of 
vote for UKIP; greater consistency is linked to a decrease in that measure (-9.77*). 
At local elections (table 6.4), there is no statistically significant relationship between either 
intensity of action or consistency of action by Hope not Hate on any of the measures for UKIP’s 
electoral success. This is, in itself, noteworthy. 
Effect of Unite Against Fascism on the BNP 
Where Hope not Hate’s activities show significant effects across elections and measures, Unite 
Against Fascism appear less impactful.  
None of the measures for electoral success for the BNP at European elections (table 6.2) show 
themselves to be significantly affected in either direction by consistency of action by Unite 
Against Fascism. Intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism does not show any significant effect 
for change or relative change in share of vote for the BNP. It is significantly correlated with a 
decrease in the absolute share of vote (-0.053***). However, the magnitude of this effect is very 
small, on the order of one twentieth of a per cent, compared to, for instance, in excess of thirty 
per cent for the negative effect on the BNP’s absolute share of vote from consistency of action. 
That is to say, an increase in intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism by a given numeric 
amount would have a negative effect on the absolute share of vote for the BNP around six 
hundred times smaller than an increase in consistency of action by the same amount. 
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There is no statistically significant effect from either consistency or intensity of action by Unite 
Against Fascism on the electoral performance of the British National Party at Westminster 
elections (table 6.3), or at local elections (table 6.4).  
Effect of Unite Against Fascism on UKIP 
The pattern of consistency of action hindering and intensity of action helping the parties 
continues. With regard to the specific effects of Unite Against Fascism on UKIP at European 
elections (table 6.2), there are only significant effects when looking at relative change in share of 
vote; consistency of action correlates (-3.60*) with a decrease and intensity with an increase 
(0.84*).  
At elections to the parliament at Westminster (table 6.3), consistency of action by Unite Against 
Fascism correlates with a decrease in both the absolute share of vote (-18.56***) and the relative 
change in share of vote for UKIP (-3.43*). There are no statistically significant effects from 
intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism. 
When measured both by change in share of vote (-0.80***) and relative change in share of vote (-
117.21***), consistency of action by Unite Against Fascism at local elections is correlated with a 
reduction in UKIP’s standing, while intensity has the reverse effect (0.33* for change in share of 
vote and 69.74* for relative change in share of vote). In both cases, the confidence is greater for 
the negative correlation of consistency than for the positive effects of intensity. When looking at 
relative change in share of vote, the figures again appear to be extremely large. This can be in 
part attributed to the same factor as previously mentioned - a one point increase in the measured 
consistency or intensity of activity represents a very great increase in that activity. 
Consistency and intensity 
A clear pattern has emerged: consistency of action correlates, across measures and elections, 
with a decrease in the vote for the far right parties, while intensity of action similarly correlates 
with an increase in the vote for both UKIP and the BNP. 
There is one exception to this pattern. Increased intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism 
correlates with a decrease in the absolute share of vote for the British National Party at European 
elections (table 6.2). While this appears significant at the most stringent level of confidence, it 
should be borne in mind that the magnitude of the effect is very small. 
European elections 
At European Parliament elections (table 6.2), consistency of action by Hope not Hate is correlated 
with a decrease in the vote for both the BNP and UKIP (-39.06*** and -12.73* respectively), while 
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intensity of action by Hope not Hate correlates with an increase (30.90*** and 12.97** 
respectively). This pattern is repeated when looking at Unite Against Fascism with regards to 
UKIP when considering the relative change in share of vote (-3.6* for consistency and 0.84* for 
intensity). The effects for Unite Against Fascism, however, are less substantial than for Hope not 
Hate with the following exception. 
Intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism correlates with a decrease in the share of the vote 
for the BNP at European elections (-0.053***). This is the only instance in any of the quantitative 
analyses of intensity of action by one of the opposition groups hindering one of the far right 
parties. 
In terms of the socioeconomic indicators, UKIP are helped on all measures by higher economic 
activity rates (0.026***, 0.0024*, and 0.012*, respectively), higher unemployment rates (0.037*, 
0.0073***, and 0.018*, respectively), and a higher proportion of the population being both white 
and born in the UK (0.0093***, 0.0014***, and 0.0061***, respectively). A decrease in the change 
in both the rates of economic activity (-0.028**) and unemployment (-0.0065***) correlates with a 
diminution of UKIP’s vote, although there is a very small negative correlation (-0.0024*) with 
share of vote for the former and a small negative correlation of -0.067 *** for absolute vote share 
for unemployment. 
The picture with regards the BNP is complicated. The only significant effect in terms of the 
economic activity rate or change thereof is for the relative change in share of vote, which 
decreases (-0.0052***). An increase in the unemployment rate correlates with a increase in the 
absolute share of vote for the BNP (0.079***) but a decrease in the change of share of vote (-
0.0051***). For the change in unemployment rate variable, there is no significant correlation 
with the absolute share of vote, but there is a positive correlation with both the change in share 
of vote (0.0027**) and the relative change in share of vote (0.0056*). The proportion of an area 
that is both white and born in the UK correlates with an increase in the share of the vote for the 
BNP (0.011***), but a decrease in the change in share of vote (-0.00057***). Changes in the ethnic 
makeup of an area in the year to an election do not have statistically significant correlations with 
votes for the BNP however measured. 
Westminster elections 
The effects of activity by Hope not Hate on both the BNP and UKIP at Westminster elections are 
clear (table 6.3); consistency of action has a statistically significant negative relationship with the 
absolute share of vote for both parties (-52.39* for the BNP and -34.17** for UKIP), while intensity 
of action has a positive relationship with the same (66.09* and 16.49*). Both the relatively low 
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(but still significant) confidence levels achieved and the magnitudes suggest that there are real 
effects at play. 
Consistency of action by Hope not Hate also shows a significant negative relationship with the 
relative change in share of vote for UKIP (-9.77*); that is to say, their activities have a 
proportionately greater effect where UKIP are stronger. Given that the simple change variable 
does not show a statistically significant relationship, it may be that the effects of consistent 
action by Hope not Hate may be where UKIP are relatively weak. 
The socioeconomic factors included as control variables show the least effect at Westminster 
elections. For the BNP, only an increase in the change of the proportion of the population that is 
white and UK-born has a significant correlation; specifically, positive, with the absolute share of 
vote (0.074*). 
For UKIP, there is no significant relationship between economic activity or change in economic 
activity and any of the three measures of votes. For both absolute share of vote (0.041***) and 
relative change in vote (0.017***), the unemployment rate shows a positive correlation. For 
change in rate of unemployment, the same measure indicate significance, but negative rather 
than positive (-0.029** and -0.012***).  
There is a positive correlation between the proportion of an area that is both white and UK born 
and the absolute share of vote (0.011***) as well as between the relative change in share of vote 
and the proportion of an area that is both white and UK born (0.0019***). 
Local elections 
The pattern of consistency of action hindering the far right parties while intensity of action helps 
them is repeated at local elections (table 6.4). Specifically, consistency of action by Hope not Hate 
correlates with a reduction in the absolute share of vote for the British National Party (-2.75*), 
while intensity correlates with an increase in the absolute share of vote for the same (1.33*). 
There are no effects with respect to UKIP.  
Regarding Unite Against Fascism, consistency of activity negatively affects UKIP (-0.80*** and -
117.21***), and intensity of action positively affects UKIP (0.33* and 69.74*), when measured by 
change and relative change in share of vote. The magnitudes for relative change in share of vote 
are large. 




The general picture is that an increase in the economic activity rate - that is to say, the number 
of people either in work or actively seeking work expressed as a proportion of the total 
population - hinders the British National Party but helps the United Kingdom Independence 
Party. Negative effects are exhibited for the BNP at European elections (table 6.2) when measured 
by relative change in share of vote (-0.0052***); and by absolute share of vote (-0.016*) and 
change in share of vote (-0.0043***) at local elections (table 6.4). For UKIP, there is a positive 
correlation between the economic activity rate and all three measures of electoral success at 
European elections (0.026***, 0.0024*, and 0.012*); and with absolute share of vote and change in 
share of vote for local elections (0.0080* and 0.0026***). There are no significant findings for 
Westminster elections (table 6.3). 
The picture with change in the economic activity rate in the year to the election is almost the 
reverse. There is a negative correlation between change in the economic activity rate and votes 
for UKIP, measured by absolute share of vote (-0.028**) and change in share of vote (-0.0024*), at 
European elections (table 6.2). There are no statistically significant findings for the BNP at 
European elections and, again, there are no significant findings for Westminster elections (table 
6.3). At local elections, there is a positive correlation between the economic activity rate and the 
absolute share of vote for the BNP (0.017*) and change in share of vote (0.0023**) but not for 
relative change in share of vote (table 6.4). 
In simple terms, areas that are ‘bad’ or bad but improving are better for the BNP, while areas that 
are ‘good’ or good but worsening are better for UKIP. The British National Party will find its most 
fertile territory in those areas that exhibit high unemployment or low economic activity, even if 
unemployment is dropping or economic activity is rising. UKIP’s equivalent will be in those areas 
that have low unemployment or high economic activity, even if unemployment is rising or 
economic activity is dropping. 
Unemployment 
For the most part, the effects of the unemployment rate or changes in the unemployment rate 
are straightforward. There is a positive correlation between unemployment and all three 
measures of electoral success for UKIP at both European (0.037*, 0.0073***, and 0.018*) (table 6.2) 
and local elections (0.014*, 0.0025*, and 0.27*) (table 6.4), and for absolute share of vote (0.041***) 
and relative change in share of vote at Westminster elections (0.017***) (table 6.3). The absolute 
share of vote for the BNP at European elections is positively correlated with the unemployment 
rate (0.079***), while the change in share of vote shows a negative correlation (-0.0051***) (table 
6.2). The unemployment rate has no effect on votes for the BNP at Westminster elections (table 
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6.3). At local elections, there is only a negative correlation for change in share of vote for the BNP 
(-0.0050***) (table 6.4). 
Turning to change in the unemployment rate, there is a negative correlation with the absolute 
share of vote (-0.067***) and change in share of vote (-0.0065***) for UKIP at European elections 
(table 6.2). For the BNP at European elections, there are positive correlations when measured by 
change in share of votes (0.0027**) and relative change in share of votes (0.0056*) (table 6.2). At 
Westminster elections (table 6.3), the only correlations with change in the unemployment rate 
are for UKIP when measured by absolute share of vote (-0.029**) and relative change in share of 
vote (-0.012***).  
At local elections (table 6.4), there is a positive correlation between change in the unemployment 
rate and absolute share of vote for the BNP (0.055***) and change in share of vote (0.0056***). 
There is, however, a negative correlation for UKIP on the same indicators (-0.039*** and -
0.0064***, respectively). 
To sum this up in simple terms, a higher unemployment rate helps UKIP almost across the board. 
The picture is mixed for the BNP; however, the correlations are slight and only found on some 
measures, suggesting that there is not a simple relationship at work. To the extent that there are 
patterns for change in the unemployment rate, it is that a worsening unemployment rate – that is 
to say, a higher rate, indicating more people out of work – helps the BNP but actually hinders 
UKIP, suggesting that the precise means by which unemployment translates to support varies 
between the parties. 
Ethnicity 
As mentioned above, the measure used for ethnicity is the proportion of the total population of 
the electoral circumscription that is both white and born in the UK; therefore, a higher value 
means fewer black and minority ethnic residents. 
The first thing to note is that the ethnicity measure displays the same pattern as with 
unemployment for the BNP at European elections (table 6.2); that is to say, there is a positive 
correlation between the ethnicity measure and the absolute share of vote for the BNP, but a 
negative correlation between the ethnicity measure and the change in share of vote for the BNP. 
In plain terms, this means that an area that is whiter is more likely to vote for the BNP, but that 
effect may wear off over time as the change in share of vote suggests a move away from the BNP. 
Beyond this, there is a positive correlation between the ethnic measure and all three measures of 
success for UKIP at European elections (0.0093***, 0.0014***, and 0.0061*** respectively) (table 
6.2); no effect for the BNP at Westminster elections (table 6.3); a positive effect for UKIP in terms 
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of absolute share of vote (0.011***) and relative change in share of vote (0.0019***) at 
Westminster elections (table 6.3); and, for local elections (table 6.4), a positive correlation 
between the ethnicity measure and absolute share of vote for both the BNP (0.0093***) and UKIP 
(0.013***) at local elections.  
The patterns for a change in the ethnic measure in the year to the election are somewhat varied. 
At European elections (table 6.2), there are no statistically significant correlations for the BNP, 
while there is only a positive correlation for UKIP (0.023*) when measured by absolute share of 
vote. For elections to the Westminster parliament (table 6.3), there is a positive correlation 
between change in the ethnic measure and the absolute share of vote for the BNP, albeit 
relatively weak (0.074*). There are similarly weak correlations, but in the other direction, with 
the change in share of vote for UKIP (-0.0057*) and relative change in share of vote for UKIP (-
0.0043*). Turning to local elections (table 6.4), there are positive correlations between change in 
the ethnic measure and the absolute share of vote for the BNP (0.015’) and change in share of 
vote for the BNP (0.0020**). For UKIP, there are negative correlations between change in the 
ethnic measure and absolute share of vote (-0.020***) and relative change in share of vote (-
0.22783*) 
As was predicted from the ‘air war’ campaign of UKIP and the ‘ground war’ of the BNP, there are 
greater effects from the opposition groups overall on the BNP than on UKIP. Across all the 
measures, the impacts on the British National Party are greater than on UKIP. As the BNP engage 
in local campaigns, the local activities of both UAF and Hope not Hate engage, for good or ill, with 
the messaging of the BNP and the effects they have within local communities. This messaging 
from the opposition groups simply does not engage with the national messaging of UKIP. 
Analysis  
A clear pattern emerges with respect to consistency and intensity of activity. Consistency of 
action by the opposition groups appears to have the intended effect - that is to say, a reduction in 
the vote for the far right parties. However, intensity of action by the opposition groups has the 
paradoxical effect of increasing the vote for far right parties. This pattern appears at all levels of 
election, from both groups, and to differing extents in all measures.  
The difference in effect between consistency of action and intensity of action is important. Both 
measures indicate the amount of activity that one of the opposition groups is undertaking in a 
given electoral circumscription. It is clearly not just the amount of activity that matters. In crude 
terms, consistent activity is having a regular presence in an area, while intensity of action is 
saturating an area in a relatively short period of time. The two are, of course, not mutually 
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exclusive; it is possible, given sufficient resources and committed volunteers, to consistently 
saturate an area23. That is to say, it is possible to have high intensity and high consistency for the 
same area.  
The broad picture is that consistency shows more significant effects than intensity; that 
consistency shows greater magnitudes than intensity; that Hope not Hate shows more significant 
effects than Unite Against Fascism; and that Hope not Hate shows greater magnitudes than Unite 
Against Fascism. Hope not Hate generally has effects in terms of the absolute share of vote, 
whereas Unite Against Fascism generally has effects in terms of change or relative change in 
share of vote. 
There are relatively few trends for consistency and intensity; that is to say, where a significant 
result emerges for (say) intensity of action with respect to the BNP at European elections when 
measured by absolute share of vote for both Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism. Two of 
these trends occur in the case of Westminster elections, where consistency of action by both 
Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism hinders UKIP when measured both by absolute share of 
vote and relative change in share of vote. In both of these cases, the effects of Hope not Hate’s 
activities are substantially larger.  
This leads to a set of questions. Firstly, why does consistency of action appear to hinder far right 
parties while intensity of action appears to actually help them? Secondly, what causes Hope not 
Hate to exhibit effects when measured by share of vote, and what causes Unite Against Fascism to 
exhibit effects when measured by the two change variables, and not vice versa? Thirdly, why are 
Westminster elections very different from European and local elections? Finally, what can be 
learnt from the socioeconomic indicators used in the statistical modelling? 
Consistency and intensity 
It is easier to set out the possible explanations for why intensity of action might have this 
paradoxical effect - that is to say, why it is that more activity in a short period from the 
opposition groups actually makes it more likely that the far right parties under consideration will 
gain votes. 
 
23 This is what happens in Westminster by-elections; once it becomes obvious that a by-election is in the 
offing, parties will contact members to try to regularly campaign in the constituency, sometimes for 
months ahead of the actual date. At the time of writing, for instance, the Liberal Democrats are 
campaigning in Sheffield Hallam, as it is expected that the sitting MP will at some point resign. 
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One is simple; being repeatedly told the same thing in a short period of time is likely to annoy 
people24. It is also necessary to consider that the activities of the opposition groups do not take 
place in a vacuum, but are, in fact, interactions with the messages being put out by the parties, 
and sometimes directly with them. 
In the case of the British National Party, campaigning is done, as described above, in a ground 
war style. This gives voters, particularly at local elections, actual experience of contact with 
British National Party candidates and canvassers. When they turn out not to be the two-headed 
monsters that they are portrayed to be, the credibility of the campaigners may well be damaged. 
Indeed, a specific aim of the British National Party’s ‘ground war’ campaigning is to detoxify  their 
brand by giving people experience of dealing with their representatives as normal and non-
threatening people concerned about the community. 
A particular manifestation of this is when direct conflict occurs between the opposition group 
and a party. This can involve members or associates preventing a group from leafleting (for 
instance, Hope not Hate 2013a) or clashes at protests (O’ Brien 2013). Unsurprisingly, this will 
tarnish both the messenger and the message, at least in the eyes of some people, not least 
because, in the case of protests, costs of policing will fall on the local constabulary and costs of a 
lost day’s trading because of shop closures will fall on small businesses, as well as 
inconveniencing people in their day to day activities. The authorities are also less than uniformly 
welcoming; the police have, on occasion, blamed the opposition groups for starting violence and 
disorder (for instance Smith 2010). 
This would also be true for activities similar to those described above but targeted at other 
groups. Unite Against Fascism, in particular, protest against a range of far-right organisations 
that are not political parties, including the English Defence League street movement, and 
organisations that contest elections but are between political party and social movement, such as 
Britain First. Actions by Unite Against Fascism to protest, say, the English Defence League might 
descend into violent confrontation. This could then damage, in the public’s eyes, all of Unite 
Against Fascism’s activities, including those that are wholly peaceful or that are targeting a group 
other than the English Defence League. Worse still, the broader anti-fascist or anti-racist 
movement can be tarred with the same brush, weakening unrelated organisations. 
It should be borne in mind that activities that are not actually carried out by Hope not Hate or 
Unite Against Fascism, or that are carried out by people associated with the groups but not with 
 
24 This feeling will be familiar to anyone who has encountered charity collectors, also known as charity 
muggers or ‘chuggers’, generally spread out in a line on a high street. 
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the groups’ sanction, may still affect how they are seen because they are part of a broader anti-
racist, anti-fascist, or anti-establishment movement. Indeed, the confusion may be deliberately 
made; far-right blogs and blogs sympathetic to the far right, for instance, make such assertions, 
as in an incident where Nigel Farage was accosted in a pub was associated with Hope not Hate; 
while a member of Hope not Hate was at the protest, it was not organised under the Hope not 
Hate rubric (Nope, not Hope25 2015). 
Turning to UKIP, the specifics of the BNP’s ground war campaign clearly do not apply. However, a 
particular feature of UKIP’s messaging is important: the focus on a disconnected, liberal, 
metropolitan elite as a source of the woes of the common people. When a campaigning 
organisation appears and swiftly disappears, particularly if it causes problems in the area, it feeds 
into this narrative. This has two effects. Firstly, it legitimates UKIP’s discourse and, by extension, 
its other policies. Secondly, it de-legitimates the opposition to UKIP. In both cases, the effect is to 
make voting for UKIP more palatable. 
The effects of consistency of action are largely explained by the opposite effects to intensity of 
action. Being a regular presence in the community establishes the organisation’s commitment to 
an area particularly, as is important to Hope not Hate, when visibly connected to the community, 
as in newspapers branded with geographies that make clear a connection to the locality. In the 
particular case of the BNP, this gives them the standing - through a receptive population - to 
challenge them. This is particularly true in the case of Hope not Hate, who use more targeted 
literature that highlights, for instance, the criminal records of specific candidates in the areas in 
which they are contesting elections, as opposed to generic material about why voting for a far 
right party is bad. The dynamics of direct contestation with the political parties also changes; 
while it is straightforward enough for a political party to organise the occasional counter-protest, 
it is much harder, if not impossible, to do the same on a sustained basis. 
In short, consistency of action makes it easier for the opposition groups’ messages to come 
across, while intensity of action makes the population less likely to be receptive. The greater 
impacts on the BNP support Dinas et al (2016)’s arguments around the fascist variant of far right 
parties trying to set up ‘local cultures’ (Dinas et al 2016:81); consistent action, targeted to hinder 
or reverse that local embedding, counters that process.   
 
25 Nope, not Hope is a blog critical of Hope not Hate. 
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Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism 
The second question is as to the difference in patterns between the effects of Hope not Hate and 
Unite Against Fascism. 
To restate the situation, Hope not Hate generally exhibits significant effects when measured by 
absolute share of vote, while Unite Against Fascism generally exhibits significant effects when 
measured by change in share of vote or relative change in share of vote. Both exhibit the same 
pattern, with one exception, of consistency of action hindering the far right parties while 
intensity of action helps them. 
Consistency of action by Hope not Hate is correlated with a statistically significant decrease in 
the change of share of vote - that is to say, moving in a negative direction - for the BNP when 
measured by change in share of vote at European elections (1.58**), and with a decrease in the 
share of vote for UKIP when measured by relative change in share of vote at Westminster 
elections (-9.77*). 
The exception to the rule is the case of intensity of action by Unite Against Fascism regarding the 
BNP as measured by absolute share of vote at European elections, which displays a negative 
correlation (-0.053***). While the effect is significant at the 0.01 level, the magnitude is extremely 
small at around five orders of magnitude less than the equivalent effect for Hope not Hate. 
The above establishes a statistically significant correlation between activity and absolute share of 
vote. If, however, they were having a material effect, significant relationships in the change 
measures are also expected to be seen.  
If the effects from both consistency and intensity of action by Hope not Hate were in the same 
direction - that is to say, were both either positively or negatively associated with share of vote - 
it would be possible to draw the conclusion that the effect was one of targeting, with Hope not 
Hate being particularly good (or bad, depending on one’s point of view) at choosing areas where 
the parties, and in particular the British National Party, were either on the rise or on the decline 
anyway. 
However, this is not the revealed pattern. Rather, consistency of action is associated with a lower 
vote for the far right parties, and intensity with a higher vote. It is possible that Hope not Hate 
are intensively targeting areas where the BNP are on the increase anyway, and consistently 
targeting areas that are on the decrease anyway, although this starts to strain credibility. 
It is also possible that there is an overlap between areas where there is intensity of action and the 
parties doing better, or between areas where there is consistency of action and the parties doing 
164 
worse. While this is hypothetical, it is not an unreasonable supposition. The mechanism could 
plausibly be a divide between more and less urban areas. Particularly if support is being brought 
in from outside a particular area, how well connected, especially to public transport, that area is 
could affect how campaigns are organised. If an area is relatively easy to reach, it is also easy to 
campaign there, and vice versa. Well-connected areas are more likely to be metropoles and city 
centres, while less well-connected areas will be outskirts, and suburban and rural areas. That the 
dynamics of rural Lincolnshire will be different from central Manchester, even allowing for 
differences in economic and demographic situation, is not surprising. 
A further possibility is that there are interaction effects between the control variables and each 
other or the measures of activity for Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism not captured by 
the models. 
There are some significant relationships, however, in the change measures. This suggests that, 
beyond any geographic juxtaposition of effort and target, there are material effects from Hope 
not Hate’s activities on the far right parties. When taken in the context of the effects as measured 
by absolute share of vote, it seems reasonable to surmise that the effects are real, but not great. 
The corollary of the above is that, while Unite Against Fascism do consistently have effects, there 
does not appear to be any reliable targeting of their activities. Inasmuch as this is true, it is 
consistent with the activities of Unite Against Fascism - city centre festivals and the like - and, 
indeed, accords with the criticisms made of Unite Against Fascism by Hope not Hate. Particularly 
striking are the effects on local elections. Consistent action by Hope not Hate hinders the BNP (-
2.75*) when measured by absolute share of vote – it is at local elections that Hope not Hate hold 
themselves out as being most effective (Lowles 2014) – while Unite Against Fascism have larger 
effects, but against UKIP and when measured with the two change variables (-0.80*** and -
117.21***, respectively). 
It is important to note that Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate exhibit different patterns of 
consistency and intensity. Using the data for local authorities from 2008 to 2014, similar mean 
consistencies of action, at 0.032 for Unite Against Fascism and 0.030 for Hope not Hate, are seen, 
while intensity is approximately one-quarter higher for Unite Against Fascism, with the figures 
being 0.06 and 0.048. However, because of the models, it can be said that consistency of action by 
the groups, ceteris paribus, has different effects. This suggests that it is not merely the pattern of 
activity, but also the content of activity, that matters.The striking differences between 
consistency and intensity suggest that Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019)’s measures are, in the first 
instance, capturing genuine effects, and that these effects from the patterning of campaigning 
are of paramount importance. 
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This leaves us with a particular pattern that requires explanation; correlations are seen for Hope 
not Hate in terms of the absolute share of vote, while for Unite Against Fascism correlations are 
seen for the two variables that indicate change in the share of vote.  
Because the statistical measures used can only show a correlation and not a causation, it is 
necessary to be cautious in interpreting these patterns. In the case of Hope not Hate, the most we 
can reliably say is that they are engaging in actions where the BNP are present because of the 
high significance for Hope not Hate of the absolute share of vote measure. This follows on from 
what has been set out about Hope not Hate above; they are intelligence-led, often have good links 
in communities where the BNP may do well or make a point of establishing them, and have links 
to trades unions that give further insight into areas that may be of interest. 
No such relationship is seen in the case of Unite Against Fascism and absolute share of vote. This 
suggests that UAF are not targeting their activities as precisely as Hope not Hate. Again, this 
matches what may be expected given what is known about Unite Against Fascism’s style of 
campaigning, which favours city-centre demonstrations, concerts, and protest marches rather 
than very local activity. Neither with Unite Against Fascism nor Hope not Hate can we draw, 
based on the statistical evidence presented, a causal link between the diminution of vote for the 
far right parties and the activities of the opposition groups; the particular dynamics are treated 
at greater length in chapter seven. 
However, Unite Against Fascism do show more correlations when measured against either 
change in share of vote or relative change in share of vote. These correlations run in both 
directions – that is to say, in some instances they achieve their stated aim of hindering the far 
right parties they oppose, but have the opposite effect on some measures, being correlated with 
an increase in change of share of vote for the far right parties. By the same logic as above, this 
suggests that Unite Against Fascism’s activities take place where changes in voting for the far 
right parties are happening. It should be emphasised that the correlations run, depending on 
measure and election, in both directions, both helping and hindering the far right parties. This 
could suggest that consistent campaigning by UAF is hindering the far right parties and intense 
campaigning is helping them, or it could suggest that UAF activities are in areas that show lots of 
change in voting patterns, without there necessarily being a particularly high vote for the British 
National Party or United Kingdom Independence Party. 
The impacts of Hope not Hate are not completely limited to absolute share of vote, however, and 
there are correlations between their activities and the two change variables. These are patchier 
than the correlations with absolute share of vote. The combination of Hope not Hate going where 
there is, from their point of view, a far right problem and also being active where there are 
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changes in votes is suggestive of some actual impact on far right votes. However, for both Unite 
Against Fascism and Hope not Hate the magnitude of the impact of their activities is relatively 
slight, suggesting that whatever effects they do have are limited. This is explored further in 
chapter seven.  
 
Levels of election 
It is not prima facie a surprise that Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism have less effect on 
Westminster elections than on local and European elections; the former is a first order election, 
the latter two are second order elections. 
There is no statistically significant effect from either consistency or intensity of action by Unite 
Against Fascism on the electoral performance of the British National Party at Westminster 
elections, or at local elections. These results are, again, striking; it suggests that a considerable 
amount of human and financial resources are being used to no appreciable effect. 
Reif and Schmitt (1980) highlight a few features of second-order elections: lower levels of 
participation, a better chance for small and new parties, more spoilt ballots26, and more voting 
against the incumbent national government. The first two of these would certainly help the BNP 
and UKIP, and the last conceivably could as well, with voters at the rightward, Monday Club end 
of the Conservatives’ base of support and working-class Conservatives (Parkin 1967) who have 
become ‘left behind’ (Ford and Goodwin 2014a). When the distorting effect of the first-past-the-
post system and the tactical voting it engenders is taken in to account, it is not surprising that 
the BNP and UKIP do not do well at Westminster elections and, so, that there is little scope for 
opposition groups to affect them. Beyond that, there is little incentive for opposition groups to 
specifically target far right parties at elections to the House of Commons - by investigating 
candidates or publishing specific literature - precisely because the electoral system already 
hampers them so effectively. The BNP have never returned a Member of Parliament, while UKIP 
have only won one seat at a general election27.  
It was suggested above that Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism might be effective in 
targeting their activities to where the BNP and UKIP have a presence. However, this is not the 
 
26 Reif and Schmitt term this a ‘higher percentage of invalidated ballots’. 
27 Douglas Carswell in 2015. Carswell and Mark Reckless left the Conservative Party in 2014 and both forced 
by-elections in their constituencies of Clacton and Rochester & Strood, which they won under the UKIP 
banner. Mark Reckless would lose his seat at the 2015 general election, while Carswell would retain his. Bob 
Spink, in his second period as MP for Castle Point, resigned the Conservative whip to become an 
independent, and then joined UKIP, and then became an independent again. 
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same as targeting their activities where they will have the greatest impact; it may well be that the 
same amount of effort could be expended to a greater effect by taking account of the various 
socioeconomic factors at play. This could be by targeting areas whose socioeconomic and 
demographic profile suggest that UKIP or the BNP are likely to struggle anyway - to use a boxing 
metaphor, to throw the punch to make sure that a stunned opponent does not get back up from 
the mat. It could also be where UKIP and the BNP are actually most likely to do well given the 
same socioeconomic factors, on the basis that this is where effort most needs to be applied. 
Alternatively, the likelihood of the BNP or UKIP making a breakthrough and actually seeing 
candidates elected in a given area might be combined with the socioeconomic considerations so 
that such efforts and resources as can be expended have the greatest impact in electoral terms. 
Moreover, this lends to support to the importance of Tarrow (2011)’s notion of political 
opportunity structures. Manifestly, political opportunity structures are different at the local, 
European, and Westminster levels for a host of reasons – level of election, electoral system, 
timing – and this is supported by the results of the quantitative analysis. 
This also lends support to Mudde (2007)’s assertion that the meso level warrants further study. 
Hope not Hate and, to a lesser extent, Unite Against Fascism act to prevent the far right parties, 
particularly the BNP, from embedding themselves in a community (Dinas et al 2016). This 
embedding, almost definitionally, is going to be seen more in local elections, where local issues 
are to the fore and smaller circumscriptions give voters more ability to highlight particularly 
local issues. The greater impact at local elections, when meso dynamics will be to the fore, 
suggest the importance of that level of analysis.  
The strong correlations on socioeconomic and demographic factors, which are based on local 
data, also suggest that Kestilä and Söderlund (2007) are right to stress the importance of 
subnational comparisons. 
Socioeconomics 
Lastly, the effects of the socioeconomic and demographic indicators - the economic activity rate, 
unemployment rate, and proportion of the population that are both white and UK born, and the 
changes in those rates, are considered. 
Most of these effects are straightforward, particularly as regards UKIP and are detailed 
immediately below, but a few results, concerning the BNP are more interesting in their 
implications, and are covered below that. 
In broad terms, UKIP is helped by a higher economic activity rate - that is to say, there is a 
positive correlation between the economic activity rate and votes for UKIP. This holds for five of 
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the nine possible combinations of levels of election and measures of votes. To the extent that 
there is a relationship between votes for UKIP and change in the economic activity rate, it is 
negative; it only appears at European Parliamentary elections. In plain English, places where 
there are lots of people either in work or seeking work are more likely to vote for UKIP, while 
places where the number of people either in work or seeking work is decreasing are more likely 
to vote for UKIP. This would represent areas that have been prosperous but are in decline – the 
left behind (Ford and Goodwin 2014a) 
The same pattern holds for unemployment and change in unemployment, except that it is seen 
across more of the measures. In crude terms, a high economic activity rate is ‘good’, while a high 
unemployment rate is ‘bad’. At first glance, this appears contradictory. It is necessary to recall 
that the economic activity rate and unemployment rate are different, and do not mirror one 
another. Combined, this could be taken to suggest that fertile ground for UKIP would be areas 
where people are leaving the job market, either through retirement or giving up on being able to 
gain a job. 
The pattern repeats itself again for the ethnic composition of an area. The measure used is the 
proportion of an area that is white and UK-born; that is to say, a high score on the measure 
indicates a whiter area with fewer people born outside of the UK. As is discussed above, this 
measure was chosen as an efficient proxy for the ethnic composition of an area that was available 
at small geographies and with sufficient frequency. Simply put, then, ‘whiter’ areas vote UKIP, 
but areas that are becoming less ‘white’ do not vote for UKIP. This supports Golder’s (2003) 
findings around immigration. Stockemer (2016) suggests a lack of clarity on whether voters are 
motivated by immigration or the perception of immigration. These results add some weight to 
actual demographics, rather than just perceptions, being the driver at work. 
The picture as regards the British National Party is rather different. In several instances, the 
effects are essentially the opposite of what is seen with UKIP. Thus, there is a negative correlation 
between the economic activity rate and the relative change in share of vote for the BNP at 
European elections, and with absolute share of vote and change in share of vote for local 
elections. Although the evidence is not particularly strong, it suggests that areas with lower 
economic activity rates will tend to favour the BNP more than those with higher rates. Change in 
the economic activity rate only shows significant, positive correlation at local elections, as 
measured by absolute share of vote and change in share of vote.  
The effect of the unemployment rate on the BNP at European elections appears to point in both 
directions. Specifically, there is a positive correlation between the absolute share of vote for the 
party and the unemployment rate, but a negative correlation with the change in share of vote. 
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This could imply that the rate of unemployment does help the BNP, but that the power of this 
help is diminishing over time as its effect wears off. This could be as a result of changing social 
policies, or unemployment becoming more common in the country at large, or simply people 
becoming used to unemployment. There is also a negative correlation between unemployment 
and change in share of vote for the British National Party at local elections. It is also compatible 
with the argument that it is relatively well-off areas in deprived local authorities that tend to 
vote BNP (for instance, John et al. 2006; Rhodes 2011b). 
The same pattern of a positive correlation with absolute share of vote but a negative correlation 
with change in share of vote exhibited with the unemployment rate is also seen with the measure 
of the ethnic composition of an area. It can therefore be concluded again that a ‘whiter’ area is, 
the more it is favourable turf for the BNP, but that the power of this effect may be declining over 
time, again because of general attitudinal change in society as regards racial equality or 
increasing familiarity with a more diverse environment, or immigration becoming a less salient 
issue. Looking at the effect of the other control variables on voting for the BNP, there is some 
evidence that a change in the ethnicity measure - that is to say, an area becoming ‘whiter’ - helps 
the party.  
This also lends credence to Ford and Goodwin’s (2014a) argument that UKIP voters are driven by 
different concerns to BNP voters, and that their socioeconomic positions are different, with UKIP 
voters being, crudely, better off. 
As with the measures of activity by the opposition groups, effects from the socioeconomic 
indicators are less prevalent at Westminster elections than at local or European elections. This is 
particularly the case with the British National Party, where a solitary measure displays 
significance. As discussed above, this will be a result of the combination of Westminster elections 
being first-order elections and the distorting effect of the first-past-the-post system.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the results of the statistical analyses and provided a breakdown thereof. 
The headline take-aways are that, for both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate, consistency 
of action is associated with a decrease in votes for both the British National Party and UKIP, while 
intensity of action from both opposition groups is, unexpectedly, associated with an increase in 
votes for both parties. Hope not Hate's activities are more associated with absolute share of vote, 
while Unite Against Fascism's activities are more associated with the two measures of change in 
share of vote. This could suggest that Hope not Hate are going where the problem is, while Unite 
Against Fascism are going where things are changing; however, that does not imply a causation. 
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Most importantly, given the effort expended, the effects of the opposition groups’ activities reap 
meagre rewards. 
This leads to a question; why do the opposition groups have relatively slight effects? To answer 
this, the next chapter looks at the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham in the period from 
2006 to 2010 in greater detail. 
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Chapter 7 - Barking and Dagenham 
‘If I lived here, I wouldn’t vote for Harold Wilson.’ 
He paused and added, ‘I wouldn’t vote for myself either - I’d vote for Robespierre.’ 
 Ted Heath, shortly before becoming Prime Minister, in Newcastle, 
as recorded by Greg Knight MP in Dishonourable Insults 
 
Introduction 
‘Welcome to Barking - new far right capital of Britain.’ 
That is how the Guardian reported the 2006 local elections (Muir 2006). 
The election of a dozen British National Party members was a signal event. Amidst all the usual 
election night punditry, the result in Barking and Dagenham sent shockwaves through the 
political establishment. Britain was meant to be immune from the far right, a step removed from 
the problems of its European cousins. Instead, not only had a fascist party won a clutch of council 
seats, the British National Party was now the official opposition on a London Borough Council. 
However, at the next elections to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council, not a 
single British National Party candidate was returned. The far right party had apparently gone 
from nowhere to the verge of power and back again in the space of forty-eight months. Both 
Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism would claim this reversal of fortunes for the British 
National Party as being the result, at least in part, of their work in the borough. It therefore 
provides a unique opportunity to gauge the effectiveness or otherwise of Unite Against Fascism 
and Hope not Hate in a comparative perspective.  
This chapter sets out the case for the comparison and highlights a few particular features of the 
London Borough of Barking and Dagenham and how it complements the quantitative analysis 
conducted above. It then provides a brief explanation of why people might have voted for the 
British National Party in the specific context of Barking and Dagenham in the middle of the first 
decade of the century before looking at the activities of the two opposition groups in the 
borough. It proceeds to look at the outcome of the 2010 elections before analysing what 
happened to the British National Party’s vote and, finally, positing explanations for the actions of 
the organisations involved. The aim of this chapter, in short, is to explain how the British 
National Party went from electoral success to electoral wipeout in one cycle, and what effects, if 
any, Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate had on that precipitous decline. 
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The comparison 
As set out in the chapter on research design, there are considerable advantages in adopting a 
mixed methods design, both in general and in this specific instance. 
Specifically, an explanatory sequential design was adopted as the understudied nature of 
opposition to the far right means that there are not existing theories to be applied in a new case. 
Using this model, a series of expectations as to the effect of the two civil society opposition 
groups on the far right parties were drawn up based on the available literature and an 
understanding of the history and activities of those groups. These expectations were then 
quantitatively tested in chapter six. The headline takeaway was that consistency of action, in 
general, depresses votes for far right parties while intensity of action, in general, has the 
perverse effect of actually increasing votes for far right parties. However, while statistically 
significant, the magnitudes of the effects are small. In order to explain both the fact and the size 
of the effects, a qualitative, case study is undertaken.  
The case study is of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham in the period from 2006 to 
2010, with particular reference to council elections. Barking and Dagenham is an appropriate 
case study for two reasons. Firstly, as set out in the chapter on research design, it is an extreme 
case (Seawright and Gerring 2008). It is extreme on two counts; first, it represents an 
extraordinary success and then decline by the British National Party. Secondly, it is a high water 
mark for both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate. Both organisations place great stock by 
their actions in Barking and Dagenham, indicating it as a success on their parts (Unite Against 
Fascism 2018; Hope not Hate 2017). This becomes particularly useful when considering the 
relatively low magnitude of the effects. If a subtle effect is to be explained, it is logical to look to 
where that effect has been greatest so that there is as much chance as possible for it to be seen 
and, crucially, explained. 
A second factor, based as much as anything on a quirk of electoral geography, makes Barking and 
Dagenham a particularly useful case study. The Borough is represented in the House of Commons 
by two MPs, from the Barking constituency and the Dagenham constituency. The Labour Party 
organises itself internally on parliamentary constituencies, rather than local government 
boundaries. As such, there are effectively two Labour Parties at work in Barking and Dagenham, 
with two MPs. Hope not Hate would focus on the portion of the Borough that lay within the 
Dagenham28 constituency, while Unite Against Fascism’s activity would largely be in that area 
that fell within the Barking constituency. This allows a comparison between Unite Against 
 
28 The Dagenham constituency would be renamed Dagenham and Rainham as part of the 2010 boundary 
changes.  
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Fascism and Hope not Hate that keeps many possible variables constant, from a similar history of 
economic decline and recent immigration, to its relative position to a metropolitan centre, to the 
actions of the local municipal government. By virtue of being in a single London borough, the 
political situation is constant across the area, and the social and economic conditions are broadly 
the same. Factors such as transport are likewise the same. The two parts of the borough are, of 
course, geographically proximate; taking the First Law of Geography - ‘everything is related to 
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things’ (Tobler 1970:234) - it can be 
surmised that much, if not everything, will be comparable for the present purposes. 
The aim, at least in terms of their campaigning against the British National Party, of both 
organisations is to reduce the number of votes and seats that the party receives. This can be done 
by convincing people not to vote for the British National Party, or by diminishing the relative 
weight of such votes as the party receives by increasing turnout, or, indeed, both. Barking and 
Dagenham offers excellent opportunities for both inasmuch as there are manifestly lots of people 
who have voted for the British National Party who can be dissuaded from doing so again; and 
turnout is very low, giving excellent scope for other voters to be convinced to make the trip to 
the polling station and so dilute the far right vote. These two features of voting patterns in the 
area mean that, bearing in mind the conclusions drawn in the previous chapter on the 
effectiveness of the activities of Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism, it can be argued a 
fortiori that if the opposition groups are of little effect in Barking and Dagenham, they will not be 
of greater effect anywhere else.  
UKIP 
The United Kingdom Independence Party is not included in this case study. 
In general, UKIP is difficult to study in this very local manner. As set out above, the party runs an 
air war campaign, making use of national media. This makes them less sensitive to local 
campaigning than the British National Party; indeed, this is borne out by the results of the 
quantitative analysis. Moreover, UKIP’s support is diffused across the country, rather than 
concentrated in particular areas as are the BNP’s voters. This lack of concentration of voters 
means that we do not find tight geographies that hold as many potentially relevant variables 
constant. In short, we do not find areas that offer the same advantages for analysing UKIP’s 
success as we do with the BNP in Barking and Dagenham. 
The attitude of the opposition groups to the United Kingdom Independence Party in Barking and 
Dagenham is also relevant to this particular case. Neither Hope not Hate (Cruddas 2018) nor 
Unite Against Fascism (Unite Against Fascism 2018) targeted UKIP, but focussed their energies on 
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stopping the British National Party as the populist radical right party presented less of a risk 
than the fascist party. 
This lesser risk manifested in two ways. Firstly, UKIP was simply not going to take the council, 
running only seven candidates in an election of seventeen, three-member wards, where there 
was real apprehension that the BNP could actually emerge from the local elections in control of a 
London Borough. In any case, although neither Hope not Hate nor Unite Against Fascism would 
have welcomed any electoral success by UKIP, it would have been seen as preferable to the BNP 
winning seats. Moreover, UKIP was not seen as likely to win any of the seats they did contest. In 
that case, a vote for UKIP was effectively a vote against the BNP inasmuch as it did nothing to 
move the latter any closer to going past the post. In simple terms, if a BNP voter were to shift to 
casting their ballot for UKIP, it would be counted a win. 
Therefore, because of the difficulty in studying UKIP at the local level due to the nature of their 
campaigning and the diffuse nature of their support, and because of the particular circumstances 
of Barking and Dagenham that led the opposition groups to pay them little heed, this case study 
focusses on effects regarding the British National Party. 
The London Borough of Barking and Dagenham 
The London Borough of Barking and Dagenham sits in the eastern part of the city. It is on the 
north bank of the Thames, with the London Borough of Havering to its east, the London Borough 
of Redbridge to its north and west, and the London Borough of Newham to its east. It was formed 
by the major reorganisation of the London Government Act 196329 from the Municipal Borough30 
of Barking and the Municipal Borough of Dagenham. Prior to the significant expansion of London 
under the 1963 Act, both Municipal Boroughs lay in Essex. All of the Metropolitan Borough of 
Barking would go into the London Borough of Barking (the ‘and Dagenham’ would come in 1980) 
except for Beckton, a small corner of land between the Thames and the Roding, which would go 
to the London Borough of Newham. The bulk of the Metropolitan Borough of Dagenham would go 
to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, with the northern end of Chadwell Heath ward 
going to the London Borough of Redbridge (London Government Act 1963).  
 
29 Passed in 1963, with ‘shadow elections’ to the new London Boroughs in 1964 and full effect in 1965, the 
Act abolished the London County Council (LCC) and established in its place the Greater London Council 
(GLC). The GLC had much wider boundaries than the LCC; what is now Barking and Dagenham had been 
outside the easternmost edge of the LCC area, while now it is ten miles inside the M25 London Orbital 
Motorway. 
30 Municipal Boroughs are one of the many types of local government setup that have faded into history. 
175 
The expansion of the political boundaries of London recapitulates much of the history of Barking 
and Dagenham. In the aftermath of the Second World War, rebuilding and urbanisation led 
London to expand such that the government had to act to recognise the development of a rural 
or quasi-rural area31 into part of the metropolis. The area also began to industrialise. The largest 
employer in the area for generations was the Ford Motor Company; its rise and fall would chart 
the fortunes of the borough. Although Dagenham Ford was founded in the thirties, it was from 
the sixties that it achieved particular prominence. Indeed, the sewing machinists’ strike of 1968 
would be given by Barbara Castle as one of the drivers for the Equal Pay Act 1970 (Castle 
1993:409), and the pay negotiations of 1978 lay partially behind the Winter of Discontent. For 
various reasons, the Dagenham plant would go into decline, with investment by Ford going to 
other European sites. 
At the turn of the Millennium, the factory would receive the blow of the end of carmaking. 
Although enginemaking would continue, the last Fiesta would be produced in 2002 (BBC News 
2002). Thousands would lose their jobs. More than just the headline figure, these jobs were well-
paid, skilled jobs that provided stability and standing in the community.  
Barking and Dagenham is one of the poorest local government areas in the country, with the 
most social problems, sitting in the second decile on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (Ministry 
of Housing, Communities & Local Government 2019). The population grew from just under 
164,000 at the 2001 census to just under 186,000 at the 2011 census, an increase of approximately 
thirteen per cent (London Borough of Barking and Dagenham 2014). This was not just 
immigration from outside the UK; people moving from central London to an area of relatively 
cheap housing had a particular effect in making accommodation expensive for locals (Cruddas 
2018). 
Political situation 
The London Borough of Barking and Dagenham is one of thirty-two municipal areas within the 
Greater London Authority. As a London Borough, Barking and Dagenham is responsible for a 
broad range of services, from education and trading standards to recycling and tax collection. 
Some services, such as fire and policing, are administered by the Mayor of London; the most 
important of these is transport, though this is often done, particularly in the case of buses, in 
concert with the council. 
 
31 The massive Becontree estate of nearly three thousand houses was the forerunner of the urbanisation of 
the eastern fringe of London, and started the process that led to the expansion of London, but it should be 
remembered that, although built by the LCC, it was a cottage estate; the nearest modern equivalent might 
be a garden city. 
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Politically, Barking and Dagenham is very much a Labour area. The council consists of fifty-one 
members, elected from seventeen wards, three from each ward. Labour is not just dominant, but 
hegemonic. Not a single councillor was elected from any party other than Labour at the 2010, 
2014, and 2018 polls. Even in the shock 2006 results, more than two-thirds of the seats were won 
by Labour councillors. This can be seen in table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: councillors elected in the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham by party, 1998-2018 
Year Labour Con LibDem CHRA BNP UKIP Green Ind 
1998 47 0 1 3 - - - - 
2002 42 2 3 4 - - 0 0 
2006 36 2 0 0 12 0 0 1 
2010 51 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 
2014 51 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 
2018 51 0 - - 0 - - 0 
 
‘CHRA’ is the Chadwell Heath Residents Association. A dash indicates that the party did not contest the elections. 
Parties that never had a councillor elected are not included.  
Data from London Borough of Barking and Dagenham (2019) 
For the Greater London Assembly, Barking and Dagenham is in the City and East constituency, 
along with the City of London and the London Boroughs of Newham and Tower Hamlets. It has 
returned a Labour member at every election since its foundation in 2000. 
Barking and Dagenham is represented in the Westminster Parliament with two constituencies. 
Barking constituency occupies the middle and west of the borough, while Dagenham and 
Rainham constituency covers the eastern and northern part of the borough and extends into the 
neighbouring London Borough of Havering. Until boundary changes in 2010, the latter 
constituency was simply ‘Dagenham’. Dagenham is a solidly red constituency; it has only ever 
returned Labour MPs, and did so from 1987 to 2010 with more than fifty per cent share of the 
vote. The MP since 2001 has been Jon Cruddas. Barking is evenly more solidly Labour. It too has 
only ever elected Labour MPs and did so with more than half of votes cast for the Labour 
candidate in every election since its creation in 1945, except 1983, 1987, and 2005. The MP since 
1994 has been the Rt. Hon. Dame Margaret Hodge. 
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The Labour Party typically organises itself around Westminster constituencies. Thus, the two 
parts of the borough have separate Labour parties, albeit with arrangements to co-ordinate 
campaigning for local elections (Labour Party 2019). This gives further scope for the separation 
between the Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism campaigns, with each one co-operating 
more with one of the Constituency Labour Parties. 
The BNP in Barking and Dagenham 
The National Front had a history of relative success in East London generally, and Barking and 
Dagenham in particular. Despite concerns about London becoming too multicultural for its 
messages to have purchase, the British National Party did continue to work in the area. The 
pattern is of growth over time before the breakthrough of 2006. 
Two parliamentary by-elections were held in Barking and Dagenham on 9th June 1994, one in 
each Westminster seat. Both were won by the Labour candidates - Margaret Hodge in Barking 
and Judith Church in Dagenham - albeit with reduced majorities due to very low turnouts. In 
Dagenham, John Tyndall, the veteran fascist, received over 1,500 votes for the British National 
Party. On a low turnout of thirty-seven per cent, this meant that, for the first time in two 
decades, the British National Party retained its deposit. The new United Kingdom Independence 
Party would receive just over two per cent of the vote in Dagenham. The British National Party 
did not contest the Barking seat, but the National Front received almost three per cent of the 
vote, while UKIP received just over two per cent (Boothroyd nd).  
The BNP would remain on the ballot paper for the 1997, 2001, and 2005 general elections in both 
Barking and Dagenham and would increase both its total number of votes and share of vote on 
each occasion. This can be seen in table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2: votes for the British National Party at General Elections in Barking and Dagenham, 1997-2005 
 Barking Dagenham 
 Votes Share (%) Votes Share (%) 
1997 894 2.7 900 2.5 
2001 1,606 6.4 1,378 5.0 
2005 3,211 11.1 2,870 9.3 
 
Data from Boothroyd nd 
The British National Party did not contest any constituencies at the 2000 or 2004 London 
Assembly elections, but did receive 2.9% and then 4.8% share of the vote on the London-wide list. 
The BNP contested a single constituency, City and East, which included Barking and Dagenham, 
at the 2008 elections and received almost ten per cent of the vote, and 5.3% on the London-wide 
list (Greater London Authority, 2014).  
By 2004, the British National Party was contesting local by-elections. At the Valence by-election 
in July of that year, it would come second with almost a third of all votes cast. It would win the 
Goresbrook by-election in September 2004 with an absolute majority of votes cast, and would 
again come second with around a third of the vote at the Becontree and Goresbrook by-elections 
in 2005. 
This campaigning was not limited to election times, and as described above, focussed on 
presenting the British National Party as a realistic option that would address the issues facing 
people in Barking and Dagenham. 
The 2006 local elections 
At the 2006 elections to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council, the British 
National Party went from not having contested the previous elections to winning twelve seats 
and receiving eight and a half thousand votes, representing 17.2% of all votes cast, despite not 
standing in every ward.  
The reasons why a voter might choose to place their metaphorical pebble in the urn of a far right 
party are covered extensively in the literature and are discussed in the review of the literature in 
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this thesis, and so are only briefly touched upon here. However, there are a few features of this 
specific time and place, and particular manifestations of it that are not covered and which bear 
consideration. These had already started to manifest in the increasing electoral success indicated 
immediately above. 
The Labour government that came to power under Tony Blair was very different to previous 
socialist governments in the UK; indeed, the party had deliberately rebranded itself as ‘New 
Labour’ and was appealing to the middle classes whose support it felt it needed to win an 
election, while not worrying about traditional Labour voters - the white working class - on the 
basis they had ‘nowhere else to go’ (Rhodes 2011b). Immigration remained a top concern for the 
general public, with the majority of people in the UK wanting a reduction in immigration (Ipsos 
MORI 2017).  
Both Margaret Hodge and Jon Cruddas reported speaking to senior officials at Number Ten to 
raise the increasing dissatisfaction amongst such voters and the risk of the far right capitalising 
on that dissatisfaction, but were unable to secure action from Downing Street (Cruddas 2018, 
Hodge 2018). This perception was particularly present in Barking and Dagenham, with a specific 
concern that people moving into the area were crowding out indigenes from services, in 
particular housing, and that black and minority ethnic communities were being prioritised for 
council housing, (Hodge 2018; Rhodes 2011a).  
Barking and Dagenham council was not held in high regard by its residents (Goodwin 2008), and 
at times considered to be outright untrustworthy (Wood and Fowlie 2010). Added to this was that 
the local Labour Party was effectively sclerotic. Its overwhelmingly strong position meant that it 
had to do very little work to see its candidates elected; this phenomenon was not limited to 
Barking and Dagenham, but was part of a familiar pattern in Labour’s strongholds (Hazel Blears, 
quoted in Rhodes 2011a:103). The effect of this can be summed up in the stereotypical voter’s 
complaint of, ‘we only see you at election time’: there was little communication between the local 
party and the local population, and so less understanding of the issues facing that community 
and, crucially, a missed opportunity to build up a relationship of trust between citizen and 
political party.  
The British National Party was able to build on its history in East London - both recent and 
extending further back - to deploy its local style of campaigning in an area it knew well and 
which was as likely as anywhere to be receptive to it (Cruddas 2018). In short, there was a perfect 
storm of a close-knit community (Goodwin 2008), particularly vulnerable to the local politics of 
the BNP, seeing dramatic change with little confidence in the ability of national or local 
government to address their grievances. The BNP would capitalise on this, pushing racialised 
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concerns to the fore - as it had in Tower Hamlets in the 1993 by-election - as well as presenting 
itself as a party able to deal with the banal concerns of everyday life (Wilks-Heeg 2009). The BNP 
imported organisers from outside the borough to campaign and run for election there (Cruddas 
2018). Coupled with the fallout from the substantial reduction in employment at the Dagenham 
Ford plant, the British National Party was able to present Barking and Dagenham as an area and a 
people forgotten by the elites that could be saved with a vote to shake things up. 
Unite Against Fascism in Barking and Hope not Hate in 
Dagenham 
Aims 
Both Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism regard their campaigns in Barking and Dagenham 
and the removal of the British National Party from the council as amongst their greatest 
successes (Lowles 2014; Unite Against Fascism 2018). The manner of campaigning for both groups 
was archetypical of their respective styles as described above. Both organised campaign days of 
action, when large numbers of volunteers would come to the area. 
For both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate, the headline aim was simple: convince as 
many people as possible to vote for a party other than the British National Party. Both the 
general election and the local elections were conducted on the first past the post system. Seats 
were not to be allocated proportionately or with any preference system. With the British 
National Party’s aim being simply to be first past the post – or, more precisely, one of the first 
three past the post as each ward returned three councillors – any vote that did not go to them 
could be seen as a victory. Hope not Hate had a second aim; as well as encouraging people to vote 
against the BNP, they would seek to ‘suppress the BNP vote’ (Lowles 2014:158). 
Beneath this headline aim, there were particular goals for Hope not Hate. Because of access to 
private polling conducted by the Rt Hon Margaret Hodge MP, Hope not Hate did not estimate 
Nick Griffin as having any substantial chance of winning the parliamentary constituency of 
Barking and so its focus was on the local council elections (Lowles 2014). ‘Our initial objective was 
to keep the far-right party below the 26 seats it needed to win control of the council’ (Lowles 
2014:151). Activity would therefore be focused on the seats where the BNP either had sitting 
councillors or could pick up more. 
Unite Against Fascism did not have such a view; it would campaign against the BNP across 
Barking. The stated aim of Unite Against Fascism was to increase voter turnout to dilute any vote 
for the far right (Copsey and Macklin 2011:134; Unite Against Fascism 2018). This aim was to be 
achieved through a variety of means: rallies, protests, concerts, carnivals, leafleting (Unite 
181 
Against Fascism 2018). The importance of working with local people was emphasised by Unite 
Against Fascism (Unite Against Fascism 2018). However, this aim appears to have been more 
aspiration than achievement, with Unite Against Fascism themselves acknowledging that their 
inspiration were national campaigns and that localisation was secondary (Unite Against Fascism 
2018). 
As discussed above, there is a close relationship between the Socialist Workers Party and Unite 
Against Fascism. It is possible that, because of that relationship, Unite Against Fascism had 
subsidiary aims in its campaigning, including increasing the profile of the Socialist Workers 
Party, gaining more supporters, and raising money. However, there is no evidence of this and, 
were it the case, it is unlikely that representatives of the Socialist Workers Party would be 
advertising the fact. Moreover, the aims of Unite Against Fascism do align with those of the 
Socialist Workers Party even without any ulterior motive; fascism is seen as a particular threat by 
the hard left and visibly, volubly opposing fascism has become part of its DNA. The particular 
threat perceived by the hard left to itself from fascism dates back, as set out in the fourth 
chapter, to the inter-war years, as does the interplay of activity between them. Indeed, fascism 
does hold particular opprobrium for the hard left (Payne 1996). The activity of Unite Against 
Fascism could have been gauged to advance the Socialist Workers Party, but it seems at least as 
likely that its campaigns in Barking were the latest iteration of an ever-evolving repertoire of 
contention that dates back as long as the clashes between fascists and anti-fascists, if not longer.  
While the Socialist Workers Party promoted Unite Against Fascism events and while there was 
certainly crossover in terms of senior personnel between the two organisations, the SWP did not 
take a public role in the campaign. Indeed, this would have made for a very uncomfortable 
relationship with the Labour Party. 
Activities 
Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism were both very active in the London Borough of 
Barking and Dagenham in the weeks leading up to the 2010 elections. However, these activities 
differed in a number of ways, including the messages they sent, who these messages were 
targeted to and how they were targeted, and other activities in the area. 
Firstly, the messaging in the literature of the two parties was different. The essential difference 
between Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism’s messages and the tone of those messages was 
between voting against something or voting for something. Indeed, that notion of voting for 
something was encapsulated in the very name of one of the organisations: Hope not Hate. The 
name, and the genesis of the campaign under Searchlight, come from experiences in Burnley and 
Oldham around 2004 and research carried out for the organization that suggested even voters 
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hostile to the BNP were put off by very negative messages (Lowles 2014). Future campaigns would 
still criticize the BNP and highlight what Hope not Hate thought a BNP-led council would mean, 
but would also focus on positive changes in the area where they were campaigning, realities 
around multiculturalism and the like (Lowles 2014). Private polling from the Rt Hon Margaret 
Hodge MP and made available to Hope not Hate suggested that Nick Griffin was very much more 
unpopular than the local BNP (Lowles 2014). In any depiction of the local BNP, therefore, Hope 
not Hate emphasized the figure of Nick Griffin to reinforce the connection in voters’ minds 
between the party and its leader. The BNP would still be taken to task for its racist views, but in a 
less aggressive manner than Unite Against Fascism, as detailed below. 
Crucially, Hope not Hate were willing to ‘acknowledge some of the real grievances in the 
community which weren’t race based but [had] become racialized because of the activities of the 
far right’ (Cruddas 2018) such as housing and employment, fitting in with their localized 
approach to campaigning. For instance, Hope not Hate promoted in one of their tabloid-style 
newspapers a successful campaign that included a petition organized by Jon Cruddas MP to 
prevent the opening of a prison in the area (Lowles 2014). This approach would be criticized for 
potentially confusing a simple message and for giving ground to the BNP (Hodge 2018). 
Unite Against Fascism’s messaging was much more direct. They would specifically and repeatedly 
brand the British National Party as Nazis based on their history, past statements, and 
connections to other parties in Europe (Unite Against Fascism 2018) as can be seen in figure 7.1. 
The connection with the Holocaust and the death of millions of Jews was made explicit (Hodge 
2018). While local issues were acknowledged as important, a consistent national message of 
opposition to the BNP and to the fascism they represented was held to be more important (UAF 
2018). Indeed, Copsey suggests that the Hodge campaign had concerns over the UAF’s ‘hysterical 
language’ (Copsey 2017:213). 
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Figure 7.1: a leaflet delivered by Unite Against Fascism in January 2010. Attention is drawn to the graphic imagery 
Source: The Becontree Collection 
 
There is a further difference in messaging. UAF broadly maintained a consistent tone, and 
delivered leaflets widely across the borough and the campaign (UAF iv). Hope not Hate took a 
different approach, with more tailored messaging. As well as delivering leaflets, Hope not Hate 
printed three tabloid-style newspapers, setting out a much broader range of messages than a 
leaflet, including emphasizing local community leaders and the positive aspects of the area, as 
well as highlighting problems with the BNP and their leader. These were also felt to more likely 
to be kept and read than a leaflet through the letterbox (Lowles 2014).  
These were then supplemented by publications targeted at segments of the population. By using 
the electoral register, which lists dates of birth and with educated guessing about names, the 
population of the constituency was effectively segmented. This allowed a Unison-funded booklet 
to go to all women in the Borough, with a prominent female newspaper columnist and a local 
teachers’ leader writing for it. Specific leaflets were also delivered to Sikh, Muslim, Hindu, and 
Black voters, based on names. A leaflet with an open letter from a decorated World War Two 
veteran was delivered to pensioners, and a tailored leaflet was delivered to those who had only 
recently reached majority and so were voting for the first time. A leaflet was designed for the 
largest mosque in the area, and posters were put up at local churches. Shortly before election 
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day, ward-specific leaflets were delivered highlighting the inactivity of BNP councillors in those 
wards. (Lowles 2014) as can be seen in figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2: materials distributed by Hope not Hate. Attention is drawn to the columnists and positive messages under 
the masthead of the newspaper 
Source: Lowles 2014 p.163 
 
This represented a substantial amount of work for both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate. 
When large amounts of material had to be delivered, both would organize a ‘day of action’ – a 
specific day, promoted widely to supporters, when people were encouraged to come from outside 
the area to join the campaign (Lowles 2014; Unite Against Fascism 2018). Both organisations had 
set up offices in the area – UAF in Barking and Hope not Hate in Dagenham, and both had staff to 
manage their campaigns (Unite Against Fascism 2018; Lowles 2014). 
On the day of the election, both Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate engaged in the time-
honoured process of ‘knocking up’ – visiting voters who had pledged to vote to make sure they 
would actually go to the polling station.  
This illustrates a further difference between the two organisations. The Hope not Hate campaign 
was active in Barking and Dagenham well before Unite Against Fascism, with its ‘anti-fascist 
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fortnight’ of campaigns as early as March 2007 (Copsey 2017). Searchlight – then still the parent 
organization for the Hope not Hate campaign – set up a local group, Barking and Dagenham 
Together in 2006, distributing fifty thousand tabloid-style newspapers under that banner 
(Cruddas 2006). Meanwhile, the Unite Against Fascism website records no activities in Barking 
between 2006 and 200932. Hope not Hate would work with a local organization, Barking and 
Dagenham Together, to guide its activities in the area (Lowles 2014). By the end of 2009, Hope not 
Hate was establishing a voter ID operation in co-operation with the Barking and Dagenham 
Council for Voluntary Service (Copsey 2017).33 Voter ID is the process of asking voters in advance 
of an election how they intend to vote and if they intend to vote so that, on election day, 
campaigners can ‘knock up’, or remind voters to actually go to the polling station. This process of 
knocking up, at least for Hope not Hate, was fundamentally similar to that for the Labour Party 
discussed below, with the aim of encouraging two groups. The first group is those who would 
definitely go to the polls, and could be persuaded to vote against the BNP; the second is those 
who would definitely vote against the BNP, but were not sure they would go to the polling 
station.  
Unite Against Fascism would also canvass in this way, but were much more closely integrated 
with Barking Constituency Labour Party (Hodge 2018). While the aims of Labour and Unite 
Against Fascism were clearly very similar – in practice, for the BNP to lose a seat meant for 
Labour to win a seat – they were not precisely the same; Labour had a longer-term, institutional 
aim. While UAF campaigners would not specifically endorse a Labour vote, ‘Labour people were 
alongside us [who] would say “Vote Labour”’ (Unite Against Fascism 2018). Crucially, the data 
would be held by Barking Constituency Labour Party. Unite Against Fascism could therefore get 
out the vote on election day, but without being able to manage the targeting itself. Unite Against 
Fascism were also, with Barking Constituency Labour Party, doorknocking before election day 
(Hodge 2018) to talk to voters, very much in line with a new campaigning strategy undertaken by 
Margaret Hodge that is discussed below. 
Unite Against Fascism would also hold more visible demonstrations and protests (Hodge 2018; 
Unite Against Fascism 2018) outside tube and train stations and other prominent locations, while 
Love Music Hate Racism – allied to Unite Against Fascism much in the way that Rock Against 
 
32 As can be seen at http://uaf.org.uk/page/6/?s=barking. 
33 Copsey lists this as ‘Barking and Dagenham Council Voluntary Services’, but this may be an error. 
Councils for Voluntary Service are charities, generally set up on local government boundaries, that help 
co-ordinate other charitable and voluntary activities. While they are likely to have a relationship with local 
government, they are not formally part of it.  
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Racism was allied to the Anti-Nazi League in the seventies – organized concerts in Barking 
(Socialist Worker 2010). 
Both organisations saw Barking and Dagenham as a key battleground where there was a real risk 
of the British National Party making further gains, and used figures from popular culture to try 
to attract campaigners, notably the singer Ms Dynamite in the case of Unite Against Fascism and 
the spoken word poet Scroobius Pip for Hope not Hate. 
Relations with other groups 
As has been set out, there were close relations between Hope not Hate and Dagenham 
Constituency Labour Party and its MP, Jon Cruddas, and between Unite Against Fascism, Barking 
Constituency Labour Party, and its MP, the Rt Hon Dame Margaret Hodge. This is not to say there 
were not relations between Hope not Hate and the Barking side of the borough, and between the 
Dagenham side and Unite Against Fascism. Indeed, as has been noted, Margaret Hodge made 
private polling available to Hope not Hate (Lowles 2017) and there were meetings between Jon 
Cruddas and Weyman Bennett of Unite Against Fascism (Cruddas 2018). 
Although there was an existing relationship between Nick Lowles of Hope not Hate and Jon 
Cruddas MP (Cruddas 2018) and the Hope not Hate office in Dagenham was located in the same 
building as Jon Cruddas’ campaign office, Hope not Hate are at pains to separate themselves from 
Labour, saying that ‘on no occasion did we [Hope not Hate] actively campaign on its [the Labour 
Party’s] behalf’ (Lowles 2017:163), while, for his part, Cruddas describes Hope not Hate as having 
been independent of him and the Labour Party, but that he was supportive of their work 
(Cruddas 2018). 
However, Hope not Hate and Dagenham Constituency Labour Party were manifestly aware of 
what each other were doing.. If nothing else, by focusing their campaign on the British National 
Party, Hope not Hate relieved Dagenham Constituency Labour Party of this task, allowing them to 
focus on getting out their own messages for their candidates (Lowles 2017). 
Ironically, given the connection between it and the Socialist Workers Party, it was Unite Against 
Fascism that had a closer relationship with the Labour Party, specifically the Rt Hon Margaret 
Hodge MP and Barking Constituency Labour Party. Unite Against Fascism would campaign and 
knock on doors with Margaret Hodge and Barking Constituency Labour Party (Hodge 2018) in 
addition to their own activities, and were willing to take some direction over the content of 
materials (Copsey 2017).  
One of the largest impacts of the relationships between Hope not Hate, Unite Against Fascism, 
and the Labour Party may have been in effectively choosing the geographies in which they 
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campaigned. Hope not Hate already had a relationship to Dagenham Constituency Labour Party 
through Jon Cruddas (Cruddas 2018), and did not want to work with Margaret Hodge (Hodge 
2018). They therefore focused on the Dagenham side. Unite Against Fascism fundamentally 
disagreed with Hope not Hate on messages and dealing with ‘sensitive’ issues, and would 
gravitate to the other part of the Borough when campaigning there, and so develop a relationship 
with Margaret Hodge and Barking Constituency Labour Party. 
The relationship between Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism and religious groups in 
Barking and Dagenham was essentially twofold. Firstly, they would allow both groups to contact 
their parishioners, whether through posters, emails, or directly addressing the congregations 
(Lowles 2017; Unite Against Fascism 2018). Given the antipathy of the British National Party 
towards Muslims, the support of the main mosque in Barking, Al Madina, is unsurprising. Its wide 
catchment area meant that Hope not Hate would distribute leaflets there, despite being outside 
the area it focused on (Lowles 2017). Many of the churches in Barking and Dagenham cater to the 
Black communities, and the Church of England had made clear its distaste for the British National 
Party (Press Association 2009), and so were seen as likely being effective places to find people 
who could be encouraged to turn out to vote against the BNP. This is in addition to any doctrinal 
or theological opposition that the religious groups may have had. Secondly, volunteers for 
campaigning would also come from the religious organisations (Unite Against Fascism 2018), and 
they would assist in identifying ethnic minority voters from the electoral rolls (Lowles 2017). 
Trades unions were also a source of volunteers; particularly for days of action, local trade union 
branches, especially in London, would encourage their members to travel to Barking and 
Dagenham to campaign with Hope not Hate or Unite Against Fascism. They would also be sources 
of funding, both generally for the organisations and for specific activities; for instance, the leaflet 
targeted at women produced by Hope not Hate was funded by UNISON (Lowles 2014). Trade 
unions were also an easy way to identify local people who were likely to be supportive of the 
campaigns, particularly in writing for the Hope not Hate tabloid-style newspapers; Lowles (2014) 
identifies a local NUT official in particular as having done this. 
However, neither the available written accounts of the campaigns nor the interviews conducted 
for this study suggest that the unions took a particular role in determining messages or campaign 
strategies. Rather, they supported the broad approach of Hope not Hate or of Unite Against 
Fascism, according to their own internal politics. In particular, the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union34 would support Unite Against Fascism activities in Barking, while the General 
 
34 Now part of Unite. 
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Manufacturers and Boilermakers Union would concentrate on Hope not Hate and Dagenham, 
although some, such as the National Union of Teachers, would support both (Cruddas 2018). 
Individual trades union activists and trade union branches, through the local trades union 
council, tended to work with whichever organization was operating in their area (Cruddas 2018). 
There were also groups set up specifically because of the BNP’s success in 2006. Many of these 
groups faded away and have left little evidence of their activity. However, two bear commenting 
on. These are Barking Says No which, at Margaret Hodge’s instigation (Copsey 2017), Unite 
Against Fascism worked with. Searchlight established a group, Barking and Dagenham Together 
(Cruddas 2006), which the Hope not Hate campaign worked with. In the latter case, this 
relationship went back to shortly after the 2006 elections, and seems to have involved Hope not 
Hate better understanding the area – a hallmark of their approach – and forming links in the 
community, rather than direct campaigning (Lowles 2017). Barking Says No produced its own 
leaflets, and these were delivered by Unite Against Fascism activists (Unite Against Fascism 2010) 
It seems reasonable to presume that this relationship was mutual, and that Barking Says No 
would also deliver Unite Against Fascism leaflets. Either way, it appears that it was principally a 
sort of clearing-house for various local groups to get involved in the campaign against the BNP. 
In short, Hope not Hate appears to have had a sophisticated and long-lasting approach to its 
campaign in Dagenham, based on an understanding of what messages would work for that 
specific area, and groups within that area. Unite Against Fascism had a simpler theory of the case, 
based on reinforcing the message that the British National Party were Nazis. Unite Against 
Fascism came to the area later in the day, and appear to have engaged with Margaret Hodge and 
Barking Constituency Labour Party, integrating themselves into their campaign, as much as 
anything for want of alternatives, while putting out their messaging that specifically highlighted 
the extremist roots and connections of the British National Party as a whole.  
Hope not Hate’s actions can be seen as speaking to the literature in three ways. Firstly, it has 
some effect on the supply side of the equation. Mudde (2007) suggests cultural context under this 
heading, while Minkenberg (2001) adds party convergence. By changing the narrative around 
immigration, Hope not Hate shifts the cultural context. It can also open up a space for other 
parties to make positive campaigns, reducing the perceived effects of party convergence. 
More importantly, however, is that Hope not Hate are operating clearly in the meso level (Mudde 
2007). There is a strong emphasis on local connections and local issues, with publications 
targeted to engage with difficult issues, using celebrities as part of the effort. The actions of Hope 
not Hate speak directly to the meso level, which relates to how people form their opinions of the 
world around them. 
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As with other social movements, Hope not Hate has a repertoire of contention (Tilly 2006). It is, 
perhaps, unusual in that it is more intelligence- and research- led than others (though both of 
those are based on its history). Its leadership’s use of online tools meant that it could adapt it 
more quickly than other groups. Nevertheless, it sought out worthy people to promote its 
messages; set out the unity of the people in the community supporting the message; and 
demonstrated numbers and commitment by repeated, prolonged presence; it engaged in a WUNC 
display (Tilly 2006). 
Unite Against Fascism is much more clearly a classic social movement (Tilly 2006), for good and 
for ill. It had a time-honoured repertoire that it understood and that it knew would draw people, 
and stuck to it. However, it may inadvertently have shifted the political opportunity structures 
(Tarrow 1995) in the area. Because, in addition to its usual activity, it worked closely with Barking 
Constituency Labour Party, it effectively boosted the latter’s ability to campaign effectively and 
reach potentially disconnected voters. 
The 2010 elections 
The results of the 2010 elections were a serious reverse for the British National Party, losing all of 
its councillors elected in 2006. The Labour Party won every seat on the Council. The British 
National Party actually increased its total number of votes, though this can be attributed to 
running thirty-four candidates across all seventeen wards in 2010, as opposed to twelve 
candidates across seven wards in 2006. Its share of the vote across the entire borough barely 
changed, but was distributed across the whole borough instead of concentrated in a few wards. 
There are a number of challenges in gauging the effect of activity by the two opposition groups 
on the particular wards. 
Principally, consistency and intensity of action are calculated on local authority boundaries 
rather than ward boundaries on the basis that the effect of campaigning is not limited to such a 
small area. If, for instance, a street stall is held in a town centre, campaigners will not only be 
speaking to people who live in the ward that contains the town centre, but to everyone passing 
through. Mutatis mutandis, a demonstration or concert will attract more people from the 
surrounding areas than from far away.  
Making a turnout comparison is also difficult because the elections are not the same; the 2006 
local elections did not take place at the same time as any other elections. In Barking and 
Dagenham, there were no other elections of any sort. The 2010 local elections took place on the 
same day as a general election; unsurprisingly, turnout at these elections was very much higher, 
at sixty-two per cent, than the thirty-eight per cent London average at the 2006 elections 
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(Greater London Authority 2010). For Barking and Dagenham, turnout rose from just over thirty-
eight to just over sixty per cent (London Borough of Barking and Dagenham 2019). 
However, comparison can be made between wards in Barking constituency and wards in 
Dagenham constituency, and wards where the BNP had councillors returned with wards where 
the far right party did not win any seats to determine any effect. 
Turnout was higher in every ward that did not elect a BNP councillor in 2006 than those that did, 
with the exception of Eastbrook ward. 
Manifestly, turnout increased. However, the increase in turnout was not uniform, and three 
particular trends can be distinguished. Firstly, as seen in chart 7.1, turnout was higher in every 
ward across the borough in 2010 than in 2006. Secondly, with the exception of Eastbrook ward, 
the increase in turnout from 2006 to 2010 was greater in wards that had not been contested by 
the BNP in 2006 than in those wards the BNP had not contested, as can also be seen in chart 7.1. 
Again with the exception of Eastbrook ward, the third trend that can be identified is that the 
increase in turnout from 2006 to 2010 was greater in those  wards that did not elect BNP 
councillors in 2006 than in those that did. 
Eastbrook ward is effectively divided into two along a north-west to south-east axis by an 
extensive set of green areas - Central Park, Eastbrookend Park, and the Chase Nature Reserve - 
with the larger, north-eastern part being geographically and socio-economically closer to the 
London Borough of Havering than the rest of Barking and Dagenham across multiple measures, 
from ethnic makeup to life expectancy to type of housing (Greater London Authority 2017). This 
may account for its apparently anomalous position. 
It could be that the particular factors that led to the BNP contesting those wards in the first 
place, or led to them winning those wards, covary with turnout. However, the BNP struggled to 
find sufficient candidates and could not stand the maximum of three in each ward. It may also be 
that the particular factors that led the BNP to choose those wards to contest make them more 
resistant to general trends that increase turnout or less likely to be affected by the specific style 
of campaigning used by Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism. Given the findings of the 
statistical analyses above, an application of Occam’s Razor would suggest that the activities of 
Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism were simply not particularly effective in driving up 
turnout in those wards. 
Chart 7.1: Change in turnout for elections to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council 2006-2010 by BNP 




Chart 7.2: Change in turnout for elections to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council 2006-2010 by 
constituency. Data from Greater London Authority (2010) 
Valence and Alibon wards were formerly in Dagenham constituency but moved to Barking at the 
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Fifth Periodic Review of Westminster Constituencies. The changes were published in 2007, and 
took effect at the 2010 general election (The Parliamentary Constituencies (England) Order 2007) 
While there is a slight bias towards greater increases in turnout in wards in Dagenham, there is 
not sufficient evidence to conclude that there was a greater increase in turnout in Hope not 
Hate’s principal area of operations than in Unite Against Fascism’s, or vice versa, as shown in 
chart 7.2.  
Had Hope not Hate or Unite Against Fascism or both had particular effects on the British National 
Party through their chosen method of diluting the vote by increasing turnout, differential 
increases in turnout would have been observed, either between ‘BNP wards’ and ‘non-BNP 
wards’, or between the Barking side of the borough and the Dagenham side. 
What, then, might explain why the BNP went from nowhere to being the official opposition to 
nowhere in the space of fifteen hundred days? 
Political change in Barking and Dagenham 
A series of changes took place in and affecting Barking and Dagenham from 2006 to 2010. They 
are set out below as national, local, and internal to the BNP. 
National level 
Two potential factors for the precipitous decline in the BNP’s fortunes sit at the national level. 
One is, simply, that a general election took place at the same time. This would, irrespective of 
anything else, increase turnout, which would hamper the British National Party and any other 
minority party. 
The second is the passage of time: the national political environment in 2010 was different from 
2006. This ranges from perceptions of the national parties and their leaders to what concerned 
people in politics at the time. In 2006, the Labour Party under Tony Blair had won a third general 
election in a row, and the Conservatives under Michael Howard had run a campaign hostile to 
immigration. By 2010, the Labour Party was on the cusp of defeat, and the Conservative Party had 
a new leader, David Cameron, who had set about detoxifying the party’s brand. Attitudes to 
immigrants were warming (European Social Survey 2006-14). 
Labour in Barking and Dagenham 
These are, of course, national changes. There were also changes specific to Barking and 
Dagenham; one accidental, two quite deliberate. 
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The first, accidental change is simply the effect of increased immigration to the area. Voters’ 
mores do not dramatically change in a short period of time simply from a geographical 
translocation, and immigration to the area included immigration, as is described above, from 
within the UK and from within London. This demographic change would likely effect a change in 
the aggregate values and, so, voting behaviour of the population.  
The second change is in the activities of the Labour Party in the area. The British National Party’s 
electoral success was a wake-up call to two Constituency Labour Parties that had become 
accustomed to easy victories. 
In the case of Dagenham (now Dagenham and Rainham) Constituency Labour Party, there was a 
substantial increase in the traditional Labour style of campaigning, with contact rates – the share 
of the electorate that had been spoken to by a Labour campaigner – reaching seventy per cent, 
coupled with experimentation in different forms of voter engagement (Cruddas 2018). 
The changes in campaigning in Barking were more substantial. The sitting MP, Dame Margaret 
Hodge, initiated an ambitious programme of voter engagement after the 2006 local elections. 
These involved coffee mornings with people who had voted in at least one of the previous three 
elections of any level, and were an opportunity for two-way communication between voters and 
politician. Hodge herself estimates the numbers involved to be in the thousands (Hodge 2018). 
There was also a revitalisation of the local party, with changes in leadership and councillors to 
better reflect the community in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity (Copsey 2012), occasioned by 
the demonstrated threat of the BNP’s electoral breakthrough, and a consequent increase in 
campaigning and therefore contact with the community (Hodge 2018). Voter contact rates went 
from six per cent to sixty-two per cent in four years (Copsey 2012). Voter contact rates are a key 
metric for campaigning; the simple number is how many electors the party has spoken to within 
in a given electoral circumscription. Each political party has a variation on how this is conducted, 
but for Labour it involves asking a set of questions to gauge each person’s propensity to vote for 
the party. This is combined with information from the marked register – a copy of the electoral 
roll indicating who actually voted35 made available to political parties – in the Contact Creator 
database to give an indication of where effort can be most effectively spent for elections (Labour 
Party 2019a). The tenfold increase in the voter contact rate indicates not only that Barking 
Constituency Labour Party was having conversations with and so gaining data on voters, but was 
capable of organizing volunteers to have tens of thousands of such interactions. 
 
35 But not, of course, how they voted. 
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There was also an increase in co-operation between the Dagenham and Barking constituency 
Labour parties over time, although this came towards the end of the 2006 to 2010 cycle as 
elections loomed and continued thereafter (Hodge 2018; Cruddas 2018). In both Barking and 
Dagenham, the threat of the British National Party was an effective way of mobilising people to 
vote if they did not always make the trip to the polling station, particularly amongst black and 
minority ethnic communities. 
The Council 
As Wilks-Heeg (2009) argues, the fortunes of the British National Party are tied to the fortunes of 
local democracy. Many of the issues on which the BNP campaigns are local or are presented 
through a local lens, capitalizing on disaffection and disconnection. 
The election of the BNP councillors in 2006 was an unignorable warning that the situation in 
Barking and Dagenham was dire. Although the Borough could not make substantial changes to 
what it did – local government finance was and remains tight – and would likely argue that it was 
doing the right things, it did accept that it had a problem with perceptions. Indeed, the chief 
executive of the Council would admit ‘a fundamental mismatch between the traditional style of 
council communications … and our residents’ world view’ (Whiteman 2010). 
This mismatch between ‘aspirational’ (Whiteman 2010) messages and people’s perceptions would 
be toxic in Barking and Dagenham. The British National Party would exploit these perceptions, 
including to the point of outright lying to people on the doorstep (John et al 2006). The result is 
highlighted by a response from a focus group participant:  
‘I know for a fact, and I’m sure we all know, that most of the asylum seekers that live in 
our boroughs or near where we live, they’ve been allocated property and it’s council 
property at that’ (John et al 2006:25). 
This widely-held perception typified attitudes towards the council, even though it did not accord 
with reality. 
The Council recognized that these myths existed, but its efforts to challenge these perceptions 
may have even made the situation worse, with its messaging being marked as propaganda from a 
distant and disconnected bureaucracy (Whiteman 2010). Direct challenges to these myths from 
the Council would not work as they would essentially be using factual arguments to deal with 
‘what is fundamentally an emotional response’ (Wood and Fowlie 2010:295). That the messages 
were coming from a distrusted organization would have worsened this. 
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The Council set about dealing with this failure of communication and the myths it had created 
and engendered in partnership with an external organization, The Campaign Company, to 
redevelop its communications strategy. The new strategy would be based on social marketing, or 
‘the application of commercial marketing approaches to achieve behavioural change for 
individual or social good’ (Wood and Fowlie 2010:293). In simpler terms, attention would be paid 
to how messages were communicated and who was communicating them as well as the content of 
the messages. 
This process began with an extensive consultation process, speaking to thousands of residents, in 
a variety of settings (Whiteman 2010) that would detail residents’ outlook and values as ‘based on 
traditionalism, social conservativism and fear of threats’ (The Campaign Company nd). Moreover, 
rapid changes in the area meant that residents favoured very local sources of information, and 
were distrustful of ‘outsider input’ (The Campaign Company nd). The British National Party 
under Nick Griffin had tried to present itself as concerned with ‘security, freedom, identity, [and] 
democracy’ (Copsey and Macklin 2011a:63) as more acceptable versions of its traditional 
concerns. In essence, the BNP took concerns latent in the community and presented them in a 
manner intended to convince voters to choose British National Party candidates and to accept 
British National Party messages. 
In order to provide residents with trusted, local sources of information, the Council recruited 
local influencers – members of parent-teacher associations and residents’ associations, (Local 
Government Association 2019), hairdressers, owners of pubs and shops (The Campaign Company 
nd) – to work with them to provide accurate information about what was going on in the 
Borough, as well as breaking down myths (Wood and Fowlie 2010). Instead of a message coming 
from the distrusted Council, it would be coming from a local, friendly face. This made it more 
likely that the messages would be taken on board and believed, and that counter narratives from 
the British National Party would be disbelieved. 
An extensive staff training programme was also undertaken. The aim of the programme was to 
give Council employees who would be interacting with the public the skills to listen, empathise, 
and present Council perspectives in a manner that was more likely to be taken on board by 
residents. This would reach over one thousand staff, from benefits officers to librarians to street 
sweepers (Wood and Fowlie 2010).  
In common with most local councils in the United Kingdom, the London Borough of Barking and 
Dagenham produced a regular newsletter. As part of the changes in communications, this went 
from being a glossy, monthly magazine to a fortnightly tabloid. (Whiteman 2010). It was 
rebranded from the Barking and Dagenham Citizen to simply The News. As well as the usual council 
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information, the newspaper included perspectives from local people, and took a more 
conversational tone. It even included games and puzzles as part of the effort to make people 
actually read the publication.  
As part of the communication strategy, the Council built a set of clear messages that could be 
easily and effectively communicated (Whiteman 2010) built around four themes – safety, fairness, 
respect, and togetherness (Wood and Fowlie 2010). These themes paralleled the themes used by 
the BNP, but portrayed in a positive light, showing what the council was actually doing.  
This process lasted until 2009 but, in short, the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham went 
from being ‘remote and disengaged’ (Copsey 2012) to being sufficiently competent and engaged 
with its residents to win the maximum four stars in the Audit Commission’s Comprehensive 
Performance Assessments in 2010 (London Borough of Barking and Dagenham 2009). From the 
point of view of the ordinary resident, people they trusted in the community were putting a more 
positive complexion on the Council’s activities, their interactions with Council employees 
suggested that they were being listened to, and information was being presented in a manner 
perceived as more straightforward. The grievances that the BNP had exploited were still there, 
but the narratives around them changed; instead of the Council telling people how well it was 
doing, it was acknowledging challenges and making a show of listening.  
There were other initiatives, including from the national government, such as the Connecting 
Communities initiative launched by Labour MP and minister John Denham that were widely 
regarded as being a response to the BNP’s success in Barking and Dagenham and elsewhere 
(Travis 2009). There is also anecdotal evidence that funding to services in Barking and Dagenham 
and to projects aimed at improving community cohesion there increased (Hodge 2018; Cruddas 
2018). This could suggest that there is an instrumental advantage to voting for the British 
National Party in extra funding brought to an area as a result (Cruddas 2018; Hodge 2018).  
The BNP 
Finally, there are factors specific and internal to the British National Party. One is the apparently 
ever-present problem for the far right (and far left) of splits and internal divisions. The British 
National Party is a secretive organisation by nature, but statements by Nick Griffin in 2007 
addressing the charge that ‘the Griffin clique makes the BNP unelectable’ (British National Party 
2007), and the formation in 2008 of a new far right organisation, Voice of Change, by members 
expelled from the BNP in 2007 (Voice of Change 2008) suggest that the party was far from united 
and operating towards a common goal on a common programme. 
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Moreover, key activists were selected for their commitment to the cause and ideological purity, 
rather than more mundane but perhaps more important organisational skills (Rhodes 2011a). 
Internal criticism was stifled, meaning that discontent within the ranks of the British National 
Party was more likely to blow up into disengagement from activism. The appearance of Nick 
Griffin on Question Time, and his admission that he did not know what was going on in Stoke-on-
Trent when the local leader resigned (Copsey 2012), and a series of other missteps hindered the 
party’s intention of becoming a durable political force. 
Despite their efforts to present themselves as a trustworthy party, they were still seen as ‘racist … 
and deceitful’ (John et al. 2006:12). Part of the motivation for voting for the British National Party 
was a ‘kick up the backside’ for the establishment (John et al. 2006:12). Once the metaphorical 
boot had been applied to the state’s posterior, and after there was a definite and pronounced 
change in the way local government in the area approached its citizens, the need for a cri de cœur 
manifested in a vote for a far right party faded, and the British National Party failed to capitalise 
on the opportunity that the 2006 breakthrough had presented it.  
Discussion 
A number of threads can be drawn out from the developments in Barking and Dagenham from 
2006 to 2010. 
It has been argued throughout this study that Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism can be 
understood as social movements and, as such, have a campaign, a repertoire of actions, and 
engage in displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC) (Tilly 2006:52). There 
is considerable evidence to support this position from the study of Barking and Dagenham, 
particularly in the case of Unite Against Fascism.  
Unite Against Fascism clearly engaged in WUNC displays with its demonstrations in Barking and 
Dagenham. At least some of its work with Barking Constituency Labour Party, in leafleting, can 
also be seen as a WUNC display, albeit a slightly inchoate one. Where the classic formulation of 
the social movement has the state as its target, and the later formulations allowed for other 
bodies as targets, this particular instance of a social movement was seeking to make claims – 
specifically, that the BNP was a Nazi party that should be voted against – to individual voters. As 
such, doorstep conversations and leaflets through the letterbox can demonstrate commitment; 
the knowledge that this is being done across an area can demonstrate numbers and unity; and 
supportive statements from popular figures demonstrate worthiness. As noted in the review of 
the literature, worthiness is in the eye of the beholder, and while the presence of Ms Dynamite at 
an event might well be appealing to a younger audience, it would likely not be as impactful for 
senior citizens. It may also be that Unite Against Fascism’s engagement with Barking 
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Constituency Labour Party was prompted by the absence of an established repertoire for the 
specific purposes of an election campaign. 
Hope not Hate is a slightly different case. It eschews the protests and marches of Unite Against 
Fascism. However, its messaging also sought to establish worthiness – for instance, by having a 
veteran support their campaign – to demonstrate commitment through its frequency, and to 
demonstrate unity and numbers by delivering across an area, again with voters as targets rather 
than a state or corporation. 
By understanding Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism as social movements, we can also 
understand why they cleaved to tactics that appear not to have been effective. These tactics 
represent part of their repertoire of contention (Tilly 2003). The parts of a repertoire of 
contention change but slowly; to move faster would risk alienating supporters who are familiar 
with and used to those tactics. Hope not Hate did try new ways of gaining supporters through 
online means in its collaboration with Blue State Digital amongst other innovations. However, it 
fundamentally remained of the view that a campaign of leafletting, albeit a sophisticated one, 
would work.  
This can also help explain the relatively limited effects found in the quantitative analysis. Unite 
Against Fascism and, to a lesser extent, Hope not Hate were taking campaigns based on social 
movements and applying them to circumstances where they did not fit. The techniques and 
tactics in the repertoires of left-wing groups, dating back to the inter-war period, were simply 
not calibrated for electoral activity. 
One of the key avenues for the far right to do well is, under the broad heading of supply (Kitschelt 
and McGann 1995), the nature of political opportunity structures (Tarrow 1995; Eatwell 2018), 
and particularly local political opportunity structures (Kestilä and Söderlund 2007). The British 
National Party were able to adopt a local style of campaigning because the main, almost 
hegemonic, party in the area, Labour, had become complacent. Contacts between the party and 
the electorate were few, and Labour was not, in essence, engaged in the community. By 2010, 
both of the two local Labour parties in the area had overhauled their activity, both in frequency 
and in style. In doing this, the political opportunity structures that had been open for the BNP in 
2006 were closed by 2010. 
Finally, the experience of Barking and Dagenham validates Mudde’s (2007) emphasis on the 
importance of the meso level. The meso level – sitting between micro level factors such as 
individual attitudes and macro level factors such as the unemployment rate – is how individuals 
gain their understanding of the world around them, through organisations, friends, and family. 
When the BNP’s councillors were elected in 2006, information was being spread and shaped by a 
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populace that was on the defensive and mistrustful of the local council. By the time of their 
defeat in 2010, the entire structure of communications from the local council had been 
overhauled, such that the dynamics of the meso level had fundamentally shifted. If the BNP had 
earlier been able to exploit the disconnection of the council and the disengagement of Labour to 
create a localised, anti-immigrant culture (Dinas et al 2016) to set those attitudes, later on the 
activities of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council at least started to break that 
process. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the particular circumstances of the London Borough of Barking and 
Dagenham from 2006 to 2010 in order to explain the relative lack of impact of the activities of 
Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism. In doing this, it has provided an overview of the 
political situation in the borough and its immediate political history, as well as looking at both 
the stated aims of Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate and what they actually did. The case 
was chosen because it provides, both theoretically and in the opposition groups’ own assessment, 
the scenario most likely to yield results. It has done this by looking for gross and differential 
effects on turnout, again because both theory and the organisations suggest this is what to look 
for. 
Not finding any convincing evidence for effects from the activities of Hope not Hate and Unite 
Against Fascism of enough substance to account for the British National Party’s electoral decline, 
this chapter then proceeded to determine other factors that could have either reduced the 
absolute number of votes cast for the British National Party or increased turnout in other ways to 
reduce their relative share of vote. It found that changes in political activity by the two local 
Labour parties and a major change in communications from the Borough itself were likely to 
have increased turnout for Labour and decreased satisfaction, and so votes for the BNP, 
respectively. There are also national-level changes that further reinforce this pattern. 
The 2006 elections brought a great deal of attention to the area; this led to substantial changes in 
the political environment of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham by the time of the 
2010 elections. These factors were then explained in terms of the literature on social movements 
and far right parties.  
Ultimately, the reason for the British National Party’s failure in 2010 may be its success in 2006. 
‘There was a view that it was ‘safe’ to vote BNP and they [voters] ‘knew’ that the BNP could only 
win a few seats, not a majority’ (John et al. 2006:12). 2006 showed that the BNP was a real threat 





Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
‘I am glad you are here with me. Here at the end of all things, Sam.’ 
-J.R.R. Tolkien, The Return of the King 
Introduction 
This thesis has set out a question, explained the literature to date around that question, set out 
how it may be analysed, provided history and context on the groups in play, and analysed them 
quantitatively and qualitatively. This concluding chapter sets out the key findings of the research 
conducted. It then discusses the interpretation of those results and their implications. It then 
covers the limitations of this study and how it could be extended in future. Finally, it answers the 
question asked at the beginning of this thesis: did it matter? 
Key findings 
In the introduction of this study, three questions were asked. 
What is the nature of the opposition groups, measured by their strategies and tactics? 
 What are the effects of these opposition groups? 
 What are the explanations for any effects? 
In answer to the first question, the opposition groups are social movements  that engage in a 
variety of tactics to hamper the electoral progress of far right parties. The principal method by 
which this is asserted to work is by increasing turnout amongst non-far right voters in order to 
dilute the relative importance of such votes as there are for far right parties (Lowles 2014; Unite 
Against Fascism 2018). In general, Unite Against Fascism is more confrontational in that it will 
stage counter-marches and counter-demonstrations and engage more directly with the far right 
parties and other organisations it opposes. Unite Against Fascism has more of a focus on 
interrupting the activities of the groups it opposes. Its pattern of activity tends to be intense 
rather than consistent. Hope not Hate is connected to a broad, information-gathering network 
that gives it insight into particular communities. Its publications are generally highly localised in 
content, and its pattern of activity is consistent rather than intense. Rather than confronting the 
opposition, it seeks to build a community that will oppose far right parties. Both groups have 
particular links to the Labour Party and the trades unions.  
In answer to the second question, the effects of these groups are relatively limited. Consistency of 
action by both groups, where a given area is host to activity regularly over a period of time, is 
associated with a reduction in the vote for the far right parties. Intensity of action - that is to say, 
a relatively large amount of activity in a given period of time - by both groups is, 
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counterintuitively, associated with an increase in the vote for far right parties. Unite Against 
Fascism appears to have greater effects, in both directions, than Hope Not Hate. 
In answer to the third question, the reduction in vote for far right parties is caused by 
encouraging people who do not vote to go to the polls to register a vote against the far right 
parties, or by convincing people who have previously voted for far right parties not to do so 
again. The limited power of this effect is due, in the case of the British National Party, both to 
multiple other institutions also taking actions that impact the vote for the party and to the 
inability of the party, for internal reasons, to capitalise on such bridgeheads as it can make. In 
the case of the United Kingdom Independence Party, the ‘ground war’ campaigning of the 
opposition groups is simply swamped by the ‘air war’ campaigning of the party. The broad trends 
of national politics will outweigh local trends. 
In chapter three, a set of expectations was laid out. These were: 
That Hope not Hate would have a negative effect on the BNP’s vote; 
 That Hope not Hate would have no effect on UKIP’s vote; 
 That Unite Against Fascism would have no effect on the BNP’s vote; 
 That Unite Against Fascism would have a positive effect on UKIP’s vote; 
 That consistency of action would have a negative effect on the BNP’s vote; 
 That consistency of action would have no effect on UKIP’s vote; 
 That intensity of action would have no effect on the BNP’s vote; 
 That intensity of action would have a positive effect on UKIP’s vote. 
Hope not Hate does indeed, in general, have a negative effect on the British National’s Party - but 
only sometimes, and only on some measures; there is also indication that intensity of action by 
Hope not Hate does help the BNP. Hope Not Hate actually has similar effects on UKIP to those it 
has on the BNP, rather than no effect. Unite Against Fascism does, in fact, have an effect on the 
British National Party, contrary to predictions, but that effect can be in either direction 
depending on the pattern of activity. Unite Against Fascism does increase UKIP’s vote but, again, 
only in certain circumstances; consistent activity reduces it. Consistency and intensity of action 
have broadly the same effects on the BNP and on UKIP in that consistency of action depresses 
their vote while intensity of action increases it. 
The results of the quantitative analysis both inform and are built on by the case study of Barking 
and Dagenham. Because of the particularities of UKIP in its support base being broad, rather than 
concentrated as in the case of the BNP, and because UKIP was not seen by the opposition groups 
as a particular threat and so did not take substantial action against them, the case study focuses 
on the BNP. The case study is the best case scenario for finding an effect from Unite Against 
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Fascism and Hope not Hate. Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism were active in Barking and 
Dagenham before the precipitous decline in the BNP’s fortunes; the two opposition groups would 
claim responsibility for the BNP’s woes. However, it reveals that there are a number of other 
changes that took place in Barking and Dagenham, not least in how the Council communicated 
with its residents, that explain the decline in vote for the BNP, rather than the activities of the 
opposition groups..  
The long continuation of tactics, perhaps considered time-honoured by the respective opposition 
groups, suggests that both UAF and Hope not Hate can be understood as social movements (Tilly 
2006) that are engaged in, broadly, contentious politics (Tarrow 2011). As well as explaining the 
persistence of those tactics, with only slow innovation – their repertoires of contention – 
understanding the opposition groups as social movements helps to explain their different levels 
of effectiveness. Both are engaged in WUNC displays (Tilly 2006), but it appears that Hope not 
Hate’s WUNC displays are more effective; indeed, UAF appears to actually be counter-productive 
at times. This could be because they are mistargeted, or because, for instance, who UAF consider 
‘worthy’ does not match who those who must be convinced consider ‘worthy’.  
The measures of consistency and intensity developed by Ellinas and Lamprianou (2019) find 
considerable utility in this research, suggesting that the different ways of counting incidents are 
meaningful. That consistency and intensity of action have such different results also speaks to 
the manner in which Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism have effect at the meso level in 
shaping how ordinary voters understand and interpret the world around them (Goodwin 2009; 
Eatwell 2003) and in reinforcing or challenging local political opportunity structures (Tarrow 
2011). 
Interpretation 
Effects are greater on UKIP than on the BNP. Explaining this definitively would require work with 
individual voters, but there is an obvious conclusion to draw: BNP voters are stickier. Voting for 
UKIP is more socially acceptable than voting for the BNP. This can be seen in the simple fact of 
UKIP’s greater electoral success, or in the howls of outrage at Nick Griffin’s appearance on the 
BBC’s Question Time compared with Nigel Farage’s multiple visits to the programme. There is 
therefore more inertia to be overcome before a voter will opt for the British National Party. Once 
the step has been taken to vote for the British National Party, it may be that a Rubicon has been 
crossed; the inertia that kept a voters from voting for the British National Party will thereafter 
keep them voting for the British National Party. The consistent absolute shares of votes in, for 
instance, Barking and Dagenham suggest there may be inertia in remaining as a BNP voter. UKIP 
voters are, therefore, more likely to be swayable.  
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The broad patterns of votes, share of vote, and relative change in share of vote for the British 
National Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party, particularly in response to 
opposition group activity, suggest that there may be significant commonalities between them. 
The information and intelligence based campaigning of Hope not Hate may be more effective in 
identifying where to campaign to best effect, but its campaigning is not unique. The style of 
campaigning may, in fact, be efficacious but there are other institutions, including parts of the 
state, undertaking similar activities to similar outcomes, albeit without the explicit anti-far right 
leitmotif. Where Hope not Hate are effectively drowned out by similar activity on a much larger 
scale, Unite Against Fascism stand out because their protests are eye-catching and attention-
grabbing, even if on a small scale compared to work undertaken by, say, a London Borough. This 
means that, for good and for ill, their activities are more impactful, in both directions, than that 
of Hope not Hate. 
An implicit question in this research is as to why Hope not Hate and Unite Against Fascism 
campaign as they do. In both cases, their history provides a guide to their presents. Unite Against 
Fascism places itself in the long tradition of more militant anti-fascism (Olechnowicz 2010). Its 
history and its shared memory is Cable Street and Lewisham; it is disrupting far right meetings 
and preventing fascist marches. It is bashing the fash.  
Hope not Hate is the dirk to Unite Against Fascism’s cudgel. Hope not Hate’s history, through 
Searchlight, is in gathering, disseminating, and using information. It is the work of the long 
watches of the night; of quiet, patient toil. The use of voter ID and, now, online campaigning is 
the latest iteration of this process. 
These are part of their respective ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly 2004). There are two other 
aspects to a social movement, per Tilly. The claim is that the far right is particularly ‘bad’, in 
morality, in policy, and in result. The final part of Tilly’s triad is, of course, the WUNC display: 
worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. These manifest in slightly different ways - protests 
and marches versus days of action, dealing with ‘difficult issues’, coming together in small groups 
across the country regularly or in large groups less frequently - but nonetheless allow the use of 
this lens. While Tilly’s characterisation effectively describes the organisations under study, it 
does not guarantee their success. 
The rise and fall of the British National Party in the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham 
has been held out in the literature (Lowles 2010)and directly to the author (Unite Against Fascism 
2018; Rosenberg 2018)  as a signal example of how opposition can stop the far right. Another 
conclusion appears more likely. People became more used to immigrants in the area. Economic 
conditions improved. Government, both local and national, paid more attention to factors that 
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drove people to vote for the far right. The BNP councillors that were elected were often lazy and 
incompetent (Ford 2010). More than anything, the disgust at seeing a fascist party nearly in 
charge of their neighbourhood drove people who would otherwise not go to the polls to vote. 
Turnout increased most in areas that had not had a BNP candidate, which are the relatively less 
deprived and more affluent parts of the borough. It seems at least plausible that the threat of the 
BNP was an effective tool for Labour campaigners, and the revulsion of fascism drove people to 
the polls in the nicer parts of the borough. 
If the vote for the BNP in Barking and Dagenham was a cri de cœur, it was the fact that it was 
answered, rather than that people were told to complain in a different way, that caused the BNP 
to fall away.  
Implications 
This has potential implications for how the opposition groups studied, or, indeed, others might 
operate. There are two key implications. Firstly, groups seeking to oppose far right parties at 
elections should engage with an area consistently, over months and years rather than days and 
weeks. Such groups should also be wary of over-saturating an area in a short period of time, as 
this can actually have the opposite effect to what is intended. Secondly, groups that want to stop 
far right parties doing well might be better off investing their efforts in convincing government, 
at all levels, to engage in work that enhances community cohesion and, most importantly, 
changes the way that the state communicates with the citizen. Lobbying or otherwise 
encouraging councils in areas at risk of the far right doing well to adopt communications 
strategies based on social marketing, similar to the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, 
would be a clear option, although the specifics would vary according to each area. This could be 
extended to the national level, through influencers on social media, or holding up the print and 
broadcast media to scrutiny for stories that are felt to give a jaundiced view of a given policy 
issue, either by the specific content or by repeated focus on that issue. The apparent importance 
of the meso level would suggest that online influencers, who are likely to be trusted by their 
followers, would be important allies. 
Given that Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate have effects in the same direction for 
intensity and consistency, it would appear that the precise messaging is less important than the 
manner in which it is delivered, as would be expected from the apparent success of the 
aforementioned social marketing strategy. That is not to rule out testing, perhaps through focus 
groups, of particular messages, but it is the manner of their delivery rather than their content 
which has effect. 
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If formed as a recommendation, for Unite Against Fascism, it would be to continue with distinct 
messaging, but to better choose which areas to work in and to show commitment to those areas. 
That would likely mean less eye-catching protests, but more leafleting, to undercut the counter-
narrative and impression of stereotypical, liberal, metropolitan elites flying into an area and 
flying out. More formally, it would mean preferring consistency of action to intensity of action. 
Areas for campaigning should be chosen based on the social and economic factors that are likely 
to drive votes for far right parties, rather than being in a city centre, otherwise easily accessible, 
or being a large venue. They would have to be visited repeatedly. Recruiting of local notables 
would aid in this. 
For Hope not Hate, it would be to seek distinctiveness of action. Its messaging and community-
building may be effective, but it does not stand out and cannot compete with other, much better-
funded institutions, including the state itself. To an extent, this is already happening, as it moves 
more into the online space as social and other online media have become more and more 
important. The effectiveness of that endeavour, though, is for another study. 
There are also a number of implications for the literature. Although crisis as a driver was felt to 
be nebulous, there is clear evidence to support a number of the factors that are included under it. 
Unemployment (Lubbers et al. 2002and immigration (Golder 2003) are seen to have impacts. 
These impacts are different on the different parties, supporting the widespread division between 
fascist and populist radical right parties in the literature (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2016). 
The cultural context (Mudde 2010) that shapes political and discursive opportunity structures as 
well as affecting issue salience is, manifestly, key; it is also not necessarily constant across a state, 
with very local issues being taken up by political parties and by opposition groups in their 
respective campaigns.  
A few areas of interest from this research remain understudied. The distinct effects of 
consistency of action and intensity of action validate the insights of Ellinas and Lamprianou 
(2019) that a simple count of activity is insufficient. This has implications for the broader field of 
protest event analysis (Hutter 2014); if a message is transmitted more effectively by an 
organisation that is or is perceived as being embedded in a community, account must be taken of 
this patterning. 
Unemployment, economic activity, and migration have impacts on votes for the far right, but the 
fact that changes in the levels, rather than the levels themselves, of immigration, unemployment, 
and economic activity seem relevant may speak to the perceptions people have of their situation 
(Dahl 2000) being as important as the reality. 
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The importance of looking at the meso level (Goodwin 2009; Eatwell 2000) is emphasised. The 
clear implication of this study is that explanations that sit between individual attitudes and 
overriding socio-economic and demographic trends are essential to explaining the electoral 
performance of the far right.  
Finally, this study speaks to the importance of the use of local data. As discussed, there is 
evidence that the meso level is very important in determining why people vote for far right 
parties. Moreover, the implicit assumption in using national level data that a single datum will 
effectively account for a country no matter the variations within it seems problematic. This has 
implications for a great deal of research on far right parties, but may also be applicable to other 
party families outside the mainstream, including the radical left and green movements. 
Limitations 
As with almost any effort in the social sciences, data is a problem. In an ideal world, allowance 
would be made for how the political parties conducted themselves; however, gaining reliable data 
on, let alone operationalising, the internal dynamics of a political party, while useful, would 
likely be an impossible task, particularly where the far right are concerned. It is also impossible 
to characterise how much activity took place at each incident recorded in the dataset. There is 
simply no record of how many people took part, or what precise activities they engaged in. These 
limitations, while regrettable and meaning that we do not have as broad a picture as might be 
desired, are unavoidable. 
This research looks at the specific effect on electoral performance in individual electoral 
circumscriptions on the basis that local activity will have local effects. However, what this 
research does not consider is the effect that local activity may have on the national conversation. 
It is possible that, particularly where there is media coverage, the individual, local activities 
taken together have an effect on how topics like the far right, race, and immigration are 
discussed and understood. It may even be possible, even if it would require considerable 
substantiation, that these national effects might negate or outweigh any particular local effect. 
As a hypothetical example, Unite Against Fascism might not have locally distinguishable effects 
at elections, but it might have a gross national effect that the methods used in the present study 
would not be able to identify.  
It is also possible that the actions of the opposition groups have publicity and force 
multiplication effects. The opposition groups may act, particularly if they have effective means of 
gathering information on where a far right party is likely to do well, as proverbial canaries in the 
coal mine, alerting other actors to where a problem is likely to develop. They may also act to 
bring attention to a particular area, effectively shaming local institutions, including organs of the 
208 
state, into action. This publicity may also act as a force multiplier for such institutions, bringing 
in extra funding, awareness, and other support. This is also not treated in the current study. 
A particular period in time is studied in this research. As is illustrated by Hope not Hate taking on 
Blue State Digital, one of the major changes in the political and social landscape of the last few 
years, and which was starting to happen at the end of the period in question, is the emergence of 
social media as a phenomenon. For all kinds of political actors, social media is important. For 
both smaller political parties and civil society organisations, it offers a cheap means of mass 
communication. The nature of social media can also have nationalising and localising effects. A 
message put out on social media can, if the publisher wishes, be seen by anyone. The gatekeepers 
of the print and broadcast media have been pushed aside. This has been capitalised upon, in the 
instance of the United Kingdom, by groups like Britain First36, and has provoked a response, with 
Hope not Hate now operating a YouTube channel, a podcast, and sharing memes to their 
Facebook and Twitter with a view to their going viral to spread an anti-racist and anti-fascist 
message. Social media has also revealed an increasing internationalisation of far right activity. 
While co-operation between far right parties is not new, the direct cross-pollination between 
members through videos shared on YouTube and the like is a novelty. Indeed, Hope Not Hate now 
has a section of its website and workstream dedicated to the far right in America because of its 
impacts in the UK. 
Perhaps of more interest, however, is that social media also offers remarkably precise targeting. 
Adverts can be shown to narrow geographical or interest audiences. For this to be most effective, 
though, requires an understanding of an area and data on voters to be effective. This means that, 
to capitalise on this potential, an organisation would need to be set up in a different way to the 
opposition groups studied herein, with different skills brought into the mix. 
Extensions 
This research could usefully be extended in several directions. 
The first would be to apply the methodology used here to other political campaigns to determine 
their effectiveness. However, groups that specifically set out to damage a political party’s 
electoral fortunes are unusual. Not least because of the restrictions of charities law in the United 
Kingdom, an organisation like the Campaign for Real Ale might have very strong feelings about 
which party offers the better policies on beer, but is unlikely to campaign against parties in this 
way. However, localised campaigns might affect how Members of Parliament vote and how local 
 
36 And, arguably, the Leave.EU campaign for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. 
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councils act. A particularly interesting case study might be Momentum, the left-wing pressure 
group around the Labour Party set up to support Jeremy Corbyn. A study could measure 
Momentum’s impact by looking at effects on Constituency Labour Parties; for instance, by the 
passing of motions on particular issues, or by public statements. Momentum also campaigns 
directly, as well as through seeking change in the Labour Party, and it would be possible to search 
for correlations between Momentum activity, particularly where they have a community 
organiser in place, and local support for given policies. In particular, Momentum has supported 
campaigns to support Labour parliamentary candidates to unseat Members of Parliament from 
other parties with small majorities, which could be a fruitful avenue for determining the effects 
of Momentum activity in having impacts on the public. 
The second, and perhaps more fruitful, extension would be to replicate this study on a Europe-
wide basis using the techniques of geolocating opposition activity. There are anti-racist and anti-
fascist groups that campaign against far right parties beyond the UK, such as Antifaschistisches 
Infoblatt of Germany, Expo of Sweden, and the broader Antifa movement. This could be done 
using data from EUROSTAT and European Parliament results to place the results in a 
transnational perspective. Belgium and Spain would be interesting case studies. The dynamic of 
relations between Flanders and Wallonia, including how far right groups mobilise based on that, 
would pose interesting challenges for groups opposed to the far right. The plurinational nature of 
Spain, coupled with the legacy of the Franco dictatorship, and now the desire among some for 
Catalonia to become independent set an interesting backdrop against which both fascist parties, 
such as those in the Spanish Identity coalition, and populist radical right parties, such as Vox, 
compete and in which opposition groups would have to operate. 
This study also emphasises that opposition groups are understudied. In particular, the process of 
change over time is unclear. The emergence of social media as a driving form of communication 
seems to have caused Hope not Hate to radically rethink its strategy, while Unite Against Fascism 
has largely carried on before, albeit with greater publicity online. Is this a case of seizing an 
opportunity, or being forced to change because what far right parties are doing has changed? 
This would require extensive, qualitative research, and could be compared with similar 
organisations in other countries. It may also be that studying far right groups other than parties, 
such as Generation Identity and the English Defence League, would shed further light on 
opposition groups.  
One of the leitmotifs of this study has been the importance of local level data. While there are 
challenges in using this data, this thesis has argued that it is both theoretically coherent and 
methodologically sound. The strong results on the ethnic, unemployment, and economic activity 
measures demonstrate that local effects matter, and that simply using national level data will 
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obscure this granular detail. Ethnicity and immigration could be explored in further detail, 
perhaps using census classifications. There are a host of suggested drivers for far right votes in 
the literature that could be analysed with local data. A particularly interesting option might be a 
comparison of two different media markets to determine the effect of local newspapers, 
television, and radio. It would be possible to use sub-national data to re-examine past conclusions 
about the effects of different socio-economic and demographic drivers on far right parties with a 
richer, finer detail that would better explain variation within states. For instance, Golder’s (2003) 
seminal study could relatively easily be replicated using local level data across the EU. 
Answering the question 
A question was asked at the start of this thesis about the effort spent by opposition groups to 
reduce voting for far right parties in Britain: did it matter? 
The short answer is ‘no’. Opposition from civil society groups that have as their raison d’etre the 
diminution of support for far right parties do not, in general, have substantive effects on votes 
for far right parties. There are specific circumstances in which they can have an effect, but they 
are both not the norm and sometimes actually counterproductive. That the efforts of the 
opposition groups can, at least in certain circumstances, have the opposite effect to what was 
intended clearly suggests that the patterning of activities needs changing to show more 
consistency and, thus, commitment to an area. However, even with such a change, the impact, 
given the time, effort, and resource invested, might be considered disappointing, and suggest 
that other forms of campaigning against the far right might be a better use of that time, effort, 
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